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VOLUME 29

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SUMMER 1985

Forum: Technology and Arms Control

Technological Progress, Strategic Weapons, and American Nuclear Policy — Bruce D. Berkowitz — 241

Balance and Counterbalance: Technology and the Arms Race — Kevin N. Lewis — 259

Obstacles and Optimism at Geneva — Adam M. Garfinkle — 268

Soviet Ballistic Missile Defense and NATO — David S. Yost — 281

The Soviet Succession Crisis and Its Aftermath — R. Judson Mitchell and Teresa Gee — 293

The Soviet Campaign Against INF: Strategy, Tactics, and Means — Alex R. Alexiev — 319

Southeast Asia and U.S. Global Strategy: Continuing Interests and Shifting Priorities — Richard K. Betts — 351

The Dawn of Real Communism: Problems of Comecon — Jan S. Prybyla — 387

The Impact of Defense Spending on Economic Performance: A Survey of Evidence and Problems — Steve Chan — 403

Selected Publications Received — 435

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forum

TECHNOLOGY AND ARMS CONTROL

The relationship between technology, arms racing, and arms control remains a controversial issue within the strategic community. Several questions have proved to be of particular concern: Must technological advance prove always to be destabilizing? Is it possible to limit or to control the process of technological innovation and discovery in the military area? Has the increasingly rapid pace of such innovation posed an insurmountable barrier to effective arms control? These and related issues are addressed in the current "ORBIS Forum." The contributors are **Bruce D. Berkowitz,** *currently a Visiting Fellow at the Brookings Institution;* **Kevin N. Lewis,** *a member of the professional staff of the Rand Corporation; and* **Adam M. Garfinkle,** *Research Associate and Coordinator of Political Studies at the Foreign Policy Research Institute.*

TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS, STRATEGIC WEAPONS, AND AMERICAN NUCLEAR POLICY*

by BRUCE D. BERKOWITZ

When strategic analysts discuss "new technology" today, they usually are referring to such futuristic systems as high-energy lasers and particle beams. Such weapons will certainly have profound effects on American policy, though most experts would agree that their deployment is at least ten to fifteen years away. In the meantime, other technological developments *currently* underway are calling into question many assumptions underlying U.S. strategic policy.

* Many thanks are due to B. J. Dombey, David Rosenberg, Henry S. Rowen, and Edward Teller for their comments during the writing of this paper. Research for this paper was supported by a National Fellowship from the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, and several grants from the Graduate School and College of Liberal Arts of the University of Minnesota.

The author was formerly an analyst with the Central Intelligence Agency and is currently an independent consultant. This material has been reviewed by the CIA to assist the author in eliminating classified material, if any. However, that review neither constitutes CIA authentification of the material as factual nor implies CIA endorsement of the author's views.

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Strategic weapons have grown steadily smaller and cheaper. As a result, these weapons are highly mobile, with each superpower able to deploy larger numbers of them. This trend has been in progress for almost two decades; submarines, for example, have always been mobile and, thus, difficult to locate and target. However, we are now at the point where *all* strategic weapons are inherently small and mobile. Thus, these weapons are difficult (if not impossible) to target or count.

This critical point in the process of technological evolution will require us to rethink the two most important themes underlying American strategic policy. One theme is arms control; the other is deterrence.

Since the Baruch Plan of the 1940s, the United States has advocated quantitative arms limitation agreements with the Soviet Union. However, soon quantitative limits on strategic arms will be infeasible. Given the size and mobility of contemporary strategic weapons, it will soon be impossible to verify such limitations through any method that the Soviet Union is likely to accept.

Similarly, from the time of the Kennedy administration, American leaders have supported policies for "flexible response" and "counterforce" targeting doctrines. Their purpose was to improve the stability of deterrence by defining a "middle option" for using strategic nuclear weapons: attacking only Soviet military targets and keeping civilian collateral damage to a minimum, in order to avoid provoking a massive, all-out Soviet counterstrike. As weapons have become smaller and more difficult to locate, however, they have also become more difficult to target. With the next generation of strategic weapons, counterforce strikes will become even less feasible.

In short, progress in the technology of strategic weapons is making current American policy obsolete. To keep the threat and the cost of a nuclear war to the lowest possible level, we need to rethink some of these policies and the assumptions on which they are based.

Progress in Strategic Weapons Design

Early strategic weapons systems were big, heavy, and expensive. As a result, these weapons were few in number and required either large airstrips (in the case of aircraft) or fixed launchers (in the case of missiles). Progress in the design of strategic weapons can be appreciated by comparing some of the earliest systems with those now being deployed. The Hiroshima atomic bomb, *Little Boy,* was ten feet long, two feet in diameter, and weighed 9,000 pounds. The bomb used on the Nagasaki mission, *Fat Man,* was even bigger — twelve feet long, five feet in diameter, and weighed 10,800 pounds. The airplane used to deliver these

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weapons was a modified B-29 equipped with a bomb rack originally designed for the British "blockbuster" bombs. Each aircraft could carry one weapon. To load the bomb into the airplane, it was necessary to lower the weapon into a pit dug into the airstrip tarmac; the aircraft was then parked over the pit, and the bomb was raised into the bomb bay using a special jack (this procedure was necessary in part because the early bombs were too big to fit under the airplane, and in part because there was some chance that the airplane would buckle under the strain of hoisting the bomb using conventional methods).[1]

From 1945 to 1950, the bulk of the American strategic force continued to consist of B-29s armed with Mk-3 atomic bombs, essentially the same system used on the Nagasaki mission. The main problem facing weapons designers during this period appears to have been developing a system that could reach the Soviet Union from the United States without refueling. In the first years of the Cold War, American planning for a general war anticipated the likely loss of the European mainland in a matter of weeks, and assumed a good probability of losing Britain, Morocco, and other bases necessary to staging attacks against the USSR using B-29s.[2]

This problem was not really solved until the B-36 was introduced into U.S. forces in 1949. A giant of an aircraft with six reciprocating engines, four turbojets, and a wingspan of 230 feet, the B-36 required a two-mile airstrip to become airborne. Nonetheless, the B-36 did fill the requirement for an intercontinental weapons system; flown on an optimal mission profile, the B-36 could complete a round-trip mission from North America to the Soviet Union nonstop.[3]

Today's strategic weapons systems are much less cumbersome. For perspective, consider the progress that has been made in reducing the size and increasing the efficiency of intercontinental ballistic

[1] Information on nuclear weapons design used in this article was taken from David A.Rosenberg, "American Atomic Strategy and the Hydrogen Bomb Decision," *Journal of American History,* June 1979, pp. 62–87; Rosenberg, "The Origins of Overkill," *International Security,* Spring 1983, pp. 3–69; Rosenberg, "A Smoking Radiating Ruin at the End of Two Hours," *International Security,* Winter 1981–82, pp. 3–38 (including documents); William M. Arkin, Thomas B. Cochran, and Milton M. Hoenig, "The U.S. Stockpile: Materials Production and New Weapons Requirements," *Arms Control Today,* April 1982, pp. 1–8; and Cochran, Arkin, and Hoenig, *Nuclear Weapons Databook, Vol I.: U.S. Nuclear Forces and Capabilities* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1984).

[2] For a reprint of the recently declassified official JCS history describing these plans, see Kenneth W. Condit, ed., *The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,* Vol. II (Wilmington, Del.: Michael Glazier, Inc., 1979), pp. 283–303.

[3] Ironically, the B-36 had originally been designed during World War II, when U.S. planners also faced the question of how to wage a strategic bombing campaign in Europe after the possible loss of British airfields; the B-36 was intended to be used against Germany in transatlantic conventional bombing missions if Britain fell to the Nazis and was lost as a staging base. The airplane's wartime development was slowed only after it became apparent that Germany would not be able to invade the British Islands. The B-36 had the capability to carry four 10,000 Mk-3 weapons or, alternatively, two 41,000-pound thermonuclear weapons.

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TABLE 1

Sizes and Performance of American ICBMs, 1959-1990

	Atlas	Titan II	Minuteman II	Minuteman III	MX	SICM
Weight (tons)	130	170	35	38	80	16
Length (feet)	82.5	104	60	60	71	38
Range (miles)	5,500	6,300	6,000	7,000	8,100	6,000
Throwweight (pounds)	2,000	8,275	1,625	1,975	8,000	1,100
Year Deployed	1958	1963	1966	1970	1986	1991, if adopted

missiles (ICBM) and cruise missiles (this comparison could also be made to show progress in bomber design, were it not for the fact that the latest American bomber, the B-1, represents mid-1960s technology and, thus, does not indicate the current state of the art; specifications for the Advanced Technology Bomber [ATB] remain classified).

As the tables show, a state-of-the-art intercontinental ballistic missile such as the Small Intercontinental Missile (SICM, or "Midgetman") weighs 88 percent less than the Atlas, and can still perform the same mission — delivering a medium-sized warhead to intercontinental ranges. Although the MX, currently being flight-tested, is quite large, it still represents a remarkable advancement in efficiency over weapons developed twenty years earlier; weighing less than half as much as the Titan II, it lifts roughly the same payload.[4]

TABLE 2

Sizes and Performance of American Cruise Missiles, 1950-1983

	Matador	GLCM
Weight (pounds)	13,800	3,200
Length (feet)	39.6	20.3
Wingspan (feet)	28.7	8.2
Range (miles)	600	2,000
Deployment (year)	1950	1983

[4] Indeed, the size of the MX appears to have been in part the result of an intentional political decision, to build a missile as large as the Soviet SS-19 and having the same number of warheads as

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Similarly, the Ground Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM), currently being deployed in NATO countries, performs roughly the same mission as the Matador; i.e., carrying a relatively small nuclear weapon from Western Europe to targets deep inside Warsaw Pact territory. Though the GLCM weighs 77 percent less than the Matador and is about half its size, it has even greater range.

The compactness and efficiency of the new weapons systems stem from several developments. First, modern nuclear weapons of a given yield are much smaller than their predecessors (see figure 1). For example, the Mk-5 fission warhead used in the Matador weighed 3,000 pounds and had a yield in the 20-30 kiloton (kt) range. The W84 warhead used in the GLCM, on the other hand, weighs only 271 pounds and has a yield in the 200 kt range. Part of the reduction is a result of the transition from fission to fusion weapons, but it must be remembered that there is more to the miniaturization of warheads. The Mk-17, for example, the first operational thermonuclear weapon, was twenty feet in length, five feet in diameter, and weighed more than twenty tons.

Several kinds of advancement in nuclear weapons design are behind the efficiency of modern warheads. Part of the efficiency has come in the form of improved implosion systems. The Mk-3 bomb, for example, used 5,000 pounds of high explosive for its implosion system. Modern weapons suffice with less than 2 percent of this charge. Other advancements include boosting (inserting tritium or lithium deuteride into the center of a fission device to increase its yield), better critical mass configurations, and more efficient auxiliary systems.

Also important to the miniaturization of modern strategic systems is the greater efficiency of both rocket and jet engines. The efficiency of solid rocket propellant roughly doubled between the 1960s and 1980s. The Trident C-4 missile is the same size and weight as the Poseidon C-3 that it replaces, even though the Trident carries the same payload twice the range. The SICM is half the size and weight of the Minuteman II, but it carries two-thirds the payload to the same range.

Similarly, compare the jet engine used in the Matador to the powerplant used in the GLCM. The Matador engine, the Allison J-33

the SS-18, this being a gesture toward American legislators demanding equal treatment with the Soviet Union under SALT II.

Data on weapons systems are taken from John M. Collins and Thomas Peter Glakas, *U.S./Soviet Military Balance, Statistical Trends, 1970–1981,* revised edition, (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 1982); Richard K. Betts, ed., *Cruise Missiles: Technology, Strategy, Politics* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1981); Susan H. Young and John W.R. Taylor, eds., "Gallery of USAF Weapons," *Air Force Magazine,* May 1983, *pp. 147–161;* Lawrence J. Cavaiola and Bonita J. Dombey, *Modernizing U.S. Strategic Offensive Forces: The Administration's Program and Alternatives,* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Budget Office, 1983); and Jonathan Medalia, *Small Single-Warhead Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles: Hardware, Issues, and Policy Choices,* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 1983).

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Figure 1
Weights and Yields of U.S. Strategic Warheads, 1945-1985



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(derived from the first American fighter aircraft, the P-80) weighed 1,600 pounds and generated 4,600 pounds of thrust, or 2.8 pounds of thrust per pound of engine. The powerplant used in the GLCM, the Williams F-107, weighs only 130 pounds and generates 600 pounds of thrust, or about 4.6 pounds of thrust per pound of engine. The F-107 uses less fuel than the J-33, so this, too, decreases the size of the missile.

Other advancements that have shrunk strategic weapons include miniaturized electronic components, improved aerodynamic designs, lightweight alloys, plastics, and high-density fuels. Moreover, the same technology that has enabled countries to deploy *smaller* strategic weapons has also enabled each country to deploy *more* strategic weapons.

Despite public concern over the cost of defense — much of which is well-founded — often unnoticed is that over the past two decades it has actually become *less* expensive to deliver a strategic warhead to a target. As figure 2 shows, U.S. expenditures on the design, procurement, and operation of strategic weapons have declined steadily since 1962. Yet, while this was occurring, the number of warheads deployed in the active U.S. strategic forces increased almost linearly.[5]

Several developments account for the decline in the cost of delivering a warhead. One reason was the simple accumulation of weapons; i.e., strategic weapons do not have to be replaced and discarded each year, so many of the warheads deployed this year will remain operational next year. However, part of the decline in cost-per-deliverable-warhead was a result of technological advancements. The development of multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV) technology, for example, enabled the United States to deploy multiple warheads on individual delivery systems. Improved missile and aircraft production methods were another contribution. In addition, many modern weapons (e.g., solid fuel rockets, modern bombers) require less maintenance and fewer operators.[6]

Strategic forces currently tend to be quite cheap, at least in comparison with other defense spending and the defense budget as a

[5] These data do not reflect the costs of the nuclear warheads themselves, as these are included in the budget of the Department of Energy. However, the cost of warheads is relatively small in comparison to the costs of procuring, deploying, and operating the weapons system itself.

[6] For example, the B-36 carried a fifteen-man crew; the B-52 carries a six-man crew; and the B-1B will carry a four-man crew. Some readers may suggest that the decline in strategic weapons expenditures is only a result of the discontinuation of the ICBM silo construction, limits on the SSBN force, etc. by the United States during the 1960s. This probably accounts for some of the decline, but it must be remembered that U.S. silos and SSBN tubes required extensive modification to accept later-generation missiles. Also, while the strategic expenditures were falling, the U.S. embarked on an impressive number of new strategic programs, including the Minuteman II and III; the Poseidon and Trident SLBMs; a ballistic missile defense system; ALCMs and SLCMs; the B-1 and ATB aircraft; the MX; and the initial components of an ASAT system.

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

Figure 2
Strategic Warheads and Spending On
U.S. Strategic Forces, 1958-1984

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whole. Most of the defense budget is devoted to salaries, pensions, and other personnel costs. Strategic forces, though, are "capital-intensive" rather than "labor-intensive"; that is, they rely more on technology than on people.[7]

When it was possible to mount only one or two bombs into an expensive aircraft such as the B-36, the cost of strategic weapons limited the number of weapons that could be built and put into the field. With the development of relatively inexpensive systems like the GLCM, ALCM and, to a lesser extent, the SICM, costs are much less a constraint on the number of warheads that a country deploys.

As a result of the shrinking size of strategic weapons, a number of basing options, inconceivable twenty years ago, are now possible. For example, the SICM would be light enough to be deployed, if necessary, in an ordinary truck. Other basing modes for the SICM could include large airplanes and helicopters. Current plans call for basing the SICM in relatively large (thirty-ton) hardened transporters, but these plans are primarily the result of political decision rather than technological limits. The present administration has decided to confine SICMs to military reservations except during crises. This decision decreases the dispersion and increases the vulnerability of SICM transporters, requiring them to be more blast-resistant. Otherwise, the SICM launcher could be made much lighter.[8]

Similarly, GLCMs — and their cousins, Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles (SLCMs) and Air-Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCMs) — can be mounted on a wide variety of platforms. The current nuclear-armed SLCM can be launched from the torpedo tubes of almost any submarine in the U.S. inventory. Such missiles could also be deployed in large vans and in ordinary ships and airplanes. Thus, the main constraint on the operations of modern strategic weapons would seem to be the problem of maintaining adequate command and control.

The Soviet Union has been making similar progress in developing its own mobile strategic weapons. Though the Soviets appear to have lagged in the development of solid rocket propellant during the past two decades, current press reports indicate that they are now testing at least two modern, solid-fueled ICBMs. One, the SS-X-24, is roughly comparable in size and weight to the American MX. The other, the SS-X-25,

[7] The implication here is that strategic programs offer few opportunities for curing the current budget problems. Although estimates for programs such as the MX often near $35 billion, these are the costs that would be incurred over the entire life of the program. Annual costs are much lower. Consequently, even if the entire MX program were *eliminated,* the annual savings would be only $1 to $5 billion, reducing the current projected deficit by only 1 to 2 percent.

[8] For the policy rationale of the SICM and its current basing mode, see the *Report of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces,* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, April 1983).

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being flight-tested, is roughly comparable in size and weight to the proposed SICM.

Both new Soviet missiles appear to be capable of being based on some kind of mobile launcher. The SS-X-25 has been reported to use a road-mobile launcher similar to one currently used by the SS-20 intermediate range missile, and by the SS-20's sibling, the SS-16 ICBM. According to recent reports, the larger SS-X-24 will probably be deployed in fixed silos, but it might also be based in a mobile mode (the missiles could, for example, be loaded on railroad cars and moved between firing locations on rail tracks).[9]

The latest generation of Soviet cruise missiles includes the SS-NX-21, a cruise missile comparable to the American SLCM. Like the SLCM, the SS-NX-21 has about a 2,000-mile range and can be launched from a standard submarine torpedo tube. Presumably, the SS-NX-21, like its American counterparts, can also be deployed on trucks, airplanes, and other vehicles.[10]

This trend toward mobility and elusiveness of strategic weapons has not occurred suddenly; ballistic missile-firing submarines with these characteristics have been deployed by the Soviet Union since 1958 and by the United States since 1960. The point is that now *all* weapons can be small and mobile. It is also important to understand that this technology exists *today,* and that it will be impossible to "disinvent" the technology with any credibility. Therefore, the technology must be considered in American policy for arms control and deterrence.

Small Strategic Weapons and Arms Control

The modern generation of small weapons greatly complicates arms control negotiations. No American president is likely to agree to an arms control pact that requires major concessions — and risks — on the part of the United States unless Soviet compliance can be confirmed. Indeed, the SALT II debate of the summer of 1979 suggested that even if a president were to negotiate a difficult-to-verify treaty, he would face great difficulty in obtaining Senate ratification.

Similarly, the public's support of arms control is inextricably tied to its confidence in the ability of the United States to verify Soviet compliance. Most polls suggest that about four-fifths of Americans support

[9] See Lawrence J. Cavaiola and Bonita J. Dombey, *An Analysis of Strategic Arms Reduction and Modernization Proposals* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Budget Office, 1984), pp. 30-34. Also see U.S. Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power,* fourth edition, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985).

[10] See Joel Wit, "Soviet Cruise Missiles," *Survival,* January 1984, pp. 249-260; *Soviet Military Power;* and Betts, ed., *Cruise Missiles.*

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arms control agreements with the Soviet Union *in principle*. However, this support evaporates if the typical American believes that the Soviets could cheat on an agreement; when asked if they would support arms control if either side could cheat and gain an advantage, about four-fifths of those surveyed *opposed* an agreement.[11]

The degree to which an arms control agreement must lend itself to verification is a matter of acceptable risk. This, of course, is a political decision. However, it seems reasonable to assume that no treaty would be acceptable to the United States if either (a) the Soviets could easily hide their strategic weapons under the provisions of the treaty, while keeping them ready for use; or (b) the treaty permitted the Soviets to build a significant number of strategic weapons covertly.

Until now, it has been possible to define arms ceilings in terms of a particular measure — strategic weapons launchers. The inherent size and expense of strategic weapons (and, thus, their launchers) have made it possible for arms control negotiators to avoid these two problems (at least to the satisfaction of a sufficient portion of the American public). ICBMs have required large, fixed launchers, i.e., either silos or above-ground launching pads, that can be easily located and counted by satellite photography. Although the Soviets may have saved some of the missiles removed from operational launchers under SALT I and SALT II, it is unlikely that they would have been able to construct the required launching facilities for these weapons while evading detection by the United States. Similarly, the other strategic weapons systems in the American and Soviet arsenals, missile-launching submarines and bombers, were large enough that it was difficult to construct them while avoiding detection.

Because modern strategic weapons can be made small enough to be launched from many different kinds of ordinary vehicles, it will be difficult to determine the number of strategic launchers that each country has operational at a given time. Moreover, these smaller weapons tend to require simpler support systems; so, in many cases, it is possible to deploy the weapon and not worry about preparing a launcher at all. It may have been impossible to launch a large, liquid-fueled missile such as the Atlas (or its Soviet counterpart, the SS-7) without large, elaborate ground facilities, but firing off a modern, solid-fueled missile from primitive, unprepared sites is entirely feasible. Indeed, the U.S. Air Force

[11] For example, in May 1982, when CBS News and the *New York Times* asked if they supported a nuclear freeze, 79 percent said yes, 21 percent said no. However, when the respondents were asked if they would support a freeze in which either side could cheat without detection, 80 percent said no, and 20 percent said yes. Similarly, when the Gallup Poll and *Newsweek* asked people in March 1982 whether they thought verification or halting the growth of nuclear arms was more important, 73 percent gave the nod to verification, compared to only 27 percent for halting growth. See *Public Opinion*, August/September 1982, p. 39.

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has already conducted such launches in tests with its own Minuteman ICBM. Presumably the Soviets will be able to do the same as they develop comparable weapons. Though the "reserve missiles" argument waged by some individuals during the SALT II debates may have been spurious at the time, given the basing requirements of the previous generation of Soviet missiles, it will not be so in the future.

Because strategic weapons launchers are no longer an adequate unit of measure in an arms control agreement, *individual* strategic weapons must be counted instead. Unfortunately, construction of these weapons will be difficult to monitor. Even if American observers were permitted to visit designated plants, cruise missiles and (to a lesser extent) SICMs are small enough to be constructed in facilities that could be hidden.

The problem is further complicated because the new strategic systems are not much bigger than many tactical systems; in some cases strategic and tactical weapons systems are identical. Tactical cruise missiles and intermediate-range ballistic missiles could either be converted into strategic systems, or used as camouflage for their illegal production.

To some degree, the distinction between tactical and strategic weapons has always been illusory, as many so-called tactical weapons can be used by the United States against the Soviet Union and vice versa (many NATO fighter aircraft have the capability to reach the Soviet Union with nuclear weapons; the Soviet Tu-22M "Backfire" bomber can reach sections of the United States on one-way missions; and several nuclear-armed Soviet tactical naval cruise missiles have some capability against land targets in the United States). Thus, the illusion will be even more difficult to maintain in the future.

Indeed, because of the theoretical accuracies of modern strategic weapons, the ability to verify compliance with arms control limits may now be inherently incompatible with the need to maintain a survivable strategic force. The procedures for locating an opponent's strategic weapon for the purpose of verifying arms control limits are the same methods used for locating the weapon for the purpose of targeting. Once a target is located, the theoretical probability of destroying it with a modern strategic weapon such as an MX or SS-18 is greater than nine-out-of-ten. Thus, if an operational weapon can be monitored for compliance with an arms control agreement, it is probably vulnerable.

There are steps that might lead some supporters of arms control to believe that such problems of verification could be avoided. For example, some U.S. analysts have advocated on-site inspection of Soviet weapons facilities, and the Soviets have hinted at a willingness to agree to some forms of inspection. An informal limit on production rates, such

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as that accepted by Leonid Brezhnev for the Backfire bomber, is another possibility.

Unfortunately, it is a political reality that these measures are unlikely to satisfy a good number of American political leaders. The degree of risk and the probability that the Soviets could violate the agreements without detection is likely to be more than most Americans are willing to accept. More to the point, the risks are probably more than the president and one-third of the Senate are willing to accept. The failure of SALT II demonstrated the damage to Soviet-American relations that can result when Americans and Soviets *attempt* to reach an accord and fail. Often this exercise is worse than not having tried to negotiate a treaty at all.

Much of the problem stems from the difficult political question of trust. Previously, it was *technologically infeasible* for the Soviets to violate arms control agreements, given the characteristics of the earlier strategic weapons and the technical means through which the United States monitored these agreements. In the future, the characteristics of strategic weapons will necessitate *active Soviet cooperation* to enable U.S. verification of their compliance. Unfortunately, this would also require us to decide an issue that the American political system has been unable to resolve for the past four decades: What are the "intentions" of the Soviets, and can they be trusted? Countless volumes of argument have been stacked on either side of this issue, but it remains unsettled. It would seem imprudent to tie the success of arms control and, by implication, the stability of Soviet-American relations, to our ability finally to settle the controversy in the next two or three years.

This is not to say that the United States should stop negotiating with the Soviet Union on issues of mutual interest. But, in general, the United States would do better to put less emphasis on formal, legalistic documents. There are areas in which agreements can be negotiated with little risk to either side and with no requirements for verification; these would offer better opportunities for reducing Soviet-American tensions than simple quantitative limits on weapons, if only because these agreements would be much simpler to negotiate. For example, one long-time observer of strategic affairs has suggested at least three topics on which the superpowers' agreements could reduce uncertainty in crises and limit the potential casualties of a nuclear war. These proposals include agreements to avoid the deliberate targeting of cities, agreements to avoid the deliberate targeting of nuclear reactors, and agreements to limit the size of weapons that would be used in war.[12]

[12] See Edward Teller, "Defense: Retaliation or Protection," in Richard Staar, ed., *Arms Control: Myth Versus Reality,* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1984).

One is struck by how complicated arms control agreements have progressively become — owing

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Each agreement would be "verifiable by fact"; if either party violated its commitment, the other could "enforce" the treaty by retaliation. Such treaties could save lives, promote better relations, and make intentions more transparent. Similarly, treaties to improve hot line agreements, to inaugurate joint studies of the effects of nuclear war, and other such agreements that are "easy" to negotiate would enhance stability. Half the art of negotiating between countries is understanding which issues are amenable to negotiation; the other half is appreciating those issues that are not.

Modern Strategic Weapons and the Stability of Deterrence

If the bad news is that modern technology eliminates the prospect for arms control, the good news is that modern technology ought to make nuclear deterrence extremely robust. Most authorities would agree that the least likely strategic attack by either the Soviet Union or the United States would be an all-out strike against each other's cities (at least in the initial stages of a war). Although current American and Soviet war plans appear to include options for destroying "military" targets (e.g., munitions factories) inside cities, it also appears both sides understand that exercising such an option would be equivalent to a countervalue attack, warranting full retaliation. Hence, such an exchange is unlikely in the early stages of a war.

What most analysts fear as the greatest threat for nuclear war is the possibility of a limited strike by one power against its opponent's strategic weapons. This type of "counterforce" strike could escalate into a full-scale nuclear war against cities if, for example, one side erroneously analyzed the intended targets of a wave of ICBMs detected in flight. Or, the collateral damage of a "limited" counterforce strike might be so severe that the victim would be unable to appreciate its opponent's restraint.

As strategic weapons become smaller and more mobile, the targets of a limited attack will disappear into the countryside. As the targets of a counterforce strike vanish, so does the probability of such an attack. Although it might theoretically be possible to destroy an opponent's weapons with barrage attacks, this type of attack would destroy so much of the countryside — people and property — that it would be indistin-

largely to the technology of modern strategic weapons. For example, the 1982 edition of the annual yearbook on arms control agreements published by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency contains the texts of the 1963 "Hot Line" Agreement, the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty, the 1972 SALT I Agreement, and the 1979 SALT II Agreement. The first treaty occupies two pages of text; the second treaty occupies three pages; the third occupies seventeen pages (including the ABM treaty and the pages of agreed statements); and the fourth occupies forty-one pages. In general, the more complicated the agreement, the more likely that ambiguities will arise in its enforcement.

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guishable from a countervalue strike. Thus, if deterrence is assumed to be a reasonable insurance against all-out countervalue strikes, then it should deter barrage attacks, too.

The main weakness in this type of deterrence may be the temptation of one country to "decapitate" the other by attacking its command and control network. However, if command posts, communications systems, and attack warning systems are made sufficiently redundant or survivable, the incentives for a decapitation strike should diminish as the prospects for success shrink.[13]

The upshot is that, even if arms control becomes infeasible as the new strategic weapons are deployed, it may yet be possible to reduce the probability of war. Some analysts believe that limited strategic nuclear war has already been impractical for some time. For example, several writers have argued that the collateral effects of radiation, blast, and heat of an attack directed only at ICBMs would go well beyond "limited." Similarly, other analysts have claimed that the problems of command and control make limited strategic exchanges impractical, and yet other individuals have presented a case (admittedly tentative) that would lead one to believe that the environmental dangers of a nuclear exchange make limited strategic war impracticable.[14]

Despite these arguments, many responsible writers have been able to present a plausible case that limited strategic war *is* feasible. Their arguments are usually based on the theoretical vulnerability of individual weapons to an attack. For example, two 500 kt warheads delivered against a Minuteman silo theoretically have a 77 percent probability of destroying their target. Extrapolated and applied to the entire Minuteman force, this datum has led some to conclude that the Soviets could destroy almost 800 of the 1,000 ICBMs that the United States has deployed. So long as it seems plausible that a particular strategic weapon is vulnerable, it is likely that someone will argue that the weapon can be destroyed, and that in some situations there may be a good reason for doing so. However, if limited counterforce strikes have indeed been infeasible, then the new technology should make this point even less debatable.

[13] Some might note that these policies would be the functional equivalent of putting one's weapons in the middle of one's cities — a tactic that such analysts as Thomas Schelling and Herman Kahn facetiously suggested as a means for a nation to convince its opponent that even a counterforce strike would elicit full retaliation. See Thomas Schelling, *Strategy of Conflict,* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1962); and Herman Kahn, *Thinking About the Unthinkable,* (New York: Horizon Press, 1961).

[14] See, for example, Sidney Drell and Frank von Hippel, "Limited Nuclear War," *Scientific American,* November 1976, pp. 46-64; John Steinbruner, "Launch Under Attack," *Scientific American,* January 1984, pp. 37-47; Matthew Bunn and Kosta Tsipis, "The Uncertainties of a Preemptive Nuclear Attack," *Scientific American,* November 1983, pp. 38-47; R. P. Turco *et al,* "Nuclear Winter: Global Consequences of Multiple Nuclear Explosions," *Science,* December 23, 1983, pp. 1283-92; and Carl Sagan, "Nuclear War and Climatic Catastrophe: Some Policy Implications," *Foreign Affairs,* Winter 1983-4, pp. 257-92.

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Technological Advancements and Some Unresolved Issues

Although it is possible that the strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union could become more stable as a result of improvements in weapons technology, unresolved questions remain. Among them is the rate at which this technology will be introduced and old weapons retired. As long as the old, immobile weapons remain deployed, they will remain tempting targets (even if the likelihood of attack is small, their theoretical vulnerability will continue to generate controversy).

If the MX missile is the last of the large, immobile weapons that the United States deploys, and if, like the Minuteman ICBM, the MX has a lifetime of about thirty years, then the United States will continue to offer attractive targets for a Soviet strike until the year 2025 or so. If, on the other hand, the MX is cancelled, the SICM is deployed, and the Minuteman rockets are phased out over a ten-year period, then the most tempting targets in U.S. territory will have been eliminated by the mid-1990s. This would assume that other U.S. systems, such as bombers and missile-launching submarines, could be quickly dispersed in a time of crisis.

The President's Commission on Strategic Forces gave mixed signals on current direction. The commission recommended deployment of the MX which, as we have seen, is a vulnerable target. Although the commission recommended the swift development of the SICM, it was unclear on its basing. Also, there appears to be considerable resistance to the SICM on the part of the Air Force. Admittedly, the two-track development of both the MX and the SICM may have been necessary to generate political support for the administration's program, but it does not make for an optimal policy.

Similarly, the Soviet leadership will have to decide when and if it will be willing to replace its large ICBMs with smaller mobile missiles. One could argue that the Soviets would gain little by *not* doing so, assuming that arms control agreements do not limit the rate at which they could substitute SS-X-24s and SS-X-25s for SS-17s, SS-18s, and SS-19s. In fact, however, the Soviets have shown no willingness to dismantle their heavy ICBMs.

A second question that remains is the degree to which arms control agreements will be allowed to block strategic modernization. For instance, in the SALT I and SALT II negotiations, the United States objected to small, road-mobile ICBMs (e.g., the SS-16). If the U.S. negotiators continue to object to truly mobile (albeit unverifiable) weapons, then survivable systems may be delayed. The deployment of fully mobile

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ICBMs and cruise missiles is especially important from the Soviet point of view. Soviet submarines have never been very reliable. This may explain why the Soviets have been so reluctant in past negotiations to accept limits on their land-based forces. There is some evidence that the current administration is willing to relax the previous U.S. position.[15]

And finally, is "stability without arms control" a doctrine that will be accepted by the American people? Some attitudes may make this program difficult to implement. For more than a decade, Americans have been instilled with the belief that successful arms control negotiations are synonymous with stable Soviet-American relations. They have also been led to believe that a breakdown in these negotiations implies that the two countries are closer to open conflict. Because arms control agreements will be so difficult to negotiate after deployment of the next generation of strategic weapons, it is essential that the public understand the principles of deterrence and why the new weapons cannot be limited by formal agreements.

In addition, public attitudes will be important because the new weapons will require greater dispersion within the United States. The amount of land area available in which to disperse weapons is critical to the technology and expense required for deployment of SICMs and GLCMs. For example, suppose one assumes that 600 missiles are required to be able to survive a Soviet attack in order to maintain deterrence. According to one recent Congressional Budget Office study, if one sets aside an area roughly the size of the state of Oklahoma (a 50,000 square-mile tract) in which the missiles can be deployed, then one would require 1,000 missiles, each mounted in vehicles hardened to 20 psi in order to ensure that 600 missiles would survive. Building vehicles that can withstand this amount of blast is quite difficult; a typical modern tank, such as the American M-60, can withstand blasts of only up to 10 psi, and no known mobile land vehicle has yet been hardened to 20 psi.

However, if the area for dispersion is increased just over ten times — 500,000 square miles — then 1,000 missiles in vehicles hardened to just 10 psi would ensure that the required number of weapons survive. Constructing a launcher capable of surviving a 10 psi blast is a much simpler task, easily within the limits of current technology. If the launchers are allowed free access to all one million miles of the nonurban roads in the United States, then even if the missiles are deployed in standard trucks (which can resist a 2 psi blast), the targeting problem for the Soviets

[15] The evidence for the poor reliability of Soviet submarines includes the half-dozen incidents of Soviet submarines being lost or disabled while on patrol during the past twenty-five years. Also, the fact that the Soviets maintain only 15 percent of their SSBN force on patrol suggests that the Soviets themselves may be skeptical of the reliability of their submarines.

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becomes quite impossible because of the limits of current reconnaissance technology. There would, of course, be political problems in any plan to disperse nuclear weapons over such a wide area, but some compromise could be made by planning to diperse the missiles only during times of crisis. This would offer protection from everything but a successful "bolt out of the blue" attack, which almost all experts consider extremely unlikely.[16]

Toward Acceptance

The technology that has been described in this paper is available today and cannot be "wished away." Therefore, it is no longer a question of *whether* strategic weapons ought to be miniaturized. The weapons *are* small and mobile, and we now must deal with this development. The truth is that many of the premises underlying strategic thinking during the past thirty years — in particular, the belief that it was possible to count and target individual strategic weapons — have been based on a temporary technological quirk. It was inevitable that these weapons all would someday become small, mobile, and plentiful as countries gained experience in building them. Now "someday" is here, and U.S. policy must adjust.

The deployment of mobile, undetectable weapons could lead to a situation in which the probability of nuclear war is as low as possible, though we would be required to forego quantitative limits on strategic arms. Further, once strategic weapons become untargetable, the requirements for deploying more strategic weapons decrease; counterforce strategies usually require more weapons than other strategies. So, there may also be some chance of reducing the expense of strategic forces.

In the best of all worlds, there would be no nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, the prospects for nuclear disarmament are slim. Even so, we can still make the best of an imperfect situation and reduce the likelihood of nuclear war to the lowest *possible* level by understanding the new technology of strategic weapons and choosing our policies carefully.

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[16] See Cavaiola and Dombey, *Modernizing U.S. Strategic Offensive Forces,* pp. 72-73; and Medalia, *Small Single-Warhead Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles,* p. 28. These scenarios assume a 2,500 EMT attack in which the Soviets used about two-thirds of their ICBM arsenal.

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BALANCE AND COUNTERBALANCE: TECHNOLOGY AND THE ARMS RACE*

by KEVIN N. LEWIS

A deep suspicion of technology underlies much arms control debate in the West. Mordant criticism normally follows the demonstration of some new technological principle, the announcement of intentions to develop or acquire a weapon incorporating advanced technologies, or, in the case of the strategic defense initiative (SDI), the statement of intent to pursue a research program in apparently new technological realms. In many historical and retrospective accounts, the blame for instability, antagonism, or squandered resources is laid squarely at the feet of a rash decision to advance the state of one or another military art.[1]

Although their reasoning is often unclear, many commentators appear to agree on the following assumptions:

- A particular military balance at any point is "stable" in the sense that it is better left alone. Plans to impose a new wrinkle on the balance lead automatically to a worse situation.
- Technological advances (or fear of same) by one side are inevitably countered, imitated, or evaded by opponents, inciting a spiral of costly, unpredictable moves and countermoves.
- Technologies, once demonstrated, can be directly converted into effective fighting power, creating a requirement for *immediate* and often poorly conceived responses by other concerned parties.
- Weapons are just accretions of technologies. Therefore, a military threat is posed by a set of demonstrated technological advances.

Each of these assumptions is demonstrably wrong. Our experience in acquiring the Polaris weapon system, for one, confirms none of them:

- Far from destabilizing the military balance, the ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) concept enhanced mutual strategic stability *without* requiring anybody to endure a troublesome "transition period."
- Barring some earth-shaking discovery, the technical problems attendant upon any effort to knock out a fleet of SSBNs are virtually insurmountable. Thus,

* The views expressed in this paper are the author's, and do not necessarily represent those of Rand or any of its sponsors.

[1] Some of the leading culprits since World War II have been the decision to develop the hydrogen bomb, the acquisition of MIRVed (multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles) missiles, the invention of neutron bombs and modern cruise missiles, and, most recently, SDI.

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although some ASW and related areas will be studied as a matter of course, the SSBN/ASW interaction in the long run is comfortably predictable.

- The Polaris force consisted of many, then-revolutionary military technologies; it took years to combine these into even a workable prototype of a full weapon system.[2]
- In addition to its technological components, the Polaris system required entirely new concepts of operation, command and control arrangements, deployment and readiness doctrine, without which Polaris's impressive technical breakthroughs would have amounted to nothing.

Without belaboring the point, then, much negative rhetoric portraying the effects of technological progress on the arms race greatly oversimplifies the issues involved. Nonetheless, the subject is bound to remain a lively one, if only for political reasons. It is impracticable to build some grand theory relating technological advance to the status of some selected military balance. Generally speaking, some advances (like SSBNs) are very desirable. Others (for instance, biological warfare) are undesirable. Often, desirability depends on the context. Certainly, there will be asymmetries: what looks good to us may not inspire much Soviet enthusiasm, or a particular technology might favor disproportionately the side employing it first. There seems to be no easy way to frame the problem. That being the case, what assumptions or rules of thumb might yield an understanding of the pertinent issues, even if they do not answer fundamental questions completely?

At the very least, what is required is a more sophisticated look at those attributes of technological progress that make a given advance more or less good. Of many approaches to the problem, the one I would like to develop here concerns the constraints on the course of a particular dimension of a technological arms competition. I will suggest, and use a few examples to support the contention, that a qualitative arms competition often may not be inherently bad. Such a competition can, naturally, go sour if the military choices of either side are left unconstrained, or, as often in practice, are excessively restricted. When such misregulation occurs, the planning process on both sides will deviate from the set of assumptions and propositions that ordinarily modulate the arms competition to mutual benefit.

There are exceptions to this rule, if only because we may not have a very good idea where technology is leading us, or how a new or better way of doing things will fit into established plans and force structure.

[2] Actually, Polaris, a weapon radically different from any built before, took a mere five years from drawing board to the field. Compare this with the MX and B-1 (both more familiar and incremental programs). MX's operational requirement was stated in 1972, and the first B-1A prototype flew in 1974. One need only look at the present status of these weapons to see how much longer it now takes to deploy weapons of any kind.

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It seems reasonable to argue for careful monitoring of the constraints that, present or absent, might precipitate worst-case scenarios that are still better than the alternatives.

Let us consider three cases: two where a balanced competition took place to our benefit (and sometimes to the Soviets' benefit too), and one where overregulation of a competition adversely affected our strategic capability.

The Strategic Balance: 1962 vs. 1972

Whatever the fine points of their beliefs about arms control, many people agree that each side's ability to retaliate massively promotes a degree of mutual caution and, conversely, that glaring vulnerabilities may tempt attack in a severe crisis.[3] For a brief time in the early 1960s, it was highly likely that had the United States struck first, it could have effectively deprived the Soviet Union of anything but the flimsiest intercontinental reply, if that. The United States then possessed virtually the capacity to eliminate the Soviet Union as a functioning entity, while withholding a reserve force capable of satisfying U.S. objectives in almost any other contingency. The Soviet Union, during this period, faced a very real window of vulnerability.

A few specifics underscore the grave nature of the strategic balance from the perspective of Soviet planners. American strategic bomber forces then consisted of about 2,000 intermediate- and long-range aircraft. These were deployed at an array of bases ringing the USSR. These assets would have been supplemented by a substantial armada of tactical aircraft and carrier-based fighters, as well as by a limited number of intermediate- and intercontinental-range ballistic and cruise missiles. At this time, Soviet forces capable of striking the United States consisted of a handful of unreliable ICBMs and some SLBMs (ship-launched ballistic missiles) and cruise missiles aboard noisy subs that had to approach the United States and surface in order to fire. Surviving Soviet long-range bombers would have to run a North American air defense gauntlet of about 2,000 interceptors and thousands of SAMs (note that most Soviet interceptors surviving U.S. defense suppression were only daylight-

[3] The former proposition has now been explicitly challenged by the president, who has contended that the development of advanced strategic defenses capable of removing the threat of nuclear weapons to a large degree or even completely is preferable to the prospect of devastating retaliation. Note that the administration — as evinced by its concern with, for instance, Minuteman vulnerability and strategic readiness — agrees fully with the latter proposition.

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capable). Even after eliminating Soviet strategic forces, the United States would have thousands of high-yield weapons in reserve.[4]

It is arguable that such a situation is preferable to one of "balance," and an overwhelming U.S. lead is definitely superior to an overwhelming Soviet one. However, from an objective point of view, the strategic balance in the early 1960s was unstable. At the very least, the Soviets would have every reason not to go second in a very grave crisis. Moreover, the USSR would have every incentive to opt for desperate countervailing threats to the United States, such as "diplomatic bombs" pre-positioned in major U.S. cities. And those U.S. allies within reach of the Soviets' considerably larger theater nuclear arsenal would not necessarily close ranks swiftly with the United States where an emergency might not inevitably lead to nuclear war.

Compare this situation to what emerged ten or so years later. Both sides had large, diversified arsenals. And, although both had relative advantages, it was inconceivable that either could land a knock-out blow on the early 1960s model. Technological advances such as SSBNs, hardened land-based missiles, and early warning systems discouraged irresponsible behavior and relieved each side of its reliance on such provocative systems as forward-based missiles. Some technological advances even made verifiable arms control treaties a reality. In short, though both sides were locked in a vigorous technological arms competition, the strategic situation looked more robust *because* of the competition and not *in spite* of it.

In retrospect, not everything about the evolution of the balance from the early 1960s to the early 1970s was ideal from either side's point of view. We may have spent more than was needed, we may have failed to cover some important vulnerabilities, and the evolution of this strategic balance put a number of serious strains on the American-led defense coalitions. Nonetheless, there is a case to be made that the world may indeed have benefited from the fruition of a number of advanced strategic technologies in the late 1960s and early 1970s: technologies (not to mention doctrinal developments) that many, at the time, thought dangerous.

[4] The reasons we did not attack despite this advantage are self-evident. For one thing, the attack would have to be a premeditated strike out of the blue, and it is quite correct to describe such an action as politically inconceivable, not to mention un-American. For another, the Soviets did maintain, in their theater and tactical nuclear arsenals, and in their conventional forces, the ability to inflict catastrophic damage on American friends and allies on the Eurasian periphery. Finally, there remained the fact that even a marginal, ragged retaliation by the Soviet Union — though not immediately forthcoming — would have inflicted damage that, although infinitesimal compared to what they had suffered, would be unacceptable from our point of view.

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The SAC vs. PVO Strany Competition

If adroitly managed, a technological arms competition can prove to be advantageous. Arguably, advanced technology is one of the key strategic advantages enjoyed by the United States and its allies, and over time a number of Western initiatives have sought to exploit our qualitative arms lead. Provided that we do not force the USSR into some drastic response, it may occasionally be productive to pursue some military technologies for their own sakes, simply to impose costs on the Soviet Union (diverting resources from more menacing activities) and to compel the Soviets to adopt favorable arms control terms.

To illustrate, consider the historic rivalry between the Strategic Air Command (SAC) and those parts of the Soviet Union's homeland defense forces concerned with intercepting and destroying it. This contest is undoubtedly one of the most direct forms of military competition in the sense that action — even anticipated action — by one side often begets a prompt enemy response. Thus, seldom has the U.S.-Soviet offense-defense competition been anything but vigorous — in spite of frequent pronouncements that one side or another had, at some point, "won" this contest.

Throughout the 1950s, the United States relied almost exclusively on manned aircraft for its offensive forces. Soviet defensive endeavors revolved around fighter aircraft directed by ground intercept controllers. There seems little doubt that, by a combination of suppression, saturation, routing, countermeasures, and self-defense, the United States could have readily defeated this force. Thus, the downing of Francis Gary Power's U-2 in 1960 seemed to portend a revolution in the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship. To many, this unsettling demonstration of a new technology — the surface to air missile (SAM) — signalled the end of the manned bomber.

Reports of the imminent demise of the B-52, indeed of all air-breathing weapons, as viable deterrent forces proved to be premature. The demonstration of a Soviet high-altitude defense capability that brought down Power's U-2 also shot down the B-70 on the drawing-board. In a move of strategic one-upmanship, the United States neutralized the Soviet initiative (surely one of the most expensive defense programs ever undertaken) by a shift to low-altitude penetration with new B-52 tactics and, subsequently, the B-1. Recent modifications have incorporated emerging Stealth technologies, resulting in modifications in the B-1A and the B-1B. As Soviet low-altitude defenses improved, the United States adapted emerging missile technologies in order to blast holes in barrier defenses prior to the arrival of bombers. When Soviet air defenses thickened around

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key targets, standoff missiles were acquired. All the while, the force was reconfigured to anticipate new threats as they emerged. Twenty-five years after the startling demonstration of the SAM, it appears that the B-52 — the last of which was delivered to SAC during the Cuban missile crisis — will continue to be a viable weapon system into the 1990s, thanks to the air-launched cruise missile. In the end, the retirement of this force will owe more to the steadily increasing cost of maintaining aging aircraft than it will to Soviet technological progress.

None of this impugns the massive Soviet air defense effort — progress has been considerable, albeit at enormous cost. Rather, we see that the skillful management of technological advance can pay enormous dividends: potential advances in defense technology should be evaluated in this light.

In both of these cases where vigorous progress in arms technology occurred on favorable terms for the United States, two considerations were evident. First, in each case, neither side attempted to do too much too fast. Second, neither side found its options closed excessively by what one might call external constraints. These cases suggest that a healthy military-technical competition is indeed compatible with the larger goals of maintaining stability, avoiding excessive defense costs, and assuring a certain predictability when planning for the future. In contrast, other cases suggest that trouble arises when arms competitions are subject to excessive or inadequate "regulation." We will consider one example here.

The Search For a Follow-on to the Minuteman ICBM

Ironically — and contrary to certain perceived truths — the United States ICBM program has, for the past quarter of a century, been severely constrained by *cost* and *cost-effectiveness* considerations. This is not to suggest that U.S. land-based ballistic missiles of a given generation are "cheap" in some absolute sense. Rather, when presented with a menu of options, the United States has generally chosen the least costly of a series of equally capable alternatives.[5] In the past, the creative use of technological innovation has played a key role in helping planners hold down costs. However, excessive concern over the costs of developing and deploying a new follow-on ICBM explains the current dilemma before our strategic planners. Our deliberate choice not to spend more than we

[5] Of all possible constraints acting on the nature, sizing, etc. of the U.S. ICBM force, probably most important has been domestic political opinion. Following this would be legal constraints on missiles (imposed by treaties with the Soviet Union, or, in the case of the Price amendment stipulating certain "Midgetman" milestones, by Congress). Threat considerations would probably appear later.

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did on the ICBM leg of the TRIAD has ultimately proved too powerful a constraint for planners to overcome, resulting inevitably in a seriously adverse U.S.-Soviet ICBM balance.

The record is most revealing in this regard. Early on, ICBMs were seen by top SAC management as relatively unreliable and unsophisticated weapons that, in sufficient numbers, could nonetheless play a complementary role to the large U.S. manned bomber fleet. Because they could arrive earlier, a salvo of these new weapons would, if several were programmed against each target, inflict significant if unpredictable damage on Soviet air defenses, helping the bombers. Fueled by a number of factors, many not military in nature, the number of ICBMs programmed to be fielded grew, between 1957 and 1962, by nearly an order of magnitude: a deployment approaching 3,000 missiles was envisioned by many air force planners in the early 1960s.

The arrival of the Kennedy administration saw a radical overhaul of previous concepts and thinking about ICBMs. Interested in building U.S. conventional capabilities, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara set out both to curb and to make more efficient the various components of the U.S. missile force. Key decisions made by McNamara included:

- The cancellation and consolidation of redundant missile programs, especially relatively expensive and cumbersome liquid-fueled missiles.
- The imposition of a strict ceiling on the number of missiles to be fielded.
- A new emphasis on ICBM "quality" — for a given military requirement, the more reliable the missile, the fewer needed to do the job.
- The selection of a very modest Minuteman deployment concept. The inexpensive solid-fueled Minuteman based in silos posed a relatively small financial burden when it came to personnel needs, land use, maintenance costs, etc. More expensive Minuteman concepts (for instance, train-mobile Minuteman) were cancelled outright.

In the nearly two decades following the deployment of the last Minuteman, an amazing number of upgrades have been effected allowing the United States to maintain a constant degree of ICBM capability without deploying new, or more, ICBMs. These include silo hardening, a series of guidance improvements, the Command Data Buffer and several other programs that rendered the force more flexible, reliability and C^3 improvements, MIRVing, and more. Compared with the alternatives, this set of product improvements did indeed represent useful and affordable modifications in the ICBM force.[6]

[6] More expensive alternatives frequently considered but always rejected through the late 1970s included: a different basing mode for Minuteman, active defense of Minuteman silos, the deployment of more missiles, and the acquisition of some kind of new missile.

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In the end, however, the qualitative and quantitative growth of the Soviet ICBM arsenal, changes in the target base, limitations on the ability to implement still more improvements on the margin and, ultimately, the sheer aging of the force would compel the United States to adopt a significantly new ICBM concept, to get out of the ICBM business altogether, or to tolerate a steadily inadequate and intolerable ICBM misbalance. Ruling out the last two options, a number of planners focused on a new ICBM concept.[7] A follow-on ICBM concept was evaluated in the 1966 STRAT-X studies, and in 1972 SAC published a requirement for a new missile — the MX, or "Peacekeeper."

As with the Minuteman, the MX was designed with cost-effectiveness in mind. The desire to hold down program costs eventually became the missile's undoing, since the large size of the missile limits alternative basing options.[8] However, at the program's outset, a basing problem with MX did not appear foreordained. Had the missile proceeded on its original schedule, a force of 200 could have been fully deployed in silos before the end of the 1970s. Although that force could have inevitably become vulnerable to Soviet attack, one can only guess whether the Soviets would — in a reversal of the present ICBM vulnerability situation — have put so much emphasis on a fixed silo-based fourth generation of ICBMs (SS-17, -18, and -19). Perhaps the USSR's Strategic Rocket Forces would have de-emphasized these systems and instead accelerated the deployment of a mobile — but less accurate, less fractionable, and far more costly — ICBM force at the expense of heavy missiles like the SS-18.[9]

We can never be certain that an alternative outcome would have emerged had we deployed the MX on the original timetable. What we do know is that the MX was not deployed "on schedule" *because the funding was not sufficient to support such a deployment.* Though it is impossible to say for sure, had the original MX program proceeded on its original schedule, perhaps it would now be the Soviets, not us, who would have been compelled to opt for a more expensive alternative to silo-based missiles. True, the defense budget does not result from a set of such estimations and calculations: the budget is determined principally

[7] Note that predictions of the end of Minuteman's useful life were off *in both directions.* Advocates *of a new missile, active defense, or other steps stressed, wrongly as it turned out, the emerging Soviet* threat as early as the late 1960s. On the other hand, projections of Soviet counterforce potential underestimated the improvements the Soviets would make in command executive procedures (CEP) in the late 1970s.

[8] The size was required to a large extent because the missile was to carry many (ten) warheads. *The high degree of fractionation was in turn promoted by cost-effectiveness concerns: only one guidance* system and booster were required for ten re-entry vehicles. The costs of MIRVing a missile proved to be far less than the costs of deploying more boosters and guidance packages for less-MIRVed systems.

[9] Or, conversely, they could have put more emphasis on bombers or SLBMs; both pose less severe counterforce threats than modern ICBMs.

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by political concerns, which are affected only indirectly by military needs. That is as it should be; but the fact of resource constraints and the ultimate outcome of the U.S.-Soviet ICBM balance are before us today.

Conclusion

In summary, there is no way of proving that there is some middle ground in technological arms competitions where a qualitative arms race is neither over- nor under-controlled. However, it is the case that, barring the unforseen, the United States will pursue technological measures and countermeasures in such a way that the ultimate strategic balance is at least as stable as before, providing that the other side participates analogously in the ongoing qualitative military rivalry. Rather than arbitrarily rejecting all emerging technology then, we must frame the innovation in question in terms of the nature of a continuing military rivalry. In many cases, what is happening on both sides will represent a very logical approach by all concerned to an important military question. Barring unpredictable breakthroughs and erratic behavior, there may be advantages to allowing the superpowers' arms rivalry to continue within certain bounds.

It should be noted that we may have no control over many key factors that shape our weapons choices (this burden may rarely apply in the Soviet case). A key variable, naturally, is the budget. Given a fixed budget, many different schemes for solving our political problems may be proposed; it may be difficult to pick the "right" path from a potentially large menu of options. For these and other reasons, our ability to dictate the parameters of a technological arms race, or even manage such a race, may be highly limited. Nonetheless, we must view all technological initiatives in terms of the mutual U.S.-Soviet interactions that result from the use of new technology. By avoiding extreme policies that seek either to overcontrol some line of development or, conversely, to unleash with no clear plan some kind of technical initiative, we are probably going to have the best chance of keeping a technological competition under control. And, no less important, we will be able to use our superior technology to force the Soviets to risk bankruptcy matching our advances or to fall into line in important collateral negotiations.

To maneuver effectively, we need to reject the oversimplified rhetoric about technology and arms competitions in favor of a more sophisticated and detailed understanding of the determinants of a particular military relationship. "Stopping" an arms competition first requires that all the sides involved believe that such a halt can and, ultimately, will be achieved. All the parties must also agree that exogenous events

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are unlikely to perturb a balanced situation within the time-frame used by strategy, force, and employment planners (a period perhaps exceeding a decade). The instances where all the pertinent factors — technical, political, doctrinal, social, cultural, and economic — combine to eliminate or freeze an arms race are specialized and rare. With the exception of such cases, we must focus at least as much on the advantages of pursuing a new line of technology as on the liabilities of doing so.

OBSTACLES AND OPTIMISM AT GENEVA

by ADAM M. GARFINKLE

There is no shortage of obstacles to the success of U.S.-Soviet arms control negotiations these days — on that most observers readily agree. But identifying the main obstacles, not to speak of proffering the means of their removal, is a politically sensitive operation precisely because there is no general agreement on the sources of the stalemate. "No general agreement" describes not only the condition of Western academics and political observers, but also that of the U.S. and Soviet governments, which disagree between themselves and, probably, within themselves as well.

The United States government has publicly blamed the impasse on the Soviet government, charging that the Soviets have been unimaginative. U.S. officials have said that, as in the past, the Soviets prefer to use alternating doses of relentless propaganda, continued military deployments, and the fatigue of a bargaining stalemate to undermine both the U.S. negotiating position and support for U.S. military modernization programs. According to the U.S. analysis, Soviet insistence that the United States agree to consider a ban on strategic defense research and development is fatuous — a deliberate tactic to forestall progress. The Soviet offer to reduce offensive forces by some 25 percent on each side has been termed hopelessly vague and one-sided in favor of Moscow. Only when the United States and its allies demonstrate that this strategem of attrition will not work will the Soviets decide to get down to the serious business of trading concessions.

The Soviet government, not surprisingly, blames the United States. The simultaneous U.S. effort on strategic defense and offensive force modernization is offensively intended, the Soviets have charged, and the U.S. government is using Geneva as a political cover with Congress to facilitate the buildup. The Reagan administration is uninterested in serious arms control and the U.S. negotiating position proves it. How can the Soviet Union agree to reduce its ICBM force when the United States

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is modernizing every leg of the Triad *and* contemplating a ballistic missile defense deployment that could more readily serve to defeat a Soviet retaliatory *second* strike than serve its grandiose, publicly stated purpose — the obsolescence of nuclear weapons? As far as the Soviets are concerned, therefore, their insistence on discussing the U.S. strategic defense program is not fatuous at all; they claim that the U.S. *refusal* to discuss it seriously is fatuous.

The debate in the academic community and in the U.S. press follows from these essential positions. Thus, some pundits never tire of telling us that the United States can have serious arms control or the SDI, but not both.[1] Others insist that such pundits are helping the Soviets (falsely) define the issues, and are thus helping the Soviets wear down the United States politically and militarily.[2] Those who support the Reagan administration's basic strategy believe that there is a veritable chasm between actual Soviet policy and Soviet public declarations. They believe that the Soviets have taken to heart William Henry Harrison's advice, "The more you talk, the less you should say." Those who oppose the administration and who, in particular, oppose SDI, tend to accept Soviet complaints as essentially honest; some also accept the Soviet accusation that the Reagan administration has more of an interest in seeing Geneva fail than succeed.

As often when dealing with the inherent ambiguities of political assessments, there is no way for outside observers to ascertain which view, if either, is correct. Given certain premises, both are logical. But two questions must be posed: Are these public declarations of U.S. and Soviet officials mere propaganda joustings that hide more sincere, private assessments, or are they sincerely believed by their declarers? And, especially significant if the positions are sincere, are the assessments correct? The intersection of U.S. and Soviet assessments of each other's intentions composes the basic grid of possibilities at Geneva. It can tell us a good deal about the real obstacles to progress and if — and how—they can be overcome. It is not impossible that the Reagan administration's assessment of Soviet tactics is truly believed and correct. It is not impossible that the Soviet assessment of the Reagan administration's tactics is truly believed and correct. But it is not impossible, either, that *both*, though truly believed, are *wrong* about the other, at least in large part. I believe that this is the case. It was Dean Acheson who was once reported to

[1] I refer in particular to the article by McGeorge Bundy, George F. Kennan, Robert McNamara, and Gerard Smith, "The President's Choice: Star Wars or Arms Control," *Foreign Affairs,* Winter 1984/85, pp. 264-78. A somewhat more intelligent case for this same basic view is that of John Steinbruner, "Arms Control: Crisis for Compromise," *Foreign Affairs,* Summer 1985, pp. 1036-49.

[2] For one brief example, see Edward L. Rowny, "America's Objective in Geneva," *New York Times,* April 29, 1985.

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have said, "Things are not always as they seem, but sometimes they are." Here is a case where both aspects of Acheson's profundity apply: both sides are essentially telling the truth about their attitudes toward the negotiations, but neither can bring itself to really believe the other. Thus, things are as they seem on one level, and yet on a different level they are not.

The Reagan administration is internally divided on many issues, but when it comes to the Geneva talks there seems to be a consensus that the Soviets are stalling deliberately, using SDI as a pretext. Their aim is to mobilize political pressures against the U.S. negotiating position in Geneva, against U.S. military modernization programs, including "Star Wars," and against NATO coherence, such as it is. The administration's assessment seems to be that the Soviets again hope to use U.S. domestic political pressures for an arms control agreement to erode U.S. patience at the bargaining table. The remedy against such a strategem: be strong, be tenacious, and do not give in lest the Soviets take conciliation as a sign that their continued pig-headedness will bring ever greater rewards from the weary, irresolute Americans. This is why the upcoming Gorbachev-Reagan summit worries many administration officials; they fear the Soviets will use the summit "showcase" to undermine U.S. resolve. The Soviets, the argument goes, pursued a similar strategy of playing to the gallery against the Pershing II and cruise missile deployment in Western Europe in 1981-83, and failed. They stated preconditions for resuming negotiations, but eventually backed down and returned to the table. Continued American strength and tenacity will force the Soviets off their insistence on barring "Star Wars" in time, too. Indeed, by early July, there seemed to be some evidence that the Soviet position was softening, thus bolstering the administration's interpretation of Soviet attitudes.[3]

What of the Soviet contention that SDI and U.S. offensive modernization programs taken together are intended to give the United States a first strike capability, much as it was defined in the ABM debate of the late 1960s? In the administration's view, this is merely a propaganda ruse. The Soviets *must* know that the United States is sincere in its conviction that a mutual defense-dominant world is ultimately a safer world for everyone. The Soviets are *not* anti-strategic defense in principle. They have their own programs, some more advanced and mature than our own, and their strategic doctrine has always been attuned to damage limitation, including both active and passive defenses.[4] The Geneva talks

[3] See Leslie H. Gelb, "Soviet May Ease 'Star Wars' Stand," *New York Times,* July 9, 1985; but see also "Moscow Questions Press Reports on 'Star Wars' Concession," *New York Times,* July 11, 1985.

[4] See Paul Nitze's address to the Chautauqua Conference on Soviet-American Relations, entitled "SDI: The Soviet Program," *Current Policy,* No. 717, U.S. Department of State, June 28, 1985.

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are not an exercise in pedagogy; we have nothing to teach the Soviets about the principles of defense. The talks are an exercise in bargaining — in exploiting existing and potential assets, and this the Soviets understand very well indeed. The Soviets *must* also know that the United States would never strike first; U.S. policy has always insisted on a force posture capable of riding out a Soviet first strike. Besides, U.S. offensive modernization programs will not for years, if ever, give the United States an equivalent counterforce threat to Soviet ICBMs as the Soviets already pose to U.S. ICBMs — especially if the MX program remains truncated at forty operational silos.[5] It follows that the basic aim of Soviet arms control strategy is to slow U.S. strategic modernization on all fronts and to prevent, if at all possible, the United States from generating a threat to Soviet counterforce systems, but without trading away the essential counterforce balance that weighs so heavily in Moscow's favor.[6] The administration view is that if the Soviets become convinced that their objectives cannot be accomplished directly at the negotiating table, they will then employ a combination of propaganda, continued strategic military procurement, and, above all, patience. To force Moscow to deal, the United States must build better and faster, and be even more patient.

This administration view is, I am convinced, sincerely believed. But is it correct? It is not ludicrous; the Soviets have often engaged in a strategy of diplomatic attrition against U.S. arms control positions, and to good effect.[7] Moreover, at a time of Soviet leadership transition, it is not illogical to suppose that the Kremlin is incapable of reaching the kinds of major decisions required for a breakthrough at Geneva. During the waning of Yuri Andropov's brief tenure, Lawrence Eagleburger put it this way: "I am convinced the Soviets could not have signed an arms control agreement if we had proposed unilateral disarmament."[8] Many U.S. officials remain persuaded, perhaps correctly, that Moscow not only does not wish to deal now, but that it cannot. Finally, the understanding that U.S.-Soviet arms control negotiations are mainly about leverage and tenacity, not largesse and trustworthiness, is a perhaps misanthropic but undeniable truth.

[5] This is a contention repeated recently by Zbigniew Brzezinski, "A Star Wars Solution," *The New Republic,* July 8, 1985, p. 17. It was, however, also the conclusion of a recent Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) study that if both the United States and the Soviet Union do their utmost with respect to offensive modernizations, the relative Soviet lead over the United States would increase in the next decade. See a summary in Alton Frye, "Strategic Synthesis," *Foreign Policy,* Spring 1985, pp. 4-5.

[6] See Paul Nitze's address before the National Press Club, "Arms Control: The First Round in Geneva," *Current Policy,* No 698, U.S. Department of State, May 1, 1985.

[7] See, for example, my own analysis, "SALT and the MX: The U.S. Loses," *Philadelphia Inquirer,* December 11, 1982.

[8] Eagleburger's remark may be found in the transcript of an interview he gave to Philip Geyelin in *SAIS Review,* Summer/Fall 1984, p. 62.

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Nevertheless, the Soviet Union's sensitivity to what it believes to be U.S. efforts to create a first strike posture is real. Despite the administration's botching of the MX program,[9] the combination of a potentially counterforce-capable Trident fleet, the Pershing IIs deployed in Western Europe, Midgetman under development, the cruise missile program, and one or even two new manned bombers — all added to the not inconsiderable Minuteman force — must comprise a very formidable challenge in Soviet eyes. The reopening of a U.S. ICBM production facility for the first time in nearly a decade suggests that the United States *could* embark on a major deployment program. The Republican platform of 1980 called for U.S. military superiority, and the press has reported the Pentagon's efforts to formally link ballistic missile-defense deployments with offensive war-fighting plans.[10] The administration has spoken with so many different tongues on SDI (Reagan, Weinberger, Keyworth, Nitze) that it is far from clear who to believe — if anyone. And, practically speaking, all defensive systems improve their effectiveness to the extent that they have fewer incoming re-entry vehicles (RVs) to identify, track, target, and destroy, which points to a partially disarming first strike. Finally, if the United States believes in the blessings of defense dominance, why the frenzied offensive buildup? Where are the specific and serious U.S. proposals for deep offensive cuts?[11] Why does Washington defer consideration of a comprehensive test ban? This adds up to a reasonable fear of U.S. first strike intentions, all the more vivid in the eyes of Soviet planners if, as is likely, they have been planning such a first strike posture for themselves — only with insufficient technological wherewithall to implement the idea. The Soviets have never acceded to U.S notions of strategic "stability" either when referring solely to offensive deployments or now, when referring to a defense dominant world or a mixed offensive-defensive deterrence posture. But *they* know what *they* would do with a successful ballistic missile defense technology, and that is exactly what they suspect we will do with it, too. Presidential offers to "share" defensive technologies in the common interest of stabilizing the deterrence relationship, however sincere (and naive), probably strike the Soviets as a form of carnival banter designed to test their sense of credulity.

[9] I have chronicled much of the early botching in "Dense Pack: A Critique and an Alternative," *Parameters,* December 1982. It is also ironic that, in the end, the Soviet government saved what is left of the MX program. Had the Soviets not agreed to return to the table at Geneva when they did, it is almost certain that the MX vote in Congress in March 1985 would have killed the program. There was widespread concern about undermining U.S. bargaining leverage. See Steven V. Roberts, "Senate Supports MX Fund to Make 21 More Missiles," *New York Times,* March 20, 1985.

[10] See, in particluar, the article discussing efforts by Fred C. Iklé, Under Secretary of Defense, in Richard Halloran, "U.S. Studies Plan to Integrate Nuclear Arms With a Missile Shield," *New York Times,* May 29, 1985.

[11] The Soviets do not consider the U.S. proposal made in October 1983 to trade their advantage in MIRVed ICBMs for our advantage in manned bombers to be serious. They are correct.

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As for U.S. plans to ride out a Soviet first strike — supposed proof that the United States would never initiate a homeland to homeland exchange — the Soviets are not convinced. Extended deterrence, as the United States practices it with respect to NATO-Europe, commits us to nuclear first use. The logic of extended deterrence, as the Soviets no doubt see it, is that a U.S. first use in Europe would almost certainly be accompanied by a disarming strike at Soviet military assets wherever they are, lest an escalating conflict deprive the United States of the vaunted "escalation ladder control" analyzed so extensively in Western strategic literature. Besides, peacetime plans are one thing and crisis behavior is another; the Soviets must be nervous calculators, as are we, of the very improbable against the very portentous. And finally, whereas political volition is subject to sudden change, military assets and geopolitical realities, once brought into being, are somewhat less mutable. *Current* U.S policy may be to ride out a first strike, but will future U.S. administrations be tempted by the possession of military capabilities unimagined by their predecessors? This Soviet concern with the future is no less unreasonable than the sensible argument offered by Western analysts that whatever impelled the Soviet Union to invade and occupy Afghanistan is less important in the long run than the establishment of new geopolitical realities, notably the establishment of Soviet land-based air power 400 miles from the Strait of Hormuz.

In short, the Soviets are probably more worried about what the United States is doing, and probably less confident about being able to outbuild, outwait, or outwit us than the administration thinks they are. It does not matter that the basis of Soviet concern turns on Moscow's erroneous (but understandable) assessment of U.S. intentions. What matters is that the Soviets may be less reluctant to deal than the administration thinks, the United States may be in a stronger bargaining position than the administration thinks, and we risk squandering an opportunity to cash in our chips by dint of *our* misperception of the Soviets.

What of the Soviet view of American arms control strategy? It too is sincerely believed, and largely wrong. As noted above, the Soviets cannot bring themselves to believe that the United States really sees security in the last analysis as a mutual value, that the more security we have, the more the Soviets can have. They still see it as a mutually *exclusive* value, that the more we have the less you have, and the more you have, the less we have. Ultimately, it is hard to escape the conclusion that a cultural abyss is to blame for this. Western and American culture is permeated by the equilibrium metaphor of Newtonian physics and post-renaissance clockworks;[12] we see it everywhere around us — Adam

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Smith's "invisible hand," "checks and balances," separation of powers, faith in "pluralism" at home and free trade abroad, *e pluribus unum,* and one could go on. In Russian culture, on the other hand, this metaphor is decidedly weak. A pervasive philosophical Darwinism — *kto kogo,* or, who shall prevail — dominates instead; there is no escape from the universal order of hierarchy. One must ultimately command; others must submit. There is the ruler; there are the ruled. The ideal notion of a permanently sustained balance of social forces is rejected; change is inevitable, and what does not grow, dies. Thus, the American sense that there is some definition and condition of strategic military stability that would be mutually beneficial to all parties, and that such a condition could be "locked in" or brought about by formal agreement, tends to strike the Russians as peculiar.[13] They do not believe in the *mutual* desirability of defense dominance today anymore than they believed in the *mutual* desirability, as opposed to the fact, of mutual assured destruction twenty-five years ago.

One more point to be made in this regard concerns differing U.S. and Soviet understandings of what arms control is all about in the first place. In the past, if not also today in some circles, American officials and intellectuals have seen the weapons themselves as the problem that arms control was supposed to solve. U.S.-Soviet political disagreement more broadly conceived was a related, but to some degree a separable, matter; hence, the Western debate in the 1970s about the propriety and nuances of "linkage." This entire discourse must have amazed and confounded the Soviets, who have never considered the weapons to be the main problem. From the outset, the Soviets viewed the SALT process as part of the broader political relationship, not as some sort of mutually interested technical exercise. The Soviets simply cannot understand how a man like Ronald Reagan, having called the Soviet Union the central source of political evil loose in the world today, can sincerely turn around and suggest a mutually beneficial technical fix for the arms race, as if the arms race had nothing to do with the larger political competition. One sympathizes with Max Kampelman; one fears for his health and sanity in

[12] For a reading on the social significance of horology, see David S. Landes, *Revolution in Time* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983). For those interested in the intersection of metaphor, political language, and political action, see Michael Walzer, "On the Role of Symbolism in Political Thought," *Political Science Quarterly,* June 1967.

[13] This idea has a long history in U.S. strategic culture. For an analysis of Robert McNamara's belief in the existence of technological plateaus, see William R. Kintner and Harvey Sicherman, *Technology and International Politics: The Crisis of Wishing* (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1975), pp. 58-64. For two more recent articles that assert the essential *mutuality* of U.S. and Soviet security, but without reflecting on how the *Soviets* see things, see Steinbruner, "Arms Control," p. 1049; and, especially, Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics,* January 1978, pp. 167-214.

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trying to persuade the Soviets of our sincerity with regard to the basic aims of the SDI.

So here we are, sincere in our desire to pursue strategic stability through an evolution away from offensive ascendancy and toward defense dominance, equally sincere in our rejection of "first strike" planning or intent, only to watch the Soviets get it very wrong by doing their own version of mirror-imaging. But even if they are wrong, Soviet fears are not unfounded. It is a grand delusion to think that the Soviets will ever agree to deep offensive cuts in the face of matching U.S. offensive *and* defensive programs, if only we wait them out. We will never persuade them to place themselves in military jeopardy in return for assurances about our benign intentions. Perhaps the Soviets are playing a waiting game now, but only as a subsidiary strategy; it does not follow that they would not deal if a reasonable deal could be had. Perhaps they place so much emphasis on the political shadows of arms control partly because they are convinced that *Washington* would rather build than negotiate in earnest.

Thus, the interplay of mutual assessment suggests that each side's misperception of the other has led it to the pessimistic conclusion that the other side does not now wish to bargain in good faith. The actual interplay of interests, were it only understood, suggests a far less gloomy conclusion — more on this below. It must be stressed immediately that this analysis does not imply that U.S.-Soviet troubles over arms control — or anything else — are primarily a matter of communication, and that if only the two sides properly understood one another, all would be fine. As many realists have noted: sometimes nations become locked in conflict not because they do not understand each other well enough, but because they understand each other very well indeed. But U.S.-Soviet relations are poor enough for both concrete and even good reasons that neither side needs false snares anymore than a bat needs sunglasses.

Does this mean that the anti-SDI liberal pundits are correct? Can we not have both SDI and arms control? The pundits are wrong; we can have SDI and arms control. What we cannot have is SDI, an offensive modernization program of the extent currently planned, and arms control. If the Reagan administration is serious about the relatively benign effects of strategic defense on the calculus of deterrence, then some hard choices must be made about what *not* to build offensively. Some U.S. officials are angry at the Soviets for having put U.S. ICBMs in jeopardy and wish to create a reciprocal threat to Soviet forces, both for military purposes and for purposes of bargaining down high offensive force levels. Others preach strategic point defense to rescue the U.S. ICBM force from peril, and more ambitious defensive efforts to transform and reduce our risk.

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Both efforts are logical and meritorious. But we cannot do both and expect arms control to contribute to U.S. national security to the limited, but not insignificant, extent that it can. For arms control and strategic defense to be truly compatible, as the president insists they are, ballistic missile defense must not be fully integrated with an ever more robust offensive war-fighting force.[14] The benefits of a defense dominant world cannot emerge unless offensive forces are severely constrained.[15] So perhaps it is not only the Soviet bureaucracy that, in its current fluid state, is an obstacle to arms control, but also the U.S. bureaucracy which has so far avoided serious skull-crushing over what offensive systems it would be willing to give up or to eschew.

In the best of all possible worlds, the United States would face the reality of Soviet fears and adjust its negotiating strategy accordingly, and the Soviets would dispel their own illusions that the Reagan administration is not serious about strategic defense for nonaggressive reasons and about arms control. The Soviets had better understand sooner than later that within the next seven to ten years the United States will deploy a substantial ballistic missile defense system. It may well begin as a point defense system — a deployment that initially would not violate the ABM Treaty. Moscow cannot prevent this development by stalling in Geneva; what it may prevent through arms control is the development of a serious U.S. threat to its own ICBM force which, proportionally, is of greater significance to the Soviet strategic posture than is the U.S. ICBM force to the U.S. strategic posture.[16] These negotiations in Geneva can do a great deal of good if they codify a strategic condition where neither side's ICBM force rests in peril. In the current context, this would, at the very least, allow U.S. point defenses, perhaps beyond the limits of the ABM Treaty, *and* limit the potential U.S. offensive threat to Soviet land-based forces.

From the U.S. perspective, there is no sense in hiding the fact that the main point of the U.S. strategic effort since the dénouement of SALT II in 1979 has been to undo what is considered a dangerous Soviet advantage: the unilateral vulnerability of U.S. counterforce systems. It is

[14] It is here that my views diverge from those of a prominent SDI advocate, Colin S. Gray. See his *Nuclear Strategy and Strategic Planning* (Philadelphia: The Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1984), pp. 79-86. The real issue here is the credibility of extended deterrence and differences over its nature. Space limitation prevents discursive analysis here.

[15] This is not a new observation; indeed, it was a central axiom of one of the grand old men of strategic defense advocacy, the late Donald G. Brennan. See his comments in "When the SALT Hit the Fan," *National Review,* June 23, 1972, pp. 689-90.

[16] Ironically, the ABM Treaty and the 1974 Protocol to that treaty have contributed mightily to the current Soviet dilemma. Moscow elected in 1974 to defend Moscow, not an ICBM field; Washington elected to do neither. Thus, today, we can help solve our ICBM vulnerabilty problem without violating the ABM Treaty through point defense, but the Soviets cannot. They, therefore, may be seen as more likely to abrogate the ABM Treaty than is the United States.

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certainly an obstacle to arms control when one side wishes to take an advantage away from the other side and have it ratified by treaty, and the other side knows it, and resists. But it is not an insuperable obstacle. We must be realistic about the arms control process, as both the United States and the Soviet Union have been occasionally in the past. Arms control cannot deliver the political millenium; it cannot eliminate the enmity in U.S.-Soviet relations. It cannot solve the arms race, essentially a symptom of political struggle, by dint of a technological fix. But what arms control has done, and can do again, is to bring a sense of limits to the military competition, and this is no small matter. Past U.S.-Soviet arms control agreements — whatever one thinks of their precise terms — have been exercises in political damage limitation by one side in return for an acknowledgement in essence by the other side that it would not push a military advantage to its limit. In the SALT I Interim Accord, for example, the United States accepted very high offensive ceilings because, had it not done so, its relative position might have been still worse. The Soviet side agreed not to press its advantage in return for the U.S. acknowledgement of strategic parity. The negotiating outcome reflected the momentum of military reality; that reality favored Moscow at the time and so did the agreement. But by agreeing not to press an advantage, Moscow acknowledged implicitly the principle of restraint, of limits, and in that sense, the agreement did more than reflect military realities, it affected their evolution, as well. Geneva will yield maximum benefit if, in return for a Soviet desire to limit the growth of current U.S. strategic arms programs, the United States solves its ICBM vulnerability problem but agrees not to press its growing technological advantages to their limits. As the United States admitted in 1972 that it could no longer act as a militarily superior power, so the Soviets must understand in 1985 that they cannot continue to threaten the U.S. ICBM force without running the risk that the United States will unilaterally put them at an overall disadvantage in a few short years. This is the real deal that is available in Geneva: if Moscow will agree to climb down from its current advantage, then Washington will agree not to maximize the dangers that U.S. military programs could pose in the next decade to the Soviet Union.[17]

This sort of tacit minuet, central to the negotiating process, is an ornament of civilization that adorns an otherwise brutal struggle. Care should be taken not to trivialize the significance of what is, in a sense, a ritual; were it not for such moderating rituals who could say where the arms competition might have already led us? Arms control is not essentially about numbers of this or that weapon; essentially it is threat control. That

[17] The availability of this deal is alluded to in passing in Arnold Horelick, "The Return of Arms Control," *Foreign Affairs, America and the World 1984*, p. 535.

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it ever works is reason for wonder, for why, after all, are weapons produced if not to threaten others — with retribution at the very least? Geneva is an opportunity for each side to reaffirm in plain view of the other that there must be limits to the military competition. The specifics of how this is expressed are important, but not central. More than such a reaffirmation one cannot realistically expect from the current round of talks, or any later rounds of talks, unless and until some fundamental change in the U.S.-Soviet political relationship occurs.

Of course, even this much is a lot to expect. Even if U.S. and Soviet bureaucracies become more adaptable and flexible, even if the United States and the Soviet Union extricate themselves from the self-denying prophecy of their mutual misperception, there are still formidable technical barriers to the basic agreement sketched above. Added to the daunting asymmetry of U.S. and Soviet strategic forces, long bedeviling the SALT process, is the virtual inseparability of the strategic and Euro-strategic theaters, *and* the even more serious problem of integrating measures of offense and defense into a single document. I will not dwell on the problem of theater mergings here; others have looked into this matter, and it is clear that some sort of catchall ballistic missile ceiling must encompass the European theater together with the central strategic balance.[18] The Soviets are not going to give up their advantage there, and the United States cannot, for the sake of Europe, give up the right to redress that advantage. But the competition can be subsumed and constrained if more European theater-relevant systems mean fewer central strategic and defensive systems over all.

The problem of measuring defensive and offensive systems in the same package is crucial because one must expect offensive-defensive mixes to be asymmetrical in coming years. A way must be found to encourage point defense and constrain offensive proliferation, even in the context of continuing ICBM modernization efforts. Viewed in net strategic terms, a vulnerable counterforce-capable system is worth less (and costs more in terms of risk) than a counterforce-capable system that is invulnerable by dint of deceptive or secure basing, mobility, ballistic missile defense, or some combination of the three. Thus, one way to deal with the problem would be to devise a formula whereby every "defended" or otherwise well-protected weapon, wherever based, would entitle the other side to a fixed number of offensive units — defined as a function of the number of re-entry vehicles times yield times general accuracy[19] — times the number of warheads on the platform. (This is necessary to insure

[18] For one suggestion along these lines, see Frye, "Strategic Synthesis," pp. 20-22.

[19] The basic idea may be expressed by the following formulation: $\sum \text{o.u.} = \sum_{i=1}^{n} (\text{r.v.}_{i} \cdot \text{mgt.}_{i} \cdot$

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that the formula does not reward MIRVing, the source of much present trouble.) For every undefended weapon, the other side would be entitled to keep, say, one-half the number of offensive units. This would seem to promote offensive expansion with each investment of point defense were there not strict ceilings and subceilings on offensive systems. Therefore, the total number of offensive units allotted to either side should total no more than a rough estimate of half the requirement of a pre-emptive, disarming first strike.[20] Thus, beyond a certain level of added defense, offense could not keep pace. It would allow the "game" to proceed, but within safer limits. This sort of arrangement, in time, ought to reduce considerably the anxiety of a mutual counterforce world. It would not eliminate all fears of a nuclear strike, but it would considerably narrow the range of scenarios under which even modestly rational people would contemplate such a thing.[21]

If one were to add to this formula a version of the build-down concept, one would have an even better objective. For every new ICBM RV deployed with a certain yield and accuracy, an equal number (if not more) of offensive units would have to be dismantled. Since there is no point in deploying new systems that are not in some ways better than old systems, in practice considerable military assets would be dismantled and this, in and of itself, might dampen both sides' enthusiasm for continued military modernization. The formula should be arranged to encourage smaller yields, greater accuracies, and vastly fewer overall numbers of RVs.

Of course, determining accuracies could be a matter of considerable contention even if one only needed to determine them within

c.e.p.$_1$), where o.u. stands for offensive unit, r.v. stands for re-entry vehicle, mgt. stands for a measure of warhead yield, and c.e.p. stands for circular error probable, the agreed measure of ballistic accuracy.

[20] Calculating the requirements for a first strike can be tricky, depending on which premises are built into the calculation. The common method is to assume the need for two accurate warheads to kill each hard target. If hard targets include missile silos, submarines in port, bombers on the ground, auxiliary bomber runways, and major C^{3}I nodes, then at least twice that number is the number of accurate re-entry vehicles an attacker would need to execute a disarming first strike. So, the notion in the text may be expressed as follows: $\sum \text{o.u.} < \frac{\sum \text{t.s.} \cdot 2\ \text{r.v.}}{2}$, where o.u. is country A's offensive units, where t.s. stands for country B's target sets, and r.v. stands for country A's attacking re-entry vehicles. In the absence of defense, the equation as it stands would allow no more than one re-entry vehicle per target. But since point defense is anticipated, an attacker would need to apportion more than two re-entry vehicles per target. The actual ratio of attacking r.v.s to targets does not change, but the probability that such a shorthanded attack would succeed is greatly reduced.

[21] This idea does not positively penalize vulnerability. A more ambitious, but less negotiable, variant of this formula would be to allow *more* offensive units for vulnerable systems rather than less. This way, no fixed ceilings or subceilings on offensive units would be necessary, the relationship between counterforce systems and defended and undefended targets could "float" up or down, but still within "safe" parameters. Note also that this formula avoids dealing directly with the megatonnage imbalance — a politically sensitive matter — but does deal with its practical consequences.

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say 20 percent of their actual accuracy.[22] Such a need would require either a total ban on telemetry encryption or closer monitoring, perhaps by third country neutrals acting on behalf of the United Nations International Atomic Energy Agency. But both steps are desirable anyway, and neither is impracticable. Using the precedent of counting rules established in the SALT II negotiations, each side would agree that if a certain type of missile achieves a certain accuracy, all missiles of that type are assumed to have the same accuracy (as they are assumed in the SALT II counting rule to carry the maximum number of warheads observed).[23] If, in addition, an agreement on flight test limitations could be secured, the stability of the counting rule would be enhanced. Otherwise, improvements in accuracy that raise the number of offensive units that a side possesses could be adjudicated by the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) on a yearly or twice yearly basis.

This may sound like an immensely complex technical requirement for an arms control agreement, but a lack of technical ingenuity is the least of our problems were there the political will and the clarity of vision to reach a reasonable compromise. Indeed, some of the provisions of SALT II required measurement of things like ICBM dimensional changes to within 5 percent,[24] a task more complicated than the rough measurement of ballistic missile accuracies. But if each side continues to look past the concerns of the other, convinced that the other does not wish to deal in good faith, there will be no details to work out; there will be no progress.

There are, no doubt, those on both sides who hope for failure at Geneva in the belief that unlimited military competition will yield benefits beyond the risks and costs of the competition. Maybe this is so; one cannot deny that there are many historical examples of military buildups leading to victory. But arms control cannot end the arms competition or the U.S.-Soviet struggle, and it need not reward he who deserves no reward. It is essentially an effort to reaffirm that there must be limits, so that the deep clash of U.S and Soviet visions of mankind's future does not end with no future for mankind at all.

[22] Recent revelations about the U.S. misestimation of the c.e.p. of the Soviet SS-19 between 1977 and 1985 spotlight this difficulty, but do not invalidate the general principle.

[23] The reference here is to the SALT II Treaty text, the combination of agreed statements and common understandings that follow Paragraph 5 of Article II, and Paragraph 12 of Article IV.

[24] The reference here is to the SALT II Treaty text, Paragraph 9 of Article 4, especially the Second Common Understanding.

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SOVIET BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE AND NATO*

by David S. Yost

President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), a research program regarding advanced technologies for defense against ballistic missiles, has received a great deal of analytical attention since his March 1983 speech. Soviet ballistic missile defense (BMD) capabilities and research activities have, by contrast, been relatively neglected. This neglect is unfortunate, because it promotes misleading impressions about the strategic context of the SDI, and obscures the fundamental political-military challenges that Soviet BMD could pose.

In a little-noted passage in his controversial speech of March 1985, British Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe referred to "the very considerable research under way in the Soviet Union on a range of potential defensive measures." He added that "Not enough attention has been paid to this Soviet research. It is extensive and far-reaching and has been going on for many years. Any discussion of future Western strategies must take full account of it. To ignore or to dismiss what is happening in the Soviet Union would be not only myopic, it would be dangerous." [1] The specific dangers that Soviet strategic defenses could imply for Western security become apparent in view of the history of Soviet progress in this domain, and the potential for further Soviet advances.

* The views expressed herein are those of the author alone and should not be construed to represent those of the Department of the Navy or any U.S. government agency. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Netherlands Institute of International Relations, Clingendael, conference on "The American Defense Initiative: Implications for West European Security," at the Hague, April 26-27, 1985. The author is grateful to the NATO Fellowship program and to the Fritz Thyssen Foundation for research support, and to Thomas A. Brown, James John Tritten, and John G. Hines for their critical comments. This article is published simultaneously in German in *Europa-Archiv,* the journal of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, Bonn; and in French in *Politique Etrangère,* the journal of the Institut Français des Relations Internationales. Another version is to be published this fall in *NATO Review*.

[1] Speech of March 15, 1985, issued by the British Embassy, Washington, D.C., p. 4.

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Growing "Breakout" or "Creepout" Potential

Despite uncertainties about some achievements of Soviet BMD programs, it is clear that Soviet BMD deployments in the 1960s preceded those of the United States, just as Soviet BMD research in the late 1940s and 1950s was launched prior to U.S. research efforts.[2] Soviet BMD activities have always been distinctive in taking operational considerations most seriously. For example, during their high-altitude nuclear test series in 1961 and 1962 (which included a fifty-eight-megaton yield explosion, by far the largest in history), the Soviets launched missiles from Kapustin Yar to the impact area associated with the BMD research center at Sary Shagan.[3]

Moreover, Soviet BMD efforts have always been marked by an interest in prompt operational applications — deploying capabilities in the field as soon as possible. This interest led them in the 1960s to deploy three systems of marginal value: the Griffon system near Leningrad, so disappointing that it was dismantled by 1964; the initial SA-5 array in the so-called Tallinn Line, which had marginal capability at best against early-generation U.S. sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) like Polaris A-1; and the Moscow system composed of Galosh interceptor missiles and various radars. The Moscow system of the late 1960s was vulnerable to decoys and chaff as well as nuclear effects, and could only defend against small attacks. The obvious inability of the Moscow system to cope with the predictable expansion of U.S. retaliatory capabilities through multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicle (MIRV) warheads no doubt contributed to the Soviet decision to support the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty — as did the fact that U.S. BMD technology at that time was superior to that of the USSR.

After the ABM Treaty and its 1974 Protocol limited the United States and the Soviet Union to a single BMD site each, Soviet BMD investments steadily increased. In contrast, U.S. investments in BMD activities fell after the conclusion of these agreements, and after the 1975 congressional directive to close down the Safeguard system in North Dakota. Some experts estimate that the allocation of resources shifted from an approximate two to one advantage favoring the United States in BMD technology and development spending in the late 1960s to a possible

[2] Sayre Stevens, "The Soviet BMD Program," in Ashton B. Carter and David N. Schwartz, eds., *Ballistic Missile Defense* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1984), pp. 189, 191-192; and Robert P. Berman and John C. Baker, *Soviet Strategic Forces: Requirements and Responses* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1982), p. 147.

[3] Stevens, "Soviet BMD," pp. 193, 195; and Benson D. Adams, *Ballistic Missile Defense* (New York: American Elsevier, 1971), pp. 79, 81.

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Soviet advantage of five to one in 1980.[4] Soviet investments have been concentrated in upgrading the Moscow system, developing potentially BMD-capable surface-to-air missiles, deploying new large phased-array radars, and pioneering exotic technologies such as directed-energy weapons.

Modernization of the treaty-permitted Moscow system became obvious in 1980, when the Soviets began dismantling half of the sixty-four Galosh interceptors. These missiles are being replaced by improved exoatmospheric Galosh interceptors and by new SH-08 high-acceleration endoatmospheric interceptors. The SH-08 is especially significant because it can rely on atmospheric sorting to discriminate real warheads from decoys, and because it is based in silos that may be equipped with an underground automatic reload system.[5] The Soviets are expected to reach the treaty-permitted total of 100 interceptors in the Moscow site by 1987.[6] While the modernized Moscow system (also known as ABM-X-3) includes fixed radars such as the enormous new Pushkino installation, in some ways the Pawn Shop missile guidance radars and Flat Twin tracking radars are more impressive, because of their modular construction. The Flat Twin, in particular, is readily transportable and could be mass-produced, concealed, and deployed fairly rapidly at sites requiring relatively little or no preparation.[7] The president's February 1985 report to the Congress on Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements referred to such "actions with respect to ABM component mobility" as a potential violation of the ABM Treaty.[8]

Three Soviet surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) may have some BMD capability: the SA-5, SA-10, and SA-X-12. Although the SA-5 has been repeatedly improved since the 1960s and was tested some fifty times in conjunction with ballistic missile flights in the early 1970s,[9] the approximately 2,000 SA-5 launchers probably still represent only a mar-

[4] E.C. Aldridge, Jr. and Robert L. Maust, Jr., "SALT Implications of BMD Options," in *U.S. Arms Control Objectives and the Implications for Ballistic Missile Defense,* Proceedings of a Symposium held at the Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, November 1-2, 1979 (Cambridge, Mass.: Puritan Press, 1980), pp. 55-56.

[5] Stevens, "Soviet BMD," pp. 211-212; *Aviation Week and Space Technology,* August 29, 1983, p. 19; and *International Defense Review,* September 1983, p. 1193.

[6] U.S. Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power 1985* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1985), pp. 47-48.

[7] *Aviation Week and Space Technology,* November 14, 1983, p. 23; and *A Quarter Century of Soviet Compliance Practices under Arms Control Commitments: 1958-1983* (Washington, D.C.: General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament, October 1984), pp. 9-10.

[8] *The President's Unclassified Report to the Congress on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements* (The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, February 1, 1985), p. 8.

[9] Testimony regarding "some 50" violations of the ABM Treaty in such tests was given by Admiral Elmo Zumwalt (then Chief of Naval Operations), who adds that "The Soviets should have gotten all the information they need from those tests." Zumwalt testimony in U.S. Senate, Committee on Appropriations, *SALT II Violations, Hearing* before a Subcommittee, 98th Congress, 2nd sess., March 28, 1984 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1984), pp. 68-69.

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ginal BMD capability. The SA-10 is deployed in about 800 launchers, more than half near Moscow, with mobile SA-10s expected to be operational in 1985. According to the U.S. Department of Defense, both the SA-10 and the extensively tested experimental SA-X-12 "may have the potential to intercept some types of U.S. strategic ballistic missiles." [10] All three SAMs are more likely to be able to intercept SLBM warheads than ICBM warheads, because the former are generally slower and offer larger radar cross sections. This is especially significant because SLBMs at sea are, unlike U.S. ICBMs, not subject to Soviet counterforce attack.[11]

The SA-X-12 may also be an anti-tactical ballistic missile (ATBM), in that the U.S. Department of Defense judges that the SA-X-12 "may have the capability to engage the Lance and both the Pershing I and Pershing II ballistic missiles." [12] The SA-X-12 has reportedly been successfully tested against Soviet intermediate-range missiles such as the Scaleboard.[13] The SA-X-12 is also notable because its mobility could enable the Soviets to build thousands of them and conceal them in storage until ready to deploy them relatively rapidly.[14]

The new large phased-array radars (LPARs) under construction in the Soviet Union are significant because they could supplement older radars with hand-over early warning and pointing data for the new ABM-X-3 Moscow system and the potentially BMD-capable SAMs. In February 1985 the U.S. government announced its judgment that one of the new Soviet LPARs, that near Krasnoyarsk, is a violation of the ABM Treaty, given its location hundreds of miles inland and its inward orientation.[15] When the Krasnoyarsk LPAR and the five other similar radars become operational in the late 1980s, the final gaps will be closed in the Soviet BMD radar coverage network.[16] According to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, the LPARs will provide the USSR "a much improved capability for ballistic missile early warning, attack assessment, and targeting" and will be "technically capable of providing battle management support to a widespread ABM system." [17]

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[10] Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power, 1984* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1984), p. 34.

[11] Stevens, "Soviet BMD," pp. 215-6.

[12] Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power, 1985,* p. 48.

[13] Hubertus G. Hoffmann, "A Missile Defense for Europe?" *Strategic Review,* Summer 1984, p. 53; and Michael R. Gordon, "CIA is Skeptical that New Soviet Radar is Part of an ABM Defense System," *National Journal,* March 9, 1985, p. 524.

[14] Robert Cooper, Director of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, cited in *Washington Times,* March 9, 1984, p. 3A.

[15] *President's Report,* p. 8. An informative discussion of the controversy concerning the Krasnoyarsk radar, including various assessments of the Soviet argument that it is a treaty-permitted radar for tracking objects in space, is provided in R. Jeffrey Smith, "U.S. Experts Condemn Soviet Radar," *Science,* March 22, 1985, pp. 1442-1444.

[16] Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power, 1985,* p. 46.

[17] Soviet Strategic Force Developments, testimony before a joint session of the Subcommittee on Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Defense

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Soviet BMD research based on exotic technologies — from hypervelocity kinetic energy railguns to directed energy systems (lasers, particle beams, and radiofrequency signals) — began in the mid-1960s. In 1979, the U.S. Department of Defense estimated that Soviet spending on high-energy lasers was five times that of the United States.[18] The laser programs are especially significant because they represent an area of Soviet advantage and the earliest weaponization prospects.[19] The ground-based lasers at Sary Shagan today seem capable of interfering only with low-altitude U.S. satellites, though some testing against ballistic missile warheads has reportedly already been done. Ground-based laser BMD prototypes of greater effectiveness should not be expected until the late 1980s. Space-based laser BMD systems are not likely until after 2000, and will probably be preceded by space-based anti-satellite lasers.[20]

The Soviet Union is, in short, well ahead of the United States in deployed BMD capability and applied BMD technology. As long ago as 1978, U.S. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown remarked that the U.S. lead in BMD technology had been "greatly diminished" since the approval of the ABM Treaty in 1972.[21] The United States retains superiority in various BMD-relevant technologies, including microelectronics and high-speed data processing; but the Soviet Union takes precedence in applying such technologies to BMD and getting BMD capabilities fielded. The modernization of the Moscow complex, the potentially BMD-capable SAMs, and the new LPARs make it plausible that the Soviets could achieve significant partial BMD coverage in the next decade, well before the U.S. could achieve comparable capabilities. Because of the transportable and concealable nature of many of the components, the actual deployments could be made in months, if the new LPARs were in place — as they will be.[22]

The ABM Treaty, therefore, has not prevented the Soviet Union from making progress toward substantial BMD capabilities. Whether one wishes to characterize the activities as a gradual "creep-out" from the ABM Treaty or the groundwork for a relatively rapid "breakout,"

Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, June 26, 1985, by Robert M. Gates, Chairman, National Intelligence Council, and Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, and Lawrence K. Gershwin, National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs, National Intelligence Council, p. 5.

[18] Mark E. Miller, *Soviet Strategic Power and Doctrine: The Quest for Superiority* (Bethesda, Md.: Advanced International Studies Institute, 1982), p. 244.

[19] Paul Nitze cited in *New York Times,* July 12, 1985; and Paul Nitze, "SDI: The Soviet Program," *Current Policy* no. 717 (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of State, June 28, 1985), p. 2.

[20] *Aviation Week and Space Technology,* January 16, 1984, p. 16; and Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power, 1985,* p. 44.

[21] Harold Brown, *Department of Defense Annual Report Fiscal Year 1979* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978), p. 124.

[22] Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power, 1985,* p. 48.

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The Soviets have the major components for an ABM system that could be used for widespread ABM deployments well in excess of the ABM Treaty limits. . . . they could undertake rapidly paced ABM deployments to strengthen the defenses at Moscow and cover key targets in the western USSR, and to extend protection to key targets east of the Urals, by the early 1990s.[23]

This BMD capability could supplement Soviet offensive forces and other means of strategic defense. Since signing SALT I in 1972, the Soviets have quadrupled the number of warheads on their strategic ballistic missiles. The concomitant accuracy improvements mean that the capability of this missile force to attack hardened military targets has increased more than tenfold.[24] While the Soviets already have ample capabilities to attack all U.S. ICBM silos and launch control facilities, the CIA projects an extensive modernization and expansion of Soviet offensive forces in the next decade. This will include mobile ICBMs (the road-mobile SS-X-25 and the rail-mobile SS-X-24) with more MIRVed warheads and improved accuracy, more and longer-range SLBMs, more mobile SS-20s, and more air-launched cruise missiles on the Bear H bombers and, beginning in 1988 or 1989, on the new Blackjack bombers.[25]

Soviet military doctrine holds that such offensive strike forces could be used pre-emptively, to destroy enemy nuclear systems, and thus limit prospective damage to the Soviet Union. Such damage could be further limited not only by Soviet BMD, but by Soviet air defenses (SAM, fighter-interceptor and radar networks many times denser than those protecting North America and Western Europe) and anti-satellite systems (to degrade U.S. capabilities for intelligence, communications, targeting, and so forth), and by passive defenses such as hardening, concealment, redundancy, dispersal, and mobility. The active and passive defenses are dedicated to protecting the key elements of Soviet war-waging potential — above all, the leadership, the forces, and the command, control and communications systems. The huge investments in counterforce capabilities and passive defenses could simplify the tasks that could remain for active defenses such as BMD, air defenses, and anti-satellite systems.

Why Soviet BMD Matters

A large unilateral expansion of Soviet BMD capabilities could pose dramatic implications for the Atlantic Alliance in contingencies of crisis and war, because it could make Soviet advantages in strategic

[23] Gates and Gershwin, Soviet Strategic Force, pp. 6-7.
[24] Paul Nitze, "SDI and the ABM Treaty," *Current Policy* no. 711 (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of State, May 30, 1985), p. 2.
[25] Gates and Gershwin, Soviet Strategic Force, pp. 1-4.

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defenses — active and passive — more pronounced than they already are. Four major implications for alliance security in war stand out.

First, *the credibility of NATO's strategy of "flexible response" could be reduced.* NATO's flexible response strategy includes the threat of selective employment of nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union, but elements of this threat could be directly countered by Soviet BMD. To the extent that NATO's selective nuclear strike options depend on ICBMs, SLBMs, and shorter-range ballistic missiles such as the Pershing I, Pershing II, and Lance, Soviet BMD could erode the credibility of NATO strategy. The degree to which U.S. "extended deterrence" guarantees would be undone would depend in part on the level of effectiveness of Soviet BMD in denying U.S. ballistic missiles access to the USSR. Aircraft and cruise missiles, perhaps equipped with "stealth" technology to reduce signatures visible to Soviet radars, could also be used; but they would have to penetrate the extremely dense and alerted air defenses of the USSR.

Second, *Soviet prospects for victory in conventional operations could be improved.* The Soviet interest in keeping any eventual war in Europe at the conventional level of operations has been more clearly recognized in recent years. The expansion and modernization of all types of Soviet nuclear forces may be partly explained by an aspiration to undermine the credibility of potential U.S. nuclear responses to Warsaw Pact conventional aggression. Rapid air and ground offensives would try to neutralize NATO's nuclear capabilities in Europe by nonnuclear means, as rapidly as possible.[26]

Prospects for victory in such operations would be enhanced if the Soviets could use BMD to neutralize some of the various "emerging technologies" initiatives of NATO, which are intended to raise the nuclear threshold through enhanced conventional strength. Follow-on-Forces Attack (FOFA) and the Joint Tactical Missile System (JTACMS) and related concepts call for using ballistic missiles such as Lance or Pershing II to deliver advanced conventional sub-munitions against Warsaw Pact airfields and other military targets.[27] But the SA-X-12 may already be capable of intercepting these missiles, and may thus help the Soviet Union in its attempts to gain and hold air superiority — an indispensable key to victory.

Third, *potential Soviet control over the escalation process could be enhanced.* If the Soviet Union were to gain a unilateral BMD

[26] Philip A. Petersen and John G. Hines, "The Conventional Offensive in Soviet Theater Strategy," ORBIS, Fall 1983; and "Military Power in Soviet Strategy Against NATO," *RUSI Journal,* December 1983.

[27] See the discussion of FOFA and JTACMS by General Bernard Rogers in *Air Force Magazine,* February 1985, pp. 20, 23; and Donald R. Cotter, "Potential Future Roles for Conventional and Nuclear Forces in Defense of Western Europe," in *Strengthening Conventional Deterrence in Europe: Proposals for the 1980s,* Report of the European Security Study (London: Macmillan, 1983), pp. 224, 238.

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advantage significantly larger than that at present, the increased asymmetry in the already important differences in relative U.S. and Soviet vulnerabilities could endow the USSR with a more clear-cut ability to try to influence U.S. nuclear employment decisions — that is, to control escalation by "deterring the U.S. deterrent." An enhanced ability to counter and absorb U.S. attacks against the USSR — with the United States less well-defended against Soviet attacks — might enable the Soviets to directly control the scope of nuclear escalation. This could permit the Soviets to project military power into Western Europe with less fear of (or hindrance from) U.S. nuclear retaliation. This could, in turn, increase the operational and political importance of Soviet conventional and shorter-range nuclear force advantages. In short, the Soviets might be able to gain increased confidence in their prospects for confining any future wars to Europe and other contiguous regions, and for avoiding intercontinental nuclear war.

Fourth, *the credibility of the British and French nuclear deterrents could be lowered.* If the U.S. Department of Defense is correct regarding the potential of the SA-10 and SA-X-12 to intercept some types of U.S. strategic ballistic missiles, the Soviets can already expect to have some capability against the British SLBMs and the French SLBMs and IRBMs. Depending on the level of capability achieved, Soviet risks of sustaining damage in war could be reduced. Moreover, the "trigger" threat inherent in a situation of multiple centers of independent nuclear decision making in an alliance could be made more manageable, and Soviet risk calculations could be simplified. Western Europe could be effectively deprived of forces that could furnish one of the practical bases for greater defense unity in the future. If Britain and France cut back on spending for conventional forces to increase their numbers of ballistic missiles, warheads, and penetration aids, the reduced level of conventional capability in Western Europe could facilitate the realization of Soviet plans for conventional victory in the event of war.

These implications in time of war would also be implications for peace, because peacetime perceptions are affected by opinions about likely events in war. The preferred Soviet strategy would be to gain hegemony without war by leading West Europeans and North Americans to a political accommodation to Soviet goals in the face of unmistakably superior Soviet war-waging potential. The Soviets would prefer a victory without war because they recognize the uncertainties in attempting to control nuclear escalation and the likely losses in war, however effective Soviet active and passive defenses become. If the Soviet Union achieved a large unilateral advantage in BMD in addition to superiority in other forms of active and passive defense, Western vulnerability to Soviet mil-

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itary power would be increased, because Soviet vulnerability to retaliation would be reduced. Soviet expectations as to the willingness of the U.S. and allied governments to take risks in order to counter Soviet expansionism could be affected. As David Abshire, the U.S. Ambassador to NATO, has pointed out, "It would be in these circumstances that attempts by Moscow to blackmail the Alliance would become most credible. The ultimate goal of Soviet strategic blackmail clearly would be to separate the United States from its allies in the event of a crisis."[28]

Arms Control Uncertainties

The solution that all Western governments would prefer is arms control. Unfortunately, it is uncertain whether arms control will be able to address the challenges posed by the continuing expansion of the Soviet BMD potential. To begin with, Soviet behavior under the ABM Treaty has been discouraging. The United States has found the Krasnoyarsk radar to be a clear violation of the treaty; and other Soviet activities — the development of mobile BMD system components, testing air defense radars and SAM components in an ABM mode, and preparing the infrastructure for a national territorial defense — have been judged by the U.S. government to be "potential" or "highly probable" violations. As the president has noted, such noncompliance "increases doubts about the reliability of the USSR as a negotiating partner," especially when the Soviets have thus far failed to provide satisfactory explanations or to take corrective actions to alleviate U.S. concerns.[29]

The Soviets have instead rejected the U.S. concerns as baseless, accused the United States of violating the treaty, and demanded that the United States reaffirm the treaty by dropping the Strategic Defense Initiative,[30] a research program that is in fact being conducted within the treaty's constraints. This Soviet reaction may be explained in part by a Soviet desire to protect the advantages earned through their massive investments in passive and active forms of strategic defense, including BMD. As Paul Nitze has suggested, "It is not unreasonable to conclude that they would like to continue to be the only ones pressing forward in this field . . . The Soviets hope to foster a situation in which we would unilaterally restrain our research effort, even though it is fully consistent with existing treaties. This would leave them with a virtual monopoly in advanced strategic defense research; they see this as the most desirable

[28] David M. Abshire, "SDI — The Path to a More Mature Deterrent," *NATO Review*, April 1985, p. 15.

[29] *President's Report*, pp. 1, 7-9.

[30] Gorbachev cited in *Washington Post*, July 6, 1985.

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outcome."[31] For this reason, the Soviets have to date rejected the U.S. government's concept of studying the potential for a mutually beneficial defense-dominant world; the Soviets appear to be more attracted by their vision of a unilaterally beneficial Soviet-dominant world.

Further grounds for doubt about the feasibility of using negotiated constraints to control Soviet BMD reside in the purposeful rationale that seems best to explain Soviet BMD activities. Soviet BMD programs cannot, for example, be explained through a simple action-reaction "arms race" model, because Soviet BMD research and deployment programs preceded those of the United States. Marked increases in Soviet efforts in all forms of strategic defense came in the mid-to-late 1970s, well before the March 1983 speech that launched the U.S. SDI. In most areas of strategic defense — air defense, civil defense, hardening of leadership command shelters, etc. — the United States has not reacted to Soviet initiatives; the Soviets have not been imitating U.S. strategic defense programs, for the U.S. programs have been, and remain, quite modest. Nor can Soviet BMD and other strategic defense programs be accounted for by a reassuringly benign "bureaucratic politics" model. Although internal political struggles no doubt help to shape these programs, they are too costly and too coherently purposeful to be explained away as the uncoordinated outputs of quasi-independent bureaucracies pursuing their own policies without central direction.

Soviet BMD and other strategic defense efforts appear to represent an attempt to fulfill the demands of Soviet military doctrine within prevailing technological and political constraints. Most Western experts agree that the Soviets see deterrence as the product of operationally credible capabilities for war-fighting, war-survival, and victory.[32] No concept is more alien to Soviet military though than viewing Soviet vulnerability to enemy weapons as a desirable situation. Continued development of the Soviet BMD potential appears certain, whatever the fate of U.S. BMD research projects, because the Soviets would like to undermine the credibility of NATO's "flexible response" strategy and gain other critical strategic advantages.

From this perspective, it is apparent that the Soviets may well have signed the ABM Treaty for motives distinct from endorsing a principle of mutual vulnerability. Although some in the West continue to assume that the Soviets approved this principle by signing the treaty, other motives may have inspired the Soviets. These possible motives include leaving U.S. ICBMs and other hardened targets unprotected and vulnerable to

[31] Nitze, "SDI: The Soviet Program," p. 3.

[32] Benjamin S. Lambeth, *The State of Western Research on Soviet Military Strategy and Policy*, N-2230-AF (Santa Monica, Ca.: Rand Corporation, October 1984), pp. 13-15.

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Soviet attack; causing a cutback in U.S. BMD efforts; gaining time for Soviet BMD technology to catch up with the United States in some areas, and excel the United States in others; and enabling the Soviet Union to deploy an infrastructure for possible "creepout" or "breakout" from the treaty. The fact that Soviet BMD capabilities of that era were not likely to be as effective in protecting the USSR against U.S. multiple-warhead ICBMs as Soviet counterforce attacks against those missiles was probably the decisive consideration. This interpretation has the advantage of being consistent with Soviet force posture trends since the treaty was concluded in 1972 — an expansion of Soviet strategic defenses and of offensive counterforce capabilities.

Western Response Options

Although the United States will, with the support of its allies, continue to seek arms control solutions in negotiations with the Soviet Union, the uncertain prospects of such cooperative solutions necessitate the consideration of possible unilateral responses. If in years to come the Soviet Union gained a large unilateral advantage in BMD, the adverse implications could be partially addressed through improved U.S. abilities to penetrate Soviet BMD. As was pointed out by the President's Commission on Strategic Forces (the Scowcroft Commission) in April 1983, it is particularly important to be able

> to counter any improvement in Soviet ABM capability by being able to maintain the effectiveness of our offensive systems. The possibility of either a sudden breakthrough in ABM technology, a rapid Soviet breakout from the ABM treaty by a quick further deployment of their current ABM systems, or the deployment of air defense systems also having some capability against strategic ballistic missiles all point to the need for us to be able to penetrate some level of ABM defense. This dictates continued attention to having sufficient throwweight for adequate numbers of warheads and of decoys and other penetration aids.[33]

Improved U.S. abilities to penetrate Soviet air and ballistic missile defenses against U.S. intercontinental, intermediate- and shorter-range systems would help to prevent the Soviets from gaining a great advantage in escalation control capabilities. Improved penetration means could also hinder Soviet efforts to undermine the credibility of NATO's "flexible response" strategy and to defeat NATO's "emerging technologies" programs. The same principle would apply to maintaining the penetration credibility of British and French forces, so as to continue to complicate Soviet risk calculations.

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[33] *Report of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces,* April 1983, p. 12.

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Penetration capabilities would not in themselves constitute a sufficient response to Soviet BMD, however. Vigorous research and development efforts in BMD technologies are necessary, in order to be prepared to respond to the contingency of a fairly rapid expansion of existing Soviet BMD capabilities in a sufficiently timely fashion. Such research efforts could also help to deter the Soviets from further violations of the ABM Treaty and/or from undertaking a more clear-cut "breakout" or "creepout" from its constraints.

If Soviet behavior necessitated the deployment of BMD capabilities in NATO countries, BMD could help to avert the adverse consequences of what would otherwise be an even larger Soviet advantage in strategic defenses. BMD in Western Europe and North America would prevent the Soviets having a "free ride" against critical targets and enlarge the uncertainties facing Soviet attack planners. Moreover, BMD could prevent the asymmetries in vulnerability between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, owing to the much greater Soviet investments in all types of strategic defense, from growing dangerously great and tempting for the Soviets. As Paul Nitze has argued, "What we must do is give the Soviets grounds for concluding that we in the West are prepared to maintain sufficient political will and military capability to ensure deterrence of any possible aggression, conventional or nuclear. We must bring them to realize that their buildup cannot and will not be translated into an exploitable military or political advantage."[34]

In other words, the West must prevent dangerous Soviet assessments as to simplified risks and, thus, avert an increase in Western susceptibility to coercion. This can only be done through a balanced program of improved options for offensive and defensive deployments, to be implemented as necessary for the maintenance of stable deterrence. What would be imprudent and destabilizing would be leaving Soviet offensive and defensive investments unanswered. To leave the BMD field to the Soviet Union alone would be a prescription for strategic instability and Western vulnerability to Soviet military power.[35]

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[34] Paul Nitze, "The Objectives of Arms Control," *Current Policy* no. 677 (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of State, March 28, 1985), p. 5.

[35] For further reflections on the implications of BMD for Western security, see David S. Yost, "Ballistic Missile Defense and the Atlantic Alliance," *International Security,* Fall 1982, and David S. Yost, "European Anxieties about Ballistic Missile Defense," *Washington Quarterly,* Fall 1984.

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THE SOVIET SUCCESSION CRISIS AND ITS AFTERMATH

by R. Judson Mitchell and Teresa Gee

The election of Mikhail Gorbachev as general secretary of the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) Central Committee on March 11, 1985, marked a turning point for the Soviet political system. After several years of instability in the top leadership, the USSR could now expect long-term occupancy of the regime's highest post. Clearly, a vastly different situation, pregnant with hope, opportunity, and peril, faced decision makers in both the Soviet Union and the outside world.

Assessment of the significance of leadership turnover in the Kremlin requires a look beyond the emergence of a young charismatic leader to the trends and prospects of the Soviet system as a whole. Specifically, it is necessary to consider the phenomenon of succession crisis, which is central to the rhythmic, in a sense biological, cycles of stability and instability in Soviet politics. A crisis denotes the unsettling of the normal pattern of hierarchical organization of the system; such crises are linked to expectations concerning the political and physical longevity of the party leader. The crisis initiated by the physical debility of Leonid Brezhnev had been continuous since at least the spring of 1979. The election of Gorbachev promised a resolution of this extended crisis but, because selection of a new general secretary triggers no immediate wholesale turnover of personnel, scarcely guaranteed that this "Time of Troubles" had indeed ended.

Crises of succession are not confined to the Soviet Union and Soviet-type systems. The United States faced traumatic succession crises in 1963 and 1974, with profound effects both domestic and foreign. Moreover, American electoral processes and constitutional requirements dictate frequent changes of leadership, whereas the Soviets may, under normal circumstances, anticipate a long run for a leader. But the institutionalized frequency of political change in America cushions the shock of transition; the rarity of such turnover in the USSR renders it more

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difficult. Special circumstances in the early 1980s produced a dizzying pace of leadership turnover in Moscow, without any accompanying change in the institutional context. The result, not unexpected, was an apparent disorientation in the direction of Soviet affairs.

In the West, attention focuses upon the identity of potential successors and the atmosphere of Byzantine intrigue surrounding the Soviet succession. Neither of these aspects can be ignored. Given the propensity of the system toward one-man leadership, the identity of the party leader is certainly important. And the atmospherics reflect a constant of the Russian political scene. Long before the advent of the Bolsheviks, Russia experienced succession crises, notably those of 1762, 1801, and 1825, during an era when the identity of the successor was supposedly spelled out formally. Nevertheless, the identity of the successor is much less important than the underlying forces that sustain the leadership. Further, while the evident continuity of Russian political culture is certainly interesting from a historical perspective, the persistence of succession struggles is probably best regarded as a manifestation of the structural similarity of Czarist and Soviet regimes and a recurring flaw in the bureaucratic organization of power.[1]

Thus, succession is considered here as a general, probably the most crucial, problem of the Soviet regime, with considerations of systemic structure taking precedence over the conflict of personalities. Obviously, in important behavioral aspects, the Soviet system works differently when enmeshed in a succession crisis than when engaged in normal operation. Key questions that need to be considered include the following: What accounts for prolongation of the contemporary crisis? What are the effects, immediate and long-range, of this lengthy disarray in the hierarchy? Has the structure of the Soviet system undergone a fundamental evolution, so that consequences of the present crisis might differ from those observed in the aftermath of earlier ones? Finally, is the succession crisis of the 1980s over, or will processes of restabilization require several more years? Before we proceed to an exploration of these questions, it seems essential to bring greater precision and clarity to the concept of succession crisis.

The Succession Problem

A popular misconception about Soviet succession is reflected in the following statement which appeared in an American news magazine on the eve of the XXV Congress: "Since there exists no formalized mech-

[1] See Henry Jacoby, *The Bureaucratization of the World* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), pp. 61-83.

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anism for the transfer of power in the U.S.S.R., a crisis inevitably occurs when a leader dies or is ousted."[2]

There is, indeed, a specific formalized mechanism for the transfer of power. When a vacancy occurs in the general secretaryship, a plenum of the Central Committee elects a new leader. In practice, the Politburo selects the successor and the Central Committee ratifies the choice of the party hierarchs. But the procedure is definite and is as unquestioned as that of any Western political system, with no doubt about consensual acceptance of the process of decision making. Thus, succession in the Soviet Union is not a problem caused by the absence of a formalized mechanism for the transfer of power.

Further, the succession problem is not, as commonly supposed, primarily a matter of difficulty in the choice of a particular candidate. The selection is certainly not automatic, but Soviet history indicates a certain obvious quality about the choice of a new general secretary. Beginning with Stalin, the leader has been, at the time of his accession, the senior member of the Politburo in rank serving in the party Secretariat. If we add years of service as a full Politburo member and years of service in the Secretariat, an interesting pattern emerges. The totals for the party leaders after Stalin are as follows: Khrushchev, seventeen; Brezhnev, twelve; Andropov, fifteen; and Chernenko, thirteen. Taking the minimum number as a guideline, we might label the apparent systemic propensity as the "Rule of Twelve." The record demonstrates a clear tendency toward selection of a leader with certain specific qualifications of office-holding and experience. Of course, seniority must be heavily qualified by considerations of rank. Suslov far outdistanced Brezhnev in Politburo and Secretariat tenure; Kirilenko similarly had many more years of such service than did Andropov. But the protocol standings of the persons named was not in question; the rank of potential successors was quite obvious, certainly to insiders. Identification of the senior Politburo-Secretariat member could conceivably be a problem, but it does not appear to have been one in the past.

When the Politburo faced the necessity of choosing a successor to Konstantin Chernenko, there were only two persons qualified to be leader on the basis of dual membership in the Politburo and Secretariat: Gorbachev and Grigori Romanov. As of the spring of 1985, the combined years of service in the Politburo and Secretariat totaled eleven for both men. This is a bit short in terms of the historical record, but the minimal figure emerging from precedents is not a fixed standard; our "Rule of Twelve" simply dictates selection of a candidate with extensive experience on, and incumbency in, both the Politburo and Secretariat.

[2] *Time*, March 1, 1976, p. 28.

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Absent the terminal illness of Chernenko, Gorbachev, before attaining the general secretaryship, would surely have surpassed twelve years of accumulated combined service, as he will reach that milestone in the fall of 1985. Further, following the accession of Chernenko, Gorbachev was consistently accorded a higher protocol rank than Romanov and, after February 1984, was clearly recognized as number two man in the party. Thus, the obvious quality of Gorbachev's succession is not merely a matter of hindsight.

Another aspect of leadership selection merits consideration here. All of the successors have been senior (or "second") party secretaries but, at the time of succession, have had relatively brief tenures in that rank. In the five successions from 1953 to 1985, time in grade for these senior secretaries ranged from four to fifteen months. This suggests that jockeying for the succession is a continuous process, with early candidates succumbing to physical and political attrition and the prize going to the survivor. More profoundly, it suggests that anticipation of leadership transition impels political actors to attempt to work out the configuration of power for the approaching changeover. The elevation of Gorbachev probably fits this image of transition more clearly than any other accession in Soviet history.

If the succession problem is not engendered by absence of a formal mechanism for the transfer of power and if it is not primarily a matter of difficulty in selection, what then is the problem? Essentially, the problem is that the Soviet system is not a monolith as envisaged both by the Leninist model of party organization and by Western conceptions of totalitarianism. Rather, it is a seamless web of competing and overlapping political structures. Cohesion of these structures is necessary for the control of Soviet society by the regime. That cohesion is put into question by leadership transition because a succession crisis offers both temptation and opportunity for the various interests to attempt maximization of their influence. Until the crisis is resolved by re-establishment of definite lines of authority, the system suffers from an abnormal level of instability, with a consequent tendency toward indecisiveness, even immobility, in the formulation of policy. Thus, there is a natural tendency to seek preservation of existing lines of authority as long as possible and to avoid the unsettling effects of succession. It is worth noting that Khrushchev, the only party leader to be ousted in Soviet history, in effect created his own succession crisis by disrupting the existing lines of authority through his party reorganization and frequent personnel shuffles. In addition in the 1964 succession, the leadership united in opposition to Khrushchev; yet this relatively cohesive hierarchy was inhibited for several years in the formulation and execution of policy, particularly in foreign affairs.

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A succession crisis introduces an element of disequilibrium into Soviet politics that cannot be avoided by a facade of "collective leadership." The length of the current succession crisis has compounded the usual systemic difficulties accompanying processes of transition. At the same time, the length of the crisis has afforded ample opportunity for working out the systemic interrelationships that are disrupted by the uncertainties associated with succession. In terms of policy, the Soviet system has been to a certain extent on hold in recent years; yet it has been simultaneously involved in the formation of a framework for the exercise of power by an extended leadership. This accounts for the emergence of Gorbachev as a stronger leader from the outset than was anticipated by Western observers.

System Structure and Succession

The Soviet system is often viewed by Western analysts as based upon a triangular power relationship, involving party, army, and KGB.[3] This is something of an oversimplification. There are other interests, notably the governmental economic bureaucracy, that exert influence derived from performance of key functions within the system. Moreover, there is a diversity of interests within major identifiable "pressure groups" and an overlapping of allegiances crossing organizational boundaries. Nevertheless, a model of the Soviet system featuring this triangular power relationship is useful, and not merely for heuristic purposes; it reflects an essential reality of Soviet politics.

The army and the KGB are the indispensable coercive supports of the system. On the other hand, the party is the essential coordinator of the system and provides the necessary legitimizing element without which the behavior of the coercive agencies would appear merely the exercise of raw power. Even during periods when the party's influence appears diminished vis-à-vis that of other system structures, its "leading role" is given strong rhetorical emphasis.[4] Without the party's "leading role," the Soviet system as we know it would cease to exist.

Within this complex organizational system, the party's role in the hierarchical functioning of authority is crucial. Given the extreme functional complexity of the system, there is inevitably a significant diffusion of power in both the making and execution of policy. But this is

[3] Viktor Suvorov, *Inside the Soviet Army* (New York: MacMillan, 1982) pp. 22-25.

[4] For the standard view of the party's "leading role" maintained during the Brezhnev era, see "Leninskoe edinstvo partii i naroda" [Leninist Unity of Party and People], *Kommunist,* no. 6, April 1975, pp. 5-13. For a later statement emphasizing the dangers of alternative models of socialism, see Konstantin U. Chernenko, "Avangardnaya rol partii kommunistov. Vazhnoye usloviye eyo vozrastania" [The Leading Role of the Party of Communists: An Important Condition for its Growth], *Kommunist,* no. 6, April 1982, pp. 44-53.

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balanced by an overwhelming centralization in the making of major policy decisions and in the overall constitution of authority. Whatever measure of independence may be enjoyed in day-to-day affairs by lower level elements, the central "levers of command" exercise ultimate control through a monopoly of personnel selection from top to bottom, via the operation of the *nomenklatura*. The selection of a party leader is the supreme act in the personnel selection process and is inseparable from the general activity of bureaucratic staffing. Election of a general secretary is, thus, not an isolated event, a specific decision based upon immediate considerations of candidate preference. Rather, it is based upon a foundation of prior personnel selection and obtains its greatest significance through the context it provides for the subsequent filling of offices. In this view, however important particular policy questions may be, their resolution is ultimately dependent upon the positioning of office-holders within the system. Thus, the key question for systemic authority and cohesion is this: who controls the flow of personnel?

Here, two key structures, both agencies of the party, occupy central positions. The Secretariat is the primary coordinator of the party in both its internal activities and in its supervisory role; the Politburo is the supreme coordinator of all the structural elements of the system. Membership in both the Secretariat and Politburo gives one a foothold in each of the principal "levers of command"; thus, it is not surprising that the general secretary, when elected, invariably holds such joint membership. Furthermore, these two peak party bodies, like all structures in the Soviet system, are subject to a rather clear hierarchical ordering, reflected in the exceptional concern for protocol ranking. The attention given to such matters by Kremlinologists is not a game; the protocol precedence of leading political figures is a fair indicator of the underlying distribution of power within the system. Nothing else betrayed the unusual fluidity of authority relationships following Chernenko's election as did the unusual seating arrangements for Politburo and Secretariat members at the April 1984 session of the USSR Supreme Soviet.[5]

One important aspect of the system's protocol ranking is always largely hidden from view. This concerns composition of the Defense Council, the shadowy inner core of the political leadership concerned with national security policy. Only the identity of the chairman is publicly revealed; all recent party leaders have been identified as holders of this

[5] Full and candidate members usually occupy four rows of seats in one section, seated according to political ranking, with non-Politburo Secretariat members behind or beside candidate members. At this session, full and candidate members and secretaries were scattered over two sections. Candidate members Chebrikov, Dolgikh, and Shevardnadze were seated in the front row of one section with full members Solomantsev, Shcherbitsky, and Kunaev directly behind them. (See *New York Times,* April 12, 1984).

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post.[6] It is believed that the prime minister and minister of defense are members of this body, usually joined by the two Politburo members highest in rank and not included ex officio. Probable members, as of September 1984, were Chernenko, Prime Minister Nikolai Tikhonov, Defense Minister Dimitri Ustinov, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, and Gorbachev. The Defense Council is presumably mainly concerned with foreign policy issues but if it does possess the importance usually attributed to it, then its members are likely to exert disproportionate influence in primary matters of personnel selection, particularly those directly related to national security, such as the dismissal of Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov from the Chief of Staff's post in September 1984.

The next hierarchical level concerned with personnel selection includes three sectors of the party apparatus: The Main Political Administration (MPA) of the armed forces; the Department of Administrative Organs (DAO); and the Cadres Department. The MPA has the responsibility for vetting military promotion recommendations with reference to political reliability. The DAO supposedly must approve all personnel changes in the security organs and procuracy, and all major actions initiated by the KGB and the militia. The Cadres Department of the Central Committee supervises all appointments within the party organization. Thus, the flow of personnel in the three supposed pillars of the regime — party, army, and police — is at least theoretically directed by mechanisms at the center of the party apparatus. Control of these mechanisms should assure dominance of the system as a whole and succession struggles apparently revolve around these sectors of the apparatus.

The most recent succession crisis featured the cyclical diminution of central party authority that seems endemic to the Soviet political process. This cyclical effect proceeds roughly as follows. A new leader must strengthen the central party apparatus in order to establish hegemony over the system. But in the course of an extended leadership, several factors — including frictions within the party hierarchy, need for support for policy initiatives, and expectations concerning the next round of succession — lead to an erosion of the authority of the central apparatus. This natural attrition of party leadership was compounded under Brezhnev by two gambits consciously pursued by the party leaders to assure his formal authority.

First, the "stability of cadres" policy reassured middle-level officials of job security, thus avoiding the fatal pitfall of Khrushchev. At the same time, this policy greatly inhibited the flow of personnel to the center and contributed to the striking aging of the leadership and the

[6] *Krasnaya zvezda*, April 7, 1976; *Pravda*, May 9, 1983; BBC broadcast, February 28, 1984.

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absence of viable candidates for top positions in an extended leadership.[7] Second, Brezhnev's "depoliticization" strategy, designed to promote consensus by a politics of bargaining among major interests, strengthened functional sectors of the system at the expense of the central party apparatus.[8] The resulting diffusion of power was not an inevitable development due to increasing functional complexity of a maturing polity. Rather, it was principally a matter of the atrophy of the party's "levers of command."

In these circumstances, it was not surprising that Brezhnev was followed by two "non-traditional" leaders. It was not only their ages and states of health that lent a transitional aura to the tenures of Andropov and Chernenko. It has long been assumed by most Sovietologists that the general consolidation of authority associated with long-term leadership can be carried out only by a "traditional" leader, one with varied and extensive experience at several levels of the party and with a broad "organizational tail," an informal network of clients and supporters within the party.[9] This assumption seems to have retained its validity. Both Andropov and Chernenko lacked such deep roots in the party organization, and the deficiency was a severe handicap for their leaderships.

The extended succession crisis that began in 1979 can be regarded as a partial consequence of the absence of an obvious "traditional" candidate for the leadership and as an erratic search for such a figure. More consequential was the imperative need for restoration of a measure of equilibrium in the framework of authority relationships. Given the party's legitimizing role in the system and the practical absence of an organizing mechanism outside the party, such a restabilization could be achieved only with the revival of the party's "levers of command." Thus, for all its unusual features, the recent transitional phase has followed the pattern of all previous Soviet succession crises. Resolution of the crisis demands the establishment or restoration of a strong directive force at the party center, and this is almost solely dependent upon control of, and changes in, the flow of personnel. Having established this frame of reference, we can now consider the interplay of political forces that constitutes the working out of the succession crisis of the 1980s.

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[7] cf. Robert E. Blackwell, Jr., "Cadres Policy in the Brezhnev Era," *Problems of Communism*, March-April 1979, p. 36.

[8] Gail Warshofsky Lapidus, "The Brezhnev Regime and Directed Social Change: Depoliticization as Political Strategy," in Alexander Dallin, ed., *The Twenty-Fifth Congress of the CPSU: Assessment and Context* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1977), pp. 26-28.

[9] Grey Hodnett, "Succession Contingencies in the Soviet Union," *Problems of Communism*, March-April 1975, pp. 1-21; Seweryn Bialer, *Stalin's Successors: Leadership, Stability and Change in the Soviet Union* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 77.

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Renewal and Realignment of the System

When the newly constituted Central Committee met in March 1981, following the XXVI CPSU Congress, for the first time in more than fifty years of congresses, no changes whatever were made in composition of the upper party elite — full and candidate Politburo members and Secretariat.[10] Personnel mobility seemed to have come to a virtual halt and the system was stuck on dead center in terms of capability for policy initiatives. The enervating effects of "stability of cadres" had been patently demonstrated in the previous year with the installation of two septuagenarian cronies of Brezhnev from his home town in the Ukraine, Nikolai Tikhonov and Ivan Arkhipov, as premier and first deputy premier. As the actuarial tables indicated that the static condition of the leadership could not long endure, behind the facade of monolithic unity the system braced for an approaching storm. The death of Mikhail Suslov, the powerful second secretary of the Central Committee, in January 1982, exposed a furious struggle for the reins of power.

One notable exception to the general stagnation of the leadership had been the meteoric rise of Mikhail Gorbachev from regional party secretary in Stavropol to full Politburo membership within the space of twenty-three months. Gorbachev's advancement was evidently not inspired by any desire for the injection of a measure of youthful vigor into the gerontocracy. Rather, it reflected the clientage arrangements and sharing of positions within the Brezhnev-Suslov coalition. The elevation of Gorbachev was neatly paired with promotions for Brezhnev clients Chernenko and Tikhonov. Gorbachev, party leader in the Suslov bailiwick of Stavropol, moved into the slot previously occupied by another Suslov client, the deceased agriculture secretary Fedor Kulakov, also a former first secretary of the Stavropol *kraikom*. Thus, although Gorbachev's youth was in striking contrast to the general hoariness of his colleagues, his cooption into the hierarchy did not upset the distribution of power among the principal figures of the leadership.

Further, Gorbachev's relative youth and inexperience meant that he posed no immediate threat as a candidate for the succession. When his patron Suslov died, there was no diminution in Gorbachev's status, for two reasons. First, the death of Suslov did not precipitate the disintegration of his patronage network; his clients remained in place, in key positions, and Gorbachev, as the ranking member of the Suslov wing of the party, was the natural heir to the loyalties of this legion of officeholders. Second, Gorbachev had another powerful patron in the person of Yuri Andropov. Gorbachev's chances for long-term leadership de-

[10] *Pravda*, March 4, 1981.

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pended upon an extended succession crisis, now virtually guaranteed by the political circumstances. For the moment, Gorbachev and his associates could only supply useful allies in the next phase of the succession struggle.

Two issues figured prominently in that next phase. The parlous state of the Soviet economy provided powerful behind-the-scenes arguments for an alternative to the "Dnieper Mafia"; actual policy initiatives in this area had to await the coming transfer of power. A second issue, that of corruption, offered a more immediately useful weapon for the forces grouping around Andropov. An increase in corruption had been partially a by-product of the excessive security for officials entailed by "stability of cadres"; particularly affected were certain areas and levels of the party and the militia.

In the winter and spring of 1982, the "Boris the Gypsy" scandal erupted, fanned to white heat by the not entirely subtle activities of Andropov's KGB, touching Brezhnev's own family, thereby tainting the image of the leader and, by association, that of his heir-apparent, Chernenko. Meanwhile, the issue of the notorious corruption in Krasnodar *krai,* where Brezhnev protégé Sergei Medunov occupied the first secretary's post, was revived with telling effect. The issue had first been raised in 1979 by Vitali Vorotnikov, then first deputy premier of the Russian Republic, and by Viktor Afanasyev, editor of *Pravda.* A swift counterattack by the Brezhnevites resulted in the exile of Vorotnikov to Cuba as ambassador and almost cost Afanasyev his job. In the spring of 1982, the constellation of political forces was vastly different, and the tottering Brezhnev was forced to acquiesce in the June 1982 dismissal of Medunov and his replacement by his old foe Vorotnikov.[11]

As spectacular as was the virtually unprecedented public washing of the regime's dirty linen, more important was the fact of disarray at the party's center. The absence of strong "traditional" figures opened the way for an "outsider" such as Andropov and the succession was really decided at the May 1982 Central Committee plenum, when Andropov returned to the Secretariat as Suslov's successor. His victory was made possible by the support of an informal coalition including the KGB and the military, the Suslov "organizational tail," and veteran bureaucrats Gromyko and Ustinov. This sufficed for immediate purposes but, after his installation as General Secretary in November 1982, Andropov was compelled to attempt correction of his notable deficiency as an authoritative leader by the construction, almost from scratch, of his own "organizational tail."

Given Andropov's roots and organizational support, it was widely expected that elite recruitment during his tenure would feature

[11] See Zhores A. Medvedev, *Andropov* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1983), pp. 15-16, 140-41.

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the co-option of personnel from the coercive forces, especially the KGB. There was considerable movement from the KGB into the militia, and three men with security police backgrounds were promoted to important posts: Geidar Aliev, named to full Politburo rank and a first deputy premiership in November 1982; Viktor Chebrikov, appointed as head of the KGB in December 1982; and Boris Pugo, elected first secretary of the Latvian CP in April 1984 (his appointment was apparently already in the mill prior to Andropov's death). Vitali Fedorchuk, interim head of the KGB, was moved laterally to the top post in the militia. But expectations of a general outflow of KGB personnel were not fulfilled. Instead, the newcomers were drawn almost entirely from the ranks of party officials and governmental economic managers. In the process of building his own "organizational tail," Andropov vastly hastened the unavoidable general cadre turnover. And his drive for party renewal followed a clear pattern of recruitment, a pattern which retains its saliency in the Gorbachev era.

First, almost without exception, the new appointees were younger than their predecessors, the age difference ranging up to twenty years at the regional secretary level. Second, there was a strong tendency toward the promotion of men with demonstrated and specific experience in the economy. This tendency had not been lacking in the Brezhnev era but now became pronounced. Clearly, the main thrust of Andropov's domestic policy was revival of the moribund Soviet economy. The centerpiece of the economic drive was the campaign for labor discipline, which achieved some spectacular initial results but ran out of steam after a few months. This outcome may be partially attributed to Andropov's physical decline. But the main reason was that until the last weeks of his life, Andropov simply had not placed a sufficient number of reformers in key positions for a sustained drive on the economic front. At that point, the accession of Chernenko intervened, checking the reform effort.

During the thirteen months of Chernenko's leadership, personnel turnover proceeded slowly. But the shattering blow dealt to "stability of cadres" by Andropov continued to produce effects. The party had been subjected to a major overhaul at various levels, altering composition of the political elite sufficiently to limit the exercise of authority by Chernenko. Moreover, cadre restaffing with members of the Old Guard was precluded by the presence of Gorbachev, who retained the responsibility for personnel matters assigned him by Andropov in 1983.

Most notable was the turnover at the *oblast* and *krai* level. Thirty-two of the 157 regional secretaries had been replaced under Andropov, including eighteen of the 120 considered automatically qualified for the Central Committee by virtue of rank.[12]

[12] Associated Press, February 2, 1984.

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Regular elections of regional party committees in late winter 1983-84 had provided a special opportunity for personnel change. This opening was exploited by Andropov's associates in the Central Committee, their actions given a sense of urgency by knowledge of the leader's failing health. Some new appointees had been second secretaries in their regions; some were shifted from lower ranking posts in other regions; others were transferred from Moscow to the provinces. Overall, the new appointees reflected the goal of greater expertise in management of the economy and the desire to introduce younger men into positions of responsibility, in line with Andropov's August 1983 call for generational turnover.[13]

More than two decades had passed since the last shakeup of similar proportions and it must have produced a powerful psychological effect upon cadres at all levels. The changes did not affect composition of the Central Committee (this will have to await convening of the XXVII CPSU Congress in 1986) and, in any case, were not sweeping enough to forestall installation of another interim leader. But the balance of political forces in the party had been significantly altered, and the beneficiaries were the "reformers" whom Andropov had ensconced in the central "levers of command."

By far the most important of these key appointments was that of Yegor Ligachev as head of the Cadres Department of the Central Committee in the spring of 1983. At the Central Committee plenum of December 1983, Ligachev was named to the Secretariat. In the Siberian province of Tomsk, Ligachev had established a reputation as a hard-driving economic administrator and a foe of corruption. Taking over the Cadres Department, he displaced Ivan Kapitonov, who remained on the Secretariat with responsibility for consumer affairs. Kapitonov, a longtime close associate of Viktor Grishin, the Moscow party boss, had been the principal executor of the "stability of cadres" policy. The switch to Ligachev clearly indicated the direction of personnel policy and the shifting distribution of power within the party. With the most important "lever of command" in the hands of Andropov, cadre renewal could proceed vigorously. Further, it soon became clear that Gorbachev had become the Politburo member with general supervisory responsibility for cadres.

Almost as important as Ligachev's entry into the apparatus was the appointment of Mikhail Solomentsev to head the party Control Committee in June 1983 as successor to the deceased Arvid Pelshe. Solomentsev, premier of the Russian Federation since 1971 was, like Gorbachev, a client of Suslov and no friend of either the Brezhnev inner circle or "stability of cadres" policy, which together had stymied his

[13] *Pravda,* August 16, 1983.

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career advancement.[14] Solomentsev restaffed the top levels of the Control Committee with associates from the Russian Federation, particularly his former colleague in Chelyabinsk Mikhail Voropaev,[15] and made this agency, so lethargic under Pelshe, the chief party instrument in the drive against corruption.

Andropov's first addition to the Secretariat, in November 1982, was Nikolai Ryzhkov, first deputy head of *Gosplan* and former head of the Uralmash industrial complex in Sverdlovsk.[16] Not only did Ryzhkov exactly fit Andropov's requirement for economic expertise; he was also a client of Andrei Kirilenko, whose patronage network the new leader sought to add to his "organizational tail."[17] A more prominent Kirilenko client, Yakov Ryabov, was made chairman of the State Committee on Foreign Economic Relations and subsequently, under Chernenko, was promoted to a deputy premiership. A close associate of Ryzhkov and Ryabov in *Gosplan,* Nikolai Slyunkov, was the surprise choice in January 1983 as new first secretary of the Belorussian CP.[18]

Another notable appointment in the central apparatus was that of Nikolai Kruchina as head of the Central Committee Department for the Administration of Affairs, the party chancellery, in December 1983.[19] Kruchina, a close associate of Gorbachev, had served under the latter as deputy head of the Agriculture Department. The departments with oversight over the military and the police, the MPA and the DAO, remained in the hands of elderly Brezhnev protégés Aleksei Yepishev and Nikolai Savinkin, who continued to occupy these posts at the time of Gorbachev's election as general secretary. But an element of balance was introduced by bringing Romanov into the Secretariat and giving him responsibility for military affairs; in the early weeks of Chernenko's tenure, he was evidently also assigned supervision of the police.

A number of lesser posts in the Central Committee *apparat* also changed hands under Andropov and at the Union-Republic level, substantial turnover in upper-level positions occurred in Latvia, Belorussia, Georgia, Moldavia, and Uzbekistan. Ligachev's "purge" of regional and district officials in the winter of 1983-84 particularly affected the Ukrainian, Kazakh, and Moscow party organizations.

Barely noticed amid the publicity accorded party renewal, a major turnover had also occurred on the government side. As of April

[14] See John Dornberg, *Brezhnev: The Mask of Power* (New York: Basic Books, 1974), p. 279.
[15] *Pravda,* January 8, 1984.
[16] Ibid., November 23, 1982.
[17] Ryzhkov was named head of the Uralmash heavy machinery plant in Sverdlovsk in the early 1970s at a time when that province was under the personal domination of Kirilenko (see *New York Times,* April 24, 1985).
[18] *Pravda,* January 14, 1983.
[19] Ibid., December 3, 1983.

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1984, twenty-five newcomers had taken their places on the Council of Ministers since Andropov's accession, accounting for more than one-fourth of the positions with ministerial rank. At the upper levels of government, the appointments of Aliev and Vorotnikov were crucial. As First Deputy Prime Minister, Aliev assumed a wide range of functions including reorganization of the railways and the educational system, and soon branched out into foreign affairs. As Solomentsev's successor in the Russian Federation, Vorotnikov continued the ruthless purge of incompetents and corrupt officials that had characterized his reign in Krasnodar.

To sum up: no new leader in Soviet history had carried out such sweeping personnel changes in such a short period following election as general secretary. For obvious reasons, Andropov was a man in a hurry, and the atrophy of the central party apparatus which had facilitated his rise to power also enabled him to exercise a measure of authority unusual, if not unprecedented, for a new leader. True, Andropov's revolution remained incomplete at the time of his death, but it had been sufficient to send shock waves throughout the Soviet system. As it became clear in the winter of 1984-85 that Chernenko's tenure would be short and that Gorbachev was almost certain to be his successor, memories of the brief Andropov era must have conditioned expectations of office-holders at all levels of the system, causing them to adjust their behavior to the approaching victory of the "reformers" and to make the best deals possible under the circumstances. Kazakh CP chief Dinmukhamed Kunaev's fulsome endorsement of Gorbachev at the March special plenum of the Central Committee[20] is probably a case in point.

While Chernenko's tenure did produce a slowdown in party renewal, it did not stop it: sixteen more regional party secretaryships changed hands. And the period was marked by one event with profound implications for resolution of the succession crisis. The dismissal of Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov from the Chief of Staff's position in September 1984 not only simplified the bargaining processes associated with the transition, it also gave evidence that the restoration of authority by the party's central "levers of command" had progressed much further than would usually be expected in the middle stages of a succession crisis. The change in the military high command may have additionally provided the final insurance for the accession of Gorbachev.

Various explanations were proffered by Kremlinologists for the firing of Ogarkov, including the fallout from the 1983 KAL airliner incident and disagreements over military allocations and weapons procurement. Whatever the validity of such speculation, Ogarkov's previous position

[20] Dusko Doder, " 'A Nice Smile, But Iron Teeth': Gorbachev's Smooth Rise," *Washington Post,* March 17, 1985.

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in the Soviet hierarchy was clear enough. He had established a reputation as a tough-talking "political general" whose later career had been marked by friction with the political leadership, and he had emerged as the principal uniformed spokesman for the military. His dismissal had two important political effects. First, it marked finis to the chances, perhaps already slim, of Grigori Romanov to displace Gorbachev as second secretary and become the heir apparent. Lacking Gorbachev's "organizational tail" in the party, his prospects depended upon solid backing by powerful interest groups, especially the police and the military, both of which he now presumably supervised. Reportedly close to Ogarkov, Romanov was out of the country when the decision was made and this could hardly have been coincidental. Second, Ogarkov was succeeded by the lackluster veteran Marshal Sergei Sokolov;[21] the absence of an authoritative spokesman was bound to diminish the military weight in the customary bargaining surrounding the succession.

Defense Minister Ustinov, whose disagreements with Ogarkov had been exposed in the public press, had probably played a primary role in his ouster. Apparently a strong backer of Andropov, Ustinov very likely supported any arrangements favoring Gorbachev as Chernenko's successor. But the illness of Ustinov and his death in December 1984 apparently did little to upgrade Romanov in the hierarchy. In fact, Romanov dropped one place in the Politburo protocol rankings in the year separating the 1984 USSR Supreme Soviet elections and the 1985 Russia Federation Supreme Soviet campaign. Nevertheless, if Ustinov's departure had no effect on the succession decision per se, it certainly further diminished the military weight in the approaching changeover.

Ustinov had probably been the most effective spokesman for military interests in party councils that the Soviet system had seen. The Ogarkov affair had sharply reminded the uniformed military against overt intervention in political matters, a reminder with grim precedents in Soviet history. As Sokolov moved up to replace Ustinov as defense minister,[22] it was the military, not the party, which now suffered from feeble leadership at the center. When the Soviet elite gathered to pay its last respects to Chernenko, there were no military figures atop the mausoleum. Sokolov was reportedly ill but, given the Kremlin's obsession with ceremonial protocol, the total absence of the generals was surely significant.

The other major coercive force in the system, the KGB, was apparently in accord with the decision on Chernenko's successor. Its head, Chebrikov, had profited from Andropov's personnel turnover, carried out when Gorbachev was evidently the leader's chief political agent.

[21] *Krasnaya zvezda,* September 7, 1984.
[22] *Pravda,* December 23, 1984.

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And, of course, the KGB had spearheaded Andropov's drive for the restoration of discipline, which had featured Gorbachev as one of the principal actors. But there were indications that Chebrikov personally had exercised less political clout than representatives of the security police within the top leadership in previous successions — Lavrenti Beria in 1953, Aleksandr Shelepin in 1964, and Andropov in 1982.

Another institutional interest that figured prominently in the successions of 1953 and 1964, the governmental economic bureaucracy, played no conspicuous role in 1985. In 1964, the representative of this sector, Aleksei Kosygin, emerged initially as a virtual co-holder of power in the collective leadership. There was nothing remotely resembling this development in the 1985 transition.

We would certainly not argue that the Kremlin leadership has lost its collective quality. But in previous successions, the facade of collective leadership reflected less the ranking of individuals than the existing state of flux in the relationships of institutional interests. This feature was not readily apparent in the events of March 1985. Accordingly, we are inclined to conclude that processes of political restabilization are much further along than has previously been the case at the election of presumed long-term leaders. If this is true, the result must be mainly attributed to the revival of dynamism and effectiveness among the central party leadership.

If the period 1979-1985 is regarded as one of an extended succession crisis, interesting parallels can be drawn with the last previous transition to a long-term leadership. The turnover of the upper elite, 1982-85, is remarkably similar to what occurred between 1964 and 1967. In 1964, at the first regular meeting of the Central Committee after Brezhnev's election as first secretary, Aleksandr Shelepin, former head of the KGB, was accorded full Politburo membership. Subsequently, much of the jockeying for power within the hierarchy revolved around the "Komsomol" group headed by Shelepin; when Shelepin was shifted from party secretary to head of the trade unions in 1967, the threat from this faction to the dominance of senior hierarchs was removed.

It was then that Yuri Andropov made his first giant stride toward the top. Named chairman of the KGB to eliminate the influence of the "Komsomol" faction, Andropov soon became a candidate member of the Politburo and established a stable relationship between the KGB and senior party leaders that was to last more than a decade. Circumstances were somewhat different in the early 1980s. But by March 1985, the KGB, under Politburo candidate member Chebrikov, appeared to have established a stable relationship with the presumed long-term leadership

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and was unlikely to engage in factional politics detrimental to the new general secretary.

In March 1965, Kiril Mazurov, first secretary of the Belorussian CP, was promoted to full Politburo membership and appointed first deputy premier. In November 1982 another Union-Republic party leader, Geidar Aliev, was brought to Moscow and made a full Politburo member and first deputy premier. The Central Committee plenum that promoted Mazurov in 1965 also transferred a fifty-six-year-old technocrat, Dimitri Ustinov, from a government post to the party Secretariat. The Central Committee plenum that promoted Aliev in November 1982 also transferred a fifty-three-year-old technocrat, Nikolai Ryzhkov, from a government post to the Party Secretariat.

A full Politburo member holding a high party position in the Russian Republic, Andrei Kirilenko, was shifted to the party Secretariat as number three member in March 1966. A full Politburo member holding a high party position in the Russian Republic, Grigori Romanov, was shifted to the party Secretariat as number four member in June 1983. If, as many expect, Vitali Vorotnikov is soon named to the Secretariat, there might be an even more exact parallel, since the political relationship between Vorotnikov and Gorbachev roughly corresponds to that between Kirilenko and Brezhnev.

The March 1966 plenum following the XXIII CPSU Congress also named a veteran party wheelhorse who was close to the senior leadership, Arvid Pelshe (he was Suslov's brother-in-law), to the chairmanship of the party Control Committee. The June 1983 plenum that brought Romanov to Moscow named a veteran official close to Andropov and Gorbachev, Mikhail Solomentsev, as Pelshe's successor in the party watchdog agency.

Finally, and most important, in late 1965 an obscure provincial party secretary, Ivan Kapitonov, was named party secretary for cadres, with a mandate to implement the personnel policy that would serve as the political foundation for the extended leadership. In the spring of 1983, another obscure provincial party secretary, Yegor Ligachev, was called to Moscow with a corresponding mandate.

This historical record inspires a sense of déjà vu. The parallels are so uncanny as almost to suggest a master plan, a secret *nomenklatura* handbook, on the restaffing of the top leadership. For our purposes, the significance of this striking correspondence of events lies in the relative degrees of progress in achieving restablization of the hierarchy during succession crises. And it appears that the Soviet system had, as of March 1985, resolved the contemporary succession crisis at least to the degree achieved by the last extended leadership in summer 1967. If this is true,

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Gorbachev may well have already possessed in March 1985 the authority that Brezhnev required more than two and one-half years to amass. The election of party secretaries Ligachev and Ryzhkov and KGB head Chebrikov to full Politburo membership at the April 1985 CC plenum[23] indicated that Gorbachev's personal authority at least equaled that attained by Brezhnev at the XXIV CPSU Congress in 1971. And the dismissal of Grigori Romanov from all his posts and the elevation of Eduard Shevardnadze to full Politburo rank in July 1985[24] provided a stunning demonstration of Gorbachev's rapid assumption of supreme authority. Given the remarkable leadership changes between March and July 1985, it can be predicted with some confidence that Gorbachev and his associates will further consolidate their power at the XXVII CPSU Congress in 1986 as did Brezhnev and Co. at the XXIV CPSU Congress in 1971.

This result must be mainly attributed to the rebuilding of the party center and the general personnel turnover initiated by Andropov. Party renewal under Andropov was certainly incomplete but, given the fragmentation of the system associated with an aging leadership and Brezhnev's "stability of cadres" policy and "depoliticization" strategy, it was sufficient to provide the key to resolution of the succession crisis.

Gorbachev as Leader

Mikhail Gorbachev is, in many respects, very different from all previous Soviet leaders. The youngest leader since Stalin and the best-educated newcomer to the top post since Lenin, his experience differs considerably from that of his predecessors. Barely a teenager at the conclusion of World War II, he is the first Soviet leader whose adult life was not touched by the impact of foreign invasion, and he is also the first leader since 1953 whose career was not furthered in some way by Stalin's purges. He is the first leader whose career, prior to his admission to the central elite, was concentrated upon the agricultural sector. Unlike Khrushchev, Brezhnev, and Andropov, he has not been involved in direct supervision of either the military or the police. And his travels abroad have given him a wider acquaintance with the outside world than that possessed by any leaders since Lenin; he has visited eleven foreign countries, including six non-Communist ones.

It is, thus, not surprising that Gorbachev's election evoked widespread expectation in the West of a fresh approach to a wide range

[23] *Pravda,* April 24, 1985.
[24] Ibid., July 3, 1985.

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of issues, both domestic and foreign. But the Western reaction to Gorbachev has focused less upon his background than upon his apparent personal qualities. Commentaries in the Western press have emphasized his lack of the arrogance usually associated with Soviet officials of high rank, his well-spoken manner, and his unassuming demeanor. Gorbachev charmed his hosts in Canada in 1983 and Britain's "Iron Lady" Margaret Thatcher during his highly publicized visit to Britain in 1984. The usual Western response to Gorbachev was summarized neatly by a U.S. businessman who conferred with him in December 1984: "free from dogma, pragmatic, gentlemanly, and well-informed about American politics and foreign policy."[25]

Such impressions have been formed on the basis of personal observation and owe nothing to a KGB "disinformation" campaign, such as the one which aroused ludicrous speculation in the West that Andropov was a "closet liberal." On the other hand, Western political figures and Sovietologists have displayed a certain wariness about the new leader, sobered by the realization that this protégé of Suslov and Andropov with reputed close ties to the KGB, a man who ascended from a provincial backwater to the pinnacle of power in just over six years, is unlikely to be a liberal in any sense of the word and must be very tough indeed. While Western statesmen may welcome the prospect of dealing with an engaging personality on the Soviet side, there is also appreciation of the probability that, for the remainder of the twentieth century, they and their successors will confront a most formidable adversary in the Kremlin.

The image projected by Gorbachev will surely be a less important determinant of political outcomes at home than abroad. Nevertheless, an impression of young vigorous leadership in the Kremlin could generate enthusiasm and shake the Soviet populace out of the doldrums so apparent during the waning days of Chernenko's leadership. Much will depend upon the policies adopted and their relative success or failure. A Soviet leader well established in power may weather policy failures rather easily, but the situation is somewhat different when a new general secretary is still engaged in cementing his authority. It will be recalled that the initial success of the Virgin Lands campaign gave a major boost to Khrushchev's consolidation of power and that the collapse of "liberalization" in Eastern Europe almost brought him down.

The indications are that Gorbachev will follow Andropov's approach to domestic policy, with the main emphasis upon improving the economy through such means as modernizing industrial technology, rationalization of agricultural production, fighting corruption, and some

[25] *New York Times,* December 14, 1984.

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measure of decentralization of management. Gorbachev's speech at Chernenko's funeral conveyed a strong Andropovian message:

> The development of the initiative and creative endeavor of the masses, strict observance of law and order, consolidation of labor, state and Party discipline will continue to remain in the center of attention. We will support, encourage and elevate in all ways those who by deeds, practical results, rather than by words, show their honest and conscientious attitude toward civic duty.[26]

Andropov's policies seemed to inspire a genuine positive response among the Soviet citizenry. This raises the possibility that Gorbachev could, like Khrushchev, appeal to the masses over the heads of entrenched bureaucrats if his policy initiatives encounter serious opposition. But Gorbachev is surely aware that such a departure is fraught with peril; after all, Khrushchev's populism produced resentment in official circles that ultimately contributed to his downfall. In any case, given the existing structure of the Soviet system, Gorbachev's obvious aim to get the Soviet Union moving again is linked to, and dependent upon, the speed and extent of personnel changes. Here the new leader has certain distinct advantages.

Gorbachev possesses a rather remarkable "organizational tail" in the party for one so recently risen to the central elite. Backed by the Suslov patronage network and apparently supported by most of Kirilenko's former clients, he has placed several of his associates in key positions in the party apparatus, and his friends dominate the party Control Committee. His close ties with Andropov and his expected approach to "discipline" apparently assure the loyalty of the KGB. His clients are in charge of the key regions of Stavropol, Krasnodar, Rostov, Volgograd, and Chelyabinsk. And a powerful bulwark of support is Andrei Gromyko, who emerged as the number two man in the regime in the spring of 1985 and who gave a ringing endorsement to Gorbachev at the March Central Committee meeting. Moreover, unlike that other "gray eminence," Mikhail Suslov, with whom Brezhnev had to share power, Gromyko has no ties whatsoever to the party organization, thus affording Gorbachev a clearer path toward personal dominance of the CPSU apparatus. Gromyko's elevation to the presidency in July 1985 may leave him in a position to continue his dominance of foreign policy but further removes him from access to the political levers of command.[27]

There are, however, some clouds on the horizon. Gorbachev still has a long way to go in clearing out the dead wood and installing supportive cadres within the party. Further, there may be strains in his

[26] Ibid., March 14, 1985.
[27] *New York Times,* July 3, 1985.

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relations with the military. The generals could hardly be happy about their apparent downgrading in the maneuvering accompanying the latest succession, nor are they likely to be enthusiastic about an agricultural specialist in the general secretary's post. The public criticism of the military by *Pravda* editor Viktor Afanasyev,[28] reportedly close to Gorbachev, and by commentator Fedor Burlatsky[29] in the fall of 1983, when Gorbachev was Andropov's right-hand man, may be indicative of a persistent hostility between the new leader and the denizens of Frunze Street. The Soviet armed forces can claim credit for the USSR's rise to superpower status, and that almost singular success of the system may well be the principal popular, as opposed to the formal, legitimizer of the regime. Thus, the military can hardly be ignored.

Finally, there is the matter of the massive and stultifying governmental bureaucracy. Any initiatives for reform are likely to encounter fierce resistance from administrators in the state *apparat,* and past experience shows that such resistance is more effective in the execution of policy than in its formation. Moreover, there are built-in systemic limitations to reform. Whatever degree of freedom of action he enjoys, Gorbachev cannot proceed very far in restructuring of the command economy without endangering his own power and that of the forces supporting him.

Prospects for the System

We can now briefly summarize the answers to the basic questions raised at the outset of this study. First, prolongation of the most recent succession crisis can be accounted for by the effects of Brezhnev's "stability of cadres" policy and "depoliticization" strategy, which inhibited rapid resolution of the crisis and provided the political context for interim leaders.

Second, the most pronounced short-range effect of the crisis was a diminution of the system's capacity for the forging of policy responses to the plethora of insistent problems confronting the leadership at home and abroad. This was undoubtedly a major factor in the apparent decline in the USSR's relative position in the world "correlation of forces" that Soviet spokesmen recognized at least obliquely during U.S. President Ronald Reagan's first term.[30] This immobility on policy was most evident

[28] BBC broadcast, September 18, 1983.

[29] *Literaturnaya gazeta,* November 23, 1983, p. 4.

[30] See Grigori Romanov's Bolshevik Revolution Anniversary speech, *Pravda,* November 6, 1983; Andrei Gromyko's Bolshevik Revolution Anniversary speech, *Pravda,* November 7, 1984; and V. Kortunov, "The Ideology of Peace versus the Ideology of War," *International Affairs* 11, November 1983, pp. 9, 11.

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during Brezhnev's declining years and in the fifteen months of Chernenko's tenure. But it was also patently obvious in the course of Andropov's more activist leadership; witness the extreme confusion in reaction to the KAL airliner incident, the total absence of flexibility in the wake of the failure of the campaign against Euromissiles, and the public display of disagreement over economic decentralization between Andropov[31] and *Gosplan* head Nikolai Baibakov in August 1983.[32]

For the long run, the principal effects of the crisis lie in acceleration of the process of generational turnover and re-establishment of clear lines of authority, permitting the system to recover much of its lost dynamism in both domestic and foreign affairs. Indeed, the succession crisis appears to be the indispensable means for periodic rejuvenation of the system and correction of a crucial "contradiction" of Soviet socialism, the inadequacy of mechanisms for the regular transfer of authority. Ironically, examination of the succession phenomenon in the USSR yields an analysis remarkably analogous to that of Marx in his assessment of the corrective role of the "crises of capitalism."

We find no evidence of a fundamental evolution of the Soviet system toward a different outcome for this succession crisis than those previously experienced. On the contrary, we view resolution of this crisis as confirmation of an essential continuity in the structure of the system. The necessary element in the surmounting of all succession crises is reassertion of authority by the "levers of command" at the party center, and the contemporary transition corresponds precisely in this respect to previous successions.

Finally, there is the matter of duration of the succession crisis. We think it fair to conclude that the contemporary crisis is essentially over. The special circumstances surrounding this leadership turnover yielded an unprecedented situation: the conflict of political forces that constitutes the real substance of succession crises largely preceded, rather than followed, selection of a long-term party leader. Thus, what remains for Gorbachev is a mopping-up operation, the further installation of loyalists at the various levels of the system, comparable to the restaffings carried out by Khrushchev after 1957 and by Brezhnev after 1967. Gorbachev's relations with the military may pose an element of uncertainty in his exercise of authority but the generals are in no position to impede the vigorous prosecution of party renewal. We have argued here that the most important factor in control and stability of the Soviet system is the flow of personnel. Gorbachev will surely move toward the definitive

[31] *Pravda,* August 16, 1983.
[32] *Izvestia,* August 18, 1983.

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scrapping of Brezhnev's "stability of cadres" policy and will promote generational turnover. This may lead in the long run to a quite unexpected result: the "restagnation" of the Soviet system.

Nearly all of the upper elite members during Brezhnev's tenure were drawn from his own generation, born between 1905 and 1920. Not until 1973 did a representative of the 1920-1935 age group appear on the Politburo as an alternative member. This latter age group now, after an inordinate delay, has inherited power. All of Gorbachev's close associates in the central leadership (except for such older allies as Solomentsev) are representatives of this age group, ranging from Ligachev, born in 1920, to Boris Pastukhov, minister of publishing houses, born in 1933. The youngest recent addition to government ranks, Vladimir Cheskov, minister of the oil industry, is about four years younger than Gorbachev, at the far edge of the 1920-1935 age group.[33] A few of the new regional officials are drawn from the 1935-1950 age group, but *all* of the new men likely to occupy key positions under Gorbachev were born between 1920 and 1935. And most of these are *older* than Gorbachev. To a lesser extent, this phenomenon may be noted at the regional level; for example, Gorbachev's man in Stavropol, Vsevolod Murakhovsky, is five years older than the new party leader.

Assuming that the three party secretaries with full Politburo status — Gorbachev, Ligachov, and Ryzhkov — and the ranking member among other probable political survivors, Aliev, remain in office in 1995, their average age will be sixty-nine. This is exactly the average age of the four senior Politburo members — Brezhnev, Suslov, Kosygin, and Kirilenko — in 1974, ten years after the succession to Khrushchev. We can anticipate a similar aging of officials all down the line. Once key positions are filled with the new leaderships' loyalists, opportunities for advancement will necessarily diminish sharply. The new appointees are likely to have long runs in their positions and, at mid-point in the next decade, the 1935-1950 age group will probably face the same problem of career immobility as did the 1920-1935 age group under Brezhnev. The generation gap that had its origins in Stalin's purges, with the survivors positioned and disposed toward indefinite retention of power, will remain. "Party renewal" is likely to produce the same long-range results as did "stability of cadres." Gorbachev could avoid this result by wholesale recruitment from the 1935-1950 age group but, given his reliance upon men of his own generation, most of whom are older than the new leader, this is unlikely.

If the rejuvenation of the party can be expected to be short-lived, what are the implications for the Gorbachev leadership? As noted

[33] Ibid., February 23, 1984.

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above, the historical rhythms of Soviet politics produce an erosion of central authority in the latter stages of an extended leadership, with a diffusion of power among structural components of the system. Gorbachev will, we think, also be subject to this cyclical effect, thus limiting the time available for him to produce a decisive impact. He does, however, possess two decided advantages over his post-Stalin predecessors. First, he is about five years younger than Khrushchev and Brezhnev at their accessions and apparently is in good health. Second, the unfolding of the most recent succession crisis has afforded him a more commanding position at the outset of his tenure than was the case with either Khrushchev or Brezhnev.

Gorbachev is obviously a young man in a hurry and, even in the short run, will be able to move with some assurance in seizing opportunities. In foreign affairs, this is likely to involve efforts to revive détente on terms advantageous to the Soviets and to promote rifts in the Western alliance. But Soviet world power in the Gorbachev era is ultimately dependent upon a revitalization of the sluggish economy. A full-fledged attack on this front can hardly be launched before completion of the consolidation of the new leader's power. Gorbachev's authority should peak around 1988, followed by a period of five to seven years of relatively undiminished capacity for inducing change.

These years of expected maximum authority for Gorbachev coincide with a period of probable reduced leadership capacity in the West. After 1988, the United States will probably not be led by a figure in the charismatic mold of Ronald Reagan; and the manifold pressures toward dissensus in the Western alliance may surface at such a time, particularly if the new Soviet leadership succeeds in some measure in psychologically disarming Western leaderships and publics via almost inevitable "peace" offensives. Thus, in superpower politics, the years from 1988 to 1995 may be a period of maximum danger for the West.

Soviet hopes for a dramatic recovery in the world "correlation of forces" will, however, remain wishful thinking unless the new leadership succeeds in reversing the prevailing inertia, bureaucractic muddle, and technological shortcomings within the Soviet Union. The obstacles are formidable. Gorbachev has a mandate for reform but the structure of the Soviet system severely constricts the parameters of permissible change. Moreover, reform in the Soviet Union cannot be equated with liberalism; in fact, the more extensive the economic reform, the less liberalism there may be, since decentralization of the economy might necessitate stronger political authority and more police control from the center. As Timothy Colton has observed: "Whoever sits around the Politburo table in the 1980s and 1990s, one can be sure, will want to

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safeguard the essence of the Soviet order, its Leninist ideology, its single-party system, and its state-owned economy."[34]

Within the limitations imposed by unchanging systemic imperatives, Gorbachev and his associates will be compelled to devote massive efforts to upgrading economic performance. A clue to the range of attempted system overhaul will be the political fortunes of such men as Nikolai Ryzhkov, fifty-six, party secretary for economic planning, and Guri Marchuk, fifty-nine, deputy premier for science and technology, with a background as a computer expert. If they turn out to be prototypical in the infusion of new blood into leadership ranks, then Gorbachev's commitment to the technocratic approach favored by Andropov will be strongly confirmed.

Whatever the extent or initial successes of a reform program, Gorbachev will inevitably confront the central dilemma of the Soviet polity, the basic incompatibility between modernization and authoritarianism. Soviet Communism has aimed to achieve economic modernization while avoiding its natural concomitants, social pluralism and a thrust for political democracy. The condition of the "mature" socialist system in the USSR demonstrates that suppression of the effects of modernization inevitably inhibits the modernization process itself. For all his impressive qualities, Gorbachev is unlikely to resolve this fundamental "contradiction of socialism."

[34] Timothy J. Colton, *The Dilemma of Reform in the Soviet Union* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1984), p. 63.

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THE SOVIET CAMPAIGN AGAINST INF: STRATEGY, TACTICS, AND MEANS*

by Alex R. Alexiev

Beginning in late 1979, the Soviet Union mounted a major effort to prevent the deployment of NATO's intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF), scheduled to begin in late 1983. The campaign failed to achieve its main objective, and Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) deployments began as planned in December 1983. Despite this failure, the Soviet anti-INF campaign remains a fascinating and instructive example of Moscow's foreign political modus operandi and perhaps the best case study of a concerted Soviet effort to manipulate domestic trends in Western countries — in this case, the peace movement in West Germany. A detailed analysis of the tactics and instruments used by the Soviets in the anti-INF campaign also provides considerable insights and a frame of comparison for Western analysts and policy makers seeking to understand and neutralize the present Soviet campaign against the Strategic Defense Initiative.

Soviet Security Concepts and INF

Through the mid-1980s, Soviet policies toward Western Europe, particularly West Germany, were dominated to an unprecedented extent by a single issue: the modernization of NATO's INF and the prevention of its deployment. To understand the Soviet rationale, it is necessary to examine the perceived impact of the INF deployment within the framework of Soviet objectives in Europe.

Soviet goals and security concerns on the continent are essentially political in nature and include:

- Undermining the military and political cohesion of the Western alliance.
- Decoupling the United States from Western Europe, preferably by means of American and European self-isolation.
- Neutralizing Western Europe politically, not through "Finlandization," but within the framework of a European system of "peaceful coexistence."

* The views expressed in this paper are the author's and are not necessarily shared by Rand or its research sponsors.

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- Establishing the Soviet Union as the dominant political factor in all of Europe (this does not necessarily mean incorporating Western Europe into the Soviet bloc).

Western Europe has not figured prominently among Soviet military security concerns since World War II, despite constant propaganda to the contrary. The only real security concern is the essentially political threat posed by Western Europe to continued Soviet domination of Eastern Europe: the possibility of influencing and encouraging a disintegration of the Soviet hegemony that could spill into the Soviet Union itself. It can be argued that the Soviets perceive a secure and prosperous Western Europe as potentially exacerbating their control problems in Eastern Europe, while an insecure and intimidated one would be much less a negative influence.[1] The Soviet dilemma, and the source of a problem for the West, is that the nature of the Soviet system makes it impossible to pursue and solve these objectives and concerns through political means. Thus, the Soviets are forced to rely on military means to achieve political ends. Although this has always been the case, it has become more pronounced as a seemingly permanent systemic crisis continues to affect the nonmilitary aspects of the Soviet system. With a political ideology that has declined from an attractive utopia for many Western idealists to little more than an ossified and barren dogma, rejected even by many Communists, and an economic model that is a demonstrated failure, the Soviet Union has used its growing military power as the major, if not the sole, determinant of its great-power status. And Soviet experience over the past two decades, unlike that of the Western nations, has given Moscow no reason to doubt the continuing political utility of military power.

In this light, both the SS-20 deployment and the Soviet reaction to NATO's determination to redress the balance become clear. What the Soviet leaders sought with the installation of SS-20s in Europe was the recognized, uncontested superiority in nuclear theater capability that they have long enjoyed in conventional theater weapons. Such superiority would be a powerful political and psychological asset in their dealings with the West Europeans. This is not to say that the SS-20s — or any other Soviet programs — are irrelevant in military-operational terms. They do have a clear military rationale and well-defined missions. Yet, within the European theater framework, their military potential will continue to be subordinate to political utility; for as long as Moscow is uncertain whether a European conflict will escalate into a strategic conflagration, the Soviets are unlikely to consider a European military option as viable.

[1] For a perceptive analysis of Soviet views on security in Europe, see Alois Mertes, *Europa Archiv*, April 10, 1983, pp. 187-96.

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When the Soviets began their effort to achieve theater nuclear superiority in the late 1970s, other developments created a political climate in Europe, and especially in West Germany, that appeared conducive to Soviet advances toward long-standing objectives. First, there was a noticeable decline in European confidence in the United States as a reliable and indispensable protecting power (*Schutzmacht*). These doubts stemmed partly from the gradual decline of U.S. military power vis-à-vis that of the Soviet Union, resulting particularly from the U.S. experience in Vietnam and the trauma of Watergate, and partly from seemingly unpredictable policies pursued by Washington, epitomized by the neutron-bomb debacle. Paradoxically, during the same period, Western Europe perceived no increasing threat from the Soviet Union despite its offensive buildup, both conventional and nuclear. These evolving attitudes were also affected by domestic political developments in West Germany, which remains the focus of both Soviet and American policies in the region. In West Germany, the twin pillars on which social democratic policies had been based for a decade — an aggressive expansion of the social-welfare system and *Ostpolitik* — came under severe strains, undermining consensus and increasing polarization. *Ostpolitik,* whose declared objective had been to encourage positive change in the Soviet bloc through a policy of rapprochement (*Wandel durch Annaeherung*), had generally proven a disappointment except in the eyes of its most ardent supporters. Moreover, the SPD's (Social Democratic Party) contiued support of these policies worked to the detriment of alliance cohesion and seemed to benefit the Soviet bloc. Willy Brandt's shibboleth, "In order to change the status quo one has to accept it," resulted, in the words of one observer, in the recognition that "in order to bring about improvements in the relations with communist regimes, one has to reassure them, and . . . to reassure them one has to help them stabilize their rule."[2] This attitude was best expressed by the architect of *Ostpolitik,* Egon Bahr, the security expert of the SPD, who, after the imposition of martial law in Poland, argued that the interests of the Polish people may have to be sacrificed for the sake of détente.[3] An important consequence of this shift was a growing reluctance on the part of key politicians to see any threatening or offensive intentions in the Soviet buildup. Herbert Wehner, the grand old man of the SPD and perhaps its most powerful politician at the time, stated unequivocally in 1979 that there was no Soviet threat to Europe, and that the Soviet military buildup was strictly defensive.[4]

[2] Pierre Hassner, "Western European Perceptions of the USSR," *Daedalus,* Winter 1979, p. 145.
[3] See *Die Zeit,* February 7, 1982.
[4] *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,* February 4, 1979.

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Such attitudes, propounded by a significant minority, created a sense of an ideological decoupling from the United States in the early 1980s, when a conservative American backlash had brought to power an administration critical of what it perceived as excessive social welfare spending, deeply concerned about the Soviet buildup, and determined to rebuild U.S. military power.

With relative discord within the NATO alliance and differing perceptions of the nature of the Soviet threat, Moscow was suddenly faced with NATO's decision in December 1979 to install two weapon systems, Pershing II and GLCMs. This decision had significant military implications; perhaps the most important concerned the additional military options open to NATO defense planners and the likelihood that INF deployment would help formulate a more realistic nuclear doctrine that could only enhance deterrence. For example, the deployment was likely to relieve NATO commanders of the extreme difficulties in attempting to use short-range nuclear weapons in a war-fighting situation. To avoid being overrun by the Soviet army in a rapid offensive, short-range weapons like the Lance and nuclear artillery might have to be pulled back. Yet if needed later to interdict Warsaw Pact second-echelon reinforcements, they might have to be exploded on German or even West German territory — a nightmare scenario for the West Germans. The INF deployments make it clear that NATO is not likely to be self-deterred from using nuclear weapons in a war, greatly increasing their deterrent value. Most important, the new INF enabled NATO to strike deep into Soviet territory and, thus, denied the Soviets the ability to conduct a nuclear war in the European theater from a sanctuary. Nonetheless, the principal threat posed by the INF to the Soviets is political. The INF deployments demonstrated a renewed American dedication to the defense of Europe and a reassertion of U.S. leadership in the Alliance. They also blurred the distinction between theater and strategic forces, reinforcing the coupling of U.S. defense of Europe and the homeland. Further, the ability of the Western alliance to reach and stick by the deployment decision demonstrated NATO's viability.

Despite the efforts of Moscow's propaganda machine to prove that the INF deployments provided the United States with a first-strike capability and demonstrated aggressive intentions, the Kremlin's real concerns could occasionally be glimpsed. Thus, even before the INF decision was made, the chief of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee, Boris Ponomarev, argued in *Pravda*: "We cannot fail to see that in the event the decision is adopted, the United States hopes that a qualitatively new military-political situation will emerge. . . ."[5] Somewhat later, another noted Soviet expert, General Milshtein of the Institute for

[5] *Pravda*, November 18, 1979.

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the Study of the USA, wrote with concern that the United States was banking on the political utility of nuclear weapons as "means of resolving international problems in its own favor."[6] Perhaps the real Soviet concern was expressed most clearly in the following commentary in the Soviet army daily, *Krasnaya zvezda:* "The new missiles are needed by Washington and the NATO bloc for something quite different — to obtain superior positions in both politics and strategy. In policy this is alleged by a chance to exert political pressure from a position of strength."[7] In short, if implemented, NATO's deployment of INF threatened to neutralize the hoped-for political utility of the costly SS-20 program and also to negate many perceived Soviet achievements in Europe in the 1970s. On the other hand, if deployment could be aborted — by whatever means — not only would these negative consequences be avoided, but a greater disarray in NATO and a more congenial climate for Soviet machinations seemed likely to obtain.

"Campaigning" to achieve a particularly important objective has been a reliable tool of Soviet foreign policy since Lenin's day. Indeed, the first official act of the fledgling Soviet government was to issue a "decree of peace" designed to alleviate the immediate military threat to the survival of the regime. In later years, full-fledged campaigns were conducted for "collective security" in the mid-1930s, against the atomic bomb in the 1940s, to prevent German rearmament in the 1950s, and to prevent neutron-bomb production in 1978, to name a few. In general, a Soviet campaign requires mobilization of the arsenal of Soviet political, diplomatic, and propaganda resources, including disinformation, active measures, and covert activities. The campaign against INF provides perhaps the best illustration in Soviet history of this modus operandi. In its scope, intensity, and duration, it is very likely the most determined effort of its kind to date.

In its drive to forestall the deployment of NATO's INF, Moscow pursued a dual-track approach: a "campaign from above" to reverse the NATO decision by influencing the responsible decision-making elites, and a parallel "campaign from below" to exploit popular fears, pacifism, and misgivings about nuclear arms, and to create sufficient mass opposition to prevent the deployment.

The Campaign From Above

The "campaign from above," by far the more visible of the two, pursued a twofold strategy. First, it attempted to drive a wedge

[6] M. A. Milshtein, "Some Characteristics of Present Day U.S. Military Doctrine," *SShA: Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologiya,* No. 5, May 1980.

[7] *Krasnaya zvezda,* June 30, 1981.

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between the United States and its NATO partners by presenting the INF modernization as a program to serve Washington's nefarious and aggressive purposes, while endangering the West Europeans and especially the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). Second, Moscow launched a "peace offensive" to portray itself as willing to compromise and negotiate, while using scare tactics and threatening dire consequences if its demands were not met. Particularly in the later stages of the campaign, the Soviets tried to encourage a split in the SPD leadership and undermine consensus by cultivating "farsighted" and "progressive" elements within the SPD.

The United States as the INF Villain

From the beginning, a major Soviet objective had been to portray the United States as an increasingly aggressive, reckless power whose policies deliberately endangered the security and interests of Western Europe. Moscow sought to exploit and reinforce growing European doubts about the U.S. nuclear guarantee, as well as European uneasiness with the Reagan administration's policy of greater assertiveness. Soviet theorists had noted growing European uncertainty as early as the mid-1970s and by the end of the decade openly claimed that U.S. nuclear strategic forces, once NATO's "sword and shield," no longer served that function.[8] This was ascribed to achievements of détente and positive change in the "correlation of forces" in the world, which had "very strongly devalued in the eyes of the Europeans the American 'nuclear guarantee' of NATO."[9] Exploiting such misgivings (their alleviation had been one of the psychological determinants of the dual-track INF deployment decision), Soviet propagandists hammered at the alleged radical shift of Washington's policy onto a bellicose and confrontational course. "At the turn of the decade of the 1980s," a typical statement asserted, "the U.S. aggressive circles embarked on a course of open and direct antagonism, conducted a global offensive, a crusade, against socialism which is based on a carefully prepared complete program encompassing political, economic, ideological and military elements including the most radical measures; a policy of brinkmanship stressing a determination and readiness to engage in an open military confrontation with the Soviet Union."[10]

[8] Y. P. Davidov, *USA-Western Europe in Partnership and Rivalry*: (Moscow: Nauka, 1978), p. 138. Cited in *Research and Analytical Evaluation of the Soviet Union and Modernization of Nuclear Weapons Forces in Europe,* Advanced International Studies Institute, Washington, D.C., April 1982, p. 146.

[9] Ibid.

[10] See *Razoruzhenie: Kto Protiv (Disarmament: Who Is Against It),* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1983), p. 80.

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The main Soviet argument, the leitmotif of both the "campaign from above" and the "peace movement," was that the United States intended to attack the Soviet Union and, to avoid retaliation against its homeland, was going to use INF deployed in Europe. (Despite the dubious logic of this argument, given the Soviets' own statements that a U.S. INF attack would be met by a retaliatory strike on the United States, it has not been totally without impact.) The consequences of this "nefarious" American ploy for Europe were then clearly spelled out. Acceptance of the INF by Western Europe would simply be "an invitation to suicide."[11] condemning its peoples to the role of "nuclear hostages" and subjecting them to a retaliatory nuclear strike that "may be terminal."[12]

The alleged U.S. view of Europe as a "military bridgehead stuffed with nuclear weapons situated a long way from the United States but as close as possible to the socialist countries' vital centers" was declared to stem from a "disregard for the interests of other states including its own allies" which is "one of the principles of U.S. foreign policy."[13] Washington was depicted as creating an atmosphere to facilitate the deployment by stirring anti-Soviet hysteria and inventing a Soviet military threat to Europe. Reagan's policies and the sanctions imposed after the declaration of martial law in Poland in December 1981, for instance, were interpreted by Moscow's propagandists as designed to blackmail "recalcitrant NATO partners" and overcome opposition to the Euro-missiles.[14] Even the tragic fate of the Korean airliner shot down by the Soviets over Sakhalin in 1983 was promptly adapted to this propaganda framework: This "deliberate provocation" was allegedly concocted by the Reagan administration to "reinforce the myth of the Soviet military threat, undermine the negotiations in Geneva, and neutralize the anti-nuclear movement."[15]

The campaign of vilification of the United States was augmented by a particularly shrill and polemical response to President Reagan's decision to proceed with production of the neutron bomb, the target of a massive and largely successful Soviet campaign in 1978. On the day of the decision, a TASS commentary from Washington excoriated this "criminal decision," that revealed the "cannibalistic instincts" of

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[11] *Pravda,* September 2, 1981.

[12] See *Kanun dekabrya: Evropa pered viiborom (At the End of December Europe Is Facing a Choice),* (Moscow: Progress Publishing House, 1983), p. 26

[13] *Izvestiya,* April 11, 1983.

[14] A detailed exposé of this alleged U.S. campaign is found in Y. P. Davidov, "Washington's Anti-Polish Hysteria and Western Europe," *SShA: Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologiya,* No. 5, April 1982, pp. 53-57.

[15] *Kanun Dekabrya,* p. 29.

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U.S. imperialism and aimed at the "total destruction of Europe and the Europeans."[16]

In the propaganda blitz that followed, primarily for foreign consumption, Moscow's agitation specialists engaged in scare rhetoric and disinformation that bore little relationship to reality. The neutron bomb was said to be an ideal offensive weapon made to order for "aggressors, interventionists and terrorists."[17] Moreover, these weapons were said to increase dramatically the threat to world peace, especially in Western Europe, since Washington intended to use them on "intermediate range missiles to be deployed in Europe as well as around the world with the Rapid Deployment Force and even in space."[18]

Organically linked with this propaganda effort were parallel attempts to portray the United States as inimical to vital European and particularly German political and economic interests. In the political realm, Washington was described as deeply worried by the growing political influence and prestige of Western Europe and determined to prevent any "emancipatory" tendencies among its allies and to halt the further erosion of its influence. "I'm convinced," opined Georgi Arbatov, director of the Institute for American Studies, "that Western Europe, particularly now, has overtaken the United States in terms of political potential."[19] Realizing that this major change in the "American patron/European client" relationship had taken place during the years of détente and economic cooperation, Washington was said to be striving to poison the international atmosphere, derail the policies of détente and international cooperation, and "bind Europe to its mindless pursuit of military superiority."[20]

Inter-alliance strife was said to be particularly pronounced between the United States and West Germany. The Federal Republic, according to the propaganda, had "ceased to be a political dwarf and horse-and-rider relations no longer accord in any way with its rank and potential."[21] Furthermore, the FRG had become a key political and economic actor, particularly with respect to relations with the socialist countries. "The state of relations between the FRG and the USSR has become a sensitive indicator of international détente and peaceful coexistence in Europe, and not only in Europe."[22] The growing international importance

[16] *TASS,* August 13, 1981. For a detailed analysis of the second neutron-bomb campaign, see "Moskaus Kampagne gegen Neutronenwaffen," *Neue Zuercher Zeitung,* October 5, 1981.

[17] *New Times,* No. 34, September 1981.

[18] *Neue Zuercher Zeitung,* October 5, 1981.

[19] G. A. Arbatov, "The Main Political Issue," *SShA: Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologiya,* No. 10, October 1982, p. 3.

[20] *Pravda,* January 6, 1982.

[21] See A. Grigoryants, "Letter from Bonn: NATO Discord," *Izvestiya,* February 6, 1982.

[22] I. D. Yefgrafov, "Uroki razryadki: vashington i vostochinaya politika frg" ("The Lessons of Detente: Washington and the Ostpolitik of the FRG"), *SShA: Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologiya,* No. 3, March 1983, p. 28.

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of West Germany and its realistic *Ostpolitik* were disliked across the Atlantic, it was said, because they served to "loosen discipline" and "undermine U.S. hegemony" in NATO — hence, the U.S. determination to torpedo détente as the "only possibility to occasion a radical shift in Ostpolitik."[23]

U.S. foreign and security policies in Europe were also presented by Moscow as inextricably linked to the interests of U.S. "capitalist monopolies" and designed to assure their economic advantage at the expense of the Europeans. For example, the long-term increase of military expenditures approved by the NATO countries in 1978 was interpreted as serving Washington's objective of "weakening the competitiveness of EEC,"[24] while the imposition of U.S. sanctions following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the imposition of martial law in Poland were seen as "undermining . . . mutually beneficial economic ties between the Western European countries and the socialist countries" and "quite consciously counting on weakening the Western European countries' economic positions in comparison with the United States."[25] A blatant example of such disinformation tactics alleged a "new Morgenthau plan" designed to put West Germany and the rest of Western Europe through a "lengthy period of bloodletting" by means of a deliberate policy of interest rate increases.[26] The goal of this plan, like that of the old one, intimated the author, was "the radical removal of a rival for decades to come."[27]

The basic message underlying the entire Soviet effort was that the only way for Western Europe to safeguard its vital security, political, and economic interests was to distance itself from the "corrupting influence of American power politics" and to undertake a renewed commitment to détente — a "divisible" détente, i.e., limited to Europe, that would allow it to become an "island of peace" where there would be no place for American INF.

The Peace Offensive

While one part of the "campaign from above" depicted the United States as the source of all evil, seeking a degree of psychological decoupling of Western Europe from America, a parallel effort presented the Soviets as a benign, peaceful, and compromise-ready security partner. This diplomatic and political "peace offensive" was aimed at policy-

[23] Ibid., p. 36.
[24] *Izvestiya,* September 9, 1981.
[25] Y. P. Davidov, "Washington's Hysteria," p. 54.
[26] V. Mikhailov, "The FRG and Peace in Europe," *International Affairs,* No. 1, 1982, p. 15.
[27] Ibid.

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making elites as well as public opinion in Western Europe. In pursuing propaganda strategies, Moscow enjoys a number of distinct advantages over a democratic regime. Since it is not responsible to any elected bodies or likely to be subject to any scrutiny or questioning of its policies, the regime is free to exploit diplomacy for propaganda purposes. Moscow is also free of public pressure and shifts in public opinion, factors that weigh heavily in Western decision making.

The "peace offensive" strategy consisted essentially of advancing proposals, initiatives, pronouncements, and statements by various bodies and personalities that would lead to prevention of the INF deployments. The rationale for these activities rested on two premises that remained constant throughout the campaign: (1) that the installation of Soviet SS-20s was simply an answer to existing American forward-based systems (FBS) and, thus, ostensibly of a defensive character;[28] and (2) that the balance of nuclear weapons in Europe was nearly perfect and therefore Western deployments would be unnecessary and destabilizing. Curiously, this argument, first made in 1979, continued to be vigorously advanced some four years and 250 SS-20s later.

The array of proposals and initiatives articulated during the four years of the campaign were of four basic types:[29] *unequal proposals*, peripheral proposals, trial balloons, and propaganda proposals. These four categories, by no means clearly delineated, often overlap; nevertheless, they are sufficiently different to warrant separate treatment.

The *unequal proposals* most often were seemingly new Soviet initiatives presented as a basis for negotiation and designed to create the impression of significant Soviet concessions. Packaged to achieve the greatest possible propaganda impact and invariably vague and sketchy on fact and detail, their most characteristic feature and common denominator was their one-sidedness. If acted upon, they would have inevitably resulted in preserving Soviet INF superiority and keeping the American systems out of Europe. These proposals included the following:

- An announcement by Brezhnev in East Berlin on October 6, 1979, that the Soviet Union was willing to reduce the number of "nuclear means" deployed in the western parts of the country by an unspecified number if NATO would forgo deployment.[30]
- A November 6, 1979, interview in *Pravda* in which Brezhnev proposed that INF negotiations could be started without delay if NATO would renounce the expected dual-track decision.

[28] In the words of Vadim Zagladin, deputy chief of the CPSU International Department: "I can assure you that if there are no American forward-based systems in Europe, we will have no need at all for medium-range missiles." (*Le Monde*, November 28, 1979.)

[29] A useful analysis of the Soviet proposals from a somewhat different viewpoint is presented in "The Soviet Peace Offensive: An Analysis of Tactics," Radio Free Europe, *RFE/RL*, May 3, 1982, Munich.

[30] Text of speech available in *Pravda*, October 7, 1979.

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- A Soviet proposal presented during Chancellor Schmidt's visit to Moscow in July 1980, in which the Soviets agreed to start bilateral INF talks with the United States if FBS were included and on the condition that any agreement would be fulfilled only after ratification of SALT II.[31]
- A proposal in Brezhnev's keynote address at the XXVI CPSU Congress for a moratorium on deployment of intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe by both NATO and the Warsaw Pact.[32]
- Brezhnev's offer during his visit to the FRG on November 23, 1981, to reduce unilaterally SS-20s deployed in the European USSR if the United States would agree to a moratorium.[33]
- A proposal by Andropov to reduce the Soviet SS-20 arsenal to the level of the combined British and French nuclear forces if NATO would cancel the Pershing II and GLCM deployments.[34]

The *peripheral proposals* usually dealt with issues aimed at weakening NATO cohesion and West European solidarity, while pursuing stated Soviet objectives. Primary examples were the Soviet initiatives advocating the creation of nuclear-free zones in Europe. The first of these, in a *Pravda* commentary in the fall of 1980, claimed that the United States intended to use Northern Europe in its aggressive plans and declared Soviet willingness to cooperate in the creation of a nuclear-free zone in Northern Europe. This initiative, which received considerable attention, particularly on the part of some Scandinavian and German officials, including Olaf Palme and Egon Bahr, included persistent, if nebulous, hints of Soviet willingness to include some of its own territory in a nuclear-free zone.[35] A similar move by Brezhnev in the summer of 1981, aimed at Italy, proposed an agreement "renouncing the deployment of nuclear weapons on the territory of non-nuclear Mediterranean states." Offers of specific agreements whereby Moscow would obligate itself not to use nuclear weapons against West European countries if the latter forbade nuclear deployments on their territories were also made to Greece and the Scandinavian countries.[36] In practical terms, such offers were meaningless, since no INF deployments had been contemplated for these countries, but they were nonetheless important to Moscow because of their expected psychological decoupling impact. Soviet proposals sought to expand the European zone subject to confidence-building measures, and there was an alleged Soviet plan for a "European option" for the settlement of the INF issue.

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[31] *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, July 4, 1980.
[32] *Pravda*, February 24, 1981.
[33] *New York Times*, November 24, 1981.
[34] *Pravda*, December 22, 1981.
[35] For a detailed discussion, see "Soviet Shell Game: The Proposal for a Nuclear-Free Zone in Scandinavia," Radio Free Europe, *RFE/RL*, No. 299/81, July 30, 1981. Also see "Moskaus Friedensdruck auf Nordeuropa," *Neue Zuercher Zeitung*, July 7, 1981.
[36] See *Pravda*, April 4, June 10, and June 27, 1981.

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Trial balloons are usually launched by the Soviets in the form of unofficial statements, articles, or messages by Soviet officials. They are designed for foreign consumption, even when they appear in the Soviet media. Very few trial balloons indicate actual Soviet attitudes or policy evolution. As a rule, their objectives are to test Western public and official reaction, to stir media and public interest, to encourage conflicting Western readings of Soviet intentions, to feed speculation about divergent views within the Soviet leadership, and, if possible, to induce Western pre-emptive concessions. For instance, in September 1981, *Pravda* claimed that the Soviet Union was prepared for "considerable" reductions in intermediate missiles prior to the start of the negotiations.[37] In another example, a month after Moscow had officially rejected Reagan's "zero option" as a propaganda ploy, a key Soviet official told a Western correspondent that the Soviet Union was, in principle, prepared to discuss a "zero option."[38] The same official later told a West German parliamentarian that Moscow had stopped deploying SS-20s targeted at Western Europe, a claim flatly rejected by Western intelligence at the time. Another well-known Soviet official made the same claim to a West German seminar in March 1982. The above-mentioned alleged "European option" also had all the characteristics of a trial balloon.[39]

Propaganda proposals involve the articulation and advancement in a variety of forums of a wide assortment of peace, security, and disarmament initiatives — some old, some new — that have no prospects of being considered, let alone negotiated. Their sole purpose in the anti-INF campaign was to portray the Soviet government as genuinely peace-loving, concerned, and always willing to negotiate. Among the plethora of propaganda proposals in the "peace offensive" were initiatives to conclude nonaggression pacts between the Soviet bloc and the Western nations and then disband both alliances; to negotiate a worldwide peace treaty; to ban the development of new weapons; to impose reductions on military budgets; and to carry out an international scientific investigation of possible consequences of nuclear war.

While the "peace offensive" of the anti-INF campaign was generally intended to contrast the peace-loving, reasonable, and compromise-seeking Soviet Union with a bellicose and aggressive United States, the practice of using veiled, and not-so-veiled, threats of dire consequences to the Europeans in the event of INF deployments was an integral part of it from the very beginning. Those threats were of both a military and a political nature.

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[37] *Pravda*, September 15, 1981.
[38] Interview with Vadim Zagladin in *Frankfurter Rundschau*, December 15, 1981.
[39] *Agence France Presse*, March 4, 1982.

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The military threats consisted essentially of a more forceful reiteration of the argument that the installation of INF would transform Western Europe into an American *place d'armes* facing inevitable nuclear retaliation. Such retaliation, considering Western Europe's "limited territory, population density and tremendous concentration of arms and troops . . . [could] only result into turning it into a lifeless desert."[40] Thus, Europe was likely to be the ultimate loser, even under the U.S. "war-winning" scenario. A more serious, albeit subtle, threat was implicit in Soviet hints of the possibility of a pre-emptive Soviet first strike against INF host nations. The Soviet propaganda pamphlet, *The Threat to Europe,* suggested that by deploying the INF, the United States intended to involve its European allies in confrontations with the Soviet Union even away from the continent. Given the first-strike nature of these weapons, the pamphlet implied, in such a contingency, the Soviets might have no choice but to pre-empt.[41] The likelihood of Soviet nuclear pre-emption was also discussed by Georgi Arbatov in the party theoretical organ, *Kommunist.*[42] Also in the category of military threats were persistent Soviet warnings of countermeasures to INF deployments. Such threats remained vague until October 1983, when the Soviet Defense Ministry announced plans to deploy tactical nuclear missiles in Eastern Europe.[43] These "counter-deployments," however, were, in the opinion of most Western analysts, planned before the INF decision was even reached, to replace the obsolete SCUD and FROG-7 (free rocket over ground) missiles. They did not represent a qualitatively new threat.

More significant than the crude threats of military consequences that would result from INF deployment were the Soviet warnings of serious political consequences. These warnings were phrased to create the impression that West German relations with the East would be irreparably damaged by INF, and a new period of high tension and danger would be ushered in. "It is an illusion to believe," according to *Pravda,* "that relations between East and West could be again normalized after the deployment of the missiles. It will be a different Europe with the Pershings and the Cruise Missiles."[44] In the summer of 1981, Moscow

[40] V. Mikhailov, "The FRG and Peace in Europe," *International Affairs,* No. 1, January 1982. There were virtually scores of similar explicit threats during the campaign.

[41] *The Threat to Europe,* p. 26.

[42] Georgi Arbatov, "The Strategy of Nuclear Madness," *Kommunist,* No. 6, April 1981.

[43] The "tactical-operational" missiles the Soviets are deploying are the SS-21 and SS-23. Both are mobile and dual-capable, with a range of 125 and 500 kilometers, respectively, and are armed with a single warhead in their nuclear variant. The warhead yield is presumed to be around 200 kilotons. Of much greater political and military significance is the SS-22, a modernized version of the SS-12 (SCALEBOARD), with a range of up to 1,000 kilometers and a yield of 500 kilotons. For a more detailed discussion, see "The Counter-deployments in Eastern Europe: Military and Political Implications," Radio Free Europe, *RFE-RL,* No. 32/84, January 18, 1984.

[44] Cited in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,* August 13, 1981.

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intimated that the INF deployments would constitute a breach of the Moscow Treaty of 1970, the cornerstone of German *Ostpolitik*.[45] This implied that deployments were likely to endanger the major achievement of *Ostpolitik* — the normalization of the Berlin situation. Knowing the sensitivity of most Germans to the issue of inter-German relations and their desire to preserve the gains achieved, the Soviets and their East German allies persistently warned Bonn that relations would worsen dramatically if the INF decision were implemented. East German party boss Erich Honecker spoke of the coming of a new "ice age" in inter-German relations, while other propagandists hinted that humanitarian measures such as the reunification of families or the buying out of East German political prisoners were likely to be terminated.[46]

What the Soviets expected to gain by infusing the "peace offensive" with a dimension of threat and intimidation is unclear. In many cases the threats seemed counterproductive to the overriding Soviet objectives. For example, Soviet hints at pre-emptive nuclear strikes directly contradicted Moscow's guarantees that it would never use nuclear weapons first. In another example, a Soviet threat that Norway and Denmark could face nuclear attack if they did not join a Nordic nuclear-free zone countered Soviet assurances that the USSR would not, under any circumstances, use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear states.[47] Soviet officials may have hoped that such tactics would encourage people in Germany and elsewhere, who feared the collapse of détente and *Ostpolitik* more than they feared the Soviet military threat, to take an anti-INF stand.

The Campaign From Below

It is not unusual for Soviet foreign political campaign efforts aimed at decision makers and important members of the establishment to be paralleled by equal, at times more vigorous, attempts to gain influence and leverage among politically active groups and popular movements. The traditional objective of such efforts is the exploitation of popular and often legitimate concerns for Soviet purposes. The INF case appeared particularly susceptible to such a "campaign from below." In the preceding decade, some Western democratic societies and political processes had been significantly affected by popular disaffection and

[45] See Rudolf Dolzer, "Die 'Pravda' und die NATO-Nachruestung: Ein Bruch des Moskauer Vertrages?" *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, August 14, 1981. Interestingly, the East Germans have even claimed that INF stationing represents a breach of the Potsdam Agreement. See *Neues Deutschland*, September 22, 1983.

[46] *Deutsche Presse Agentur*, October 17, 1983.

[47] This threat was made in an interview with the Finnish news agency by Lev Voronkov, department chief of the USSR's Institute for World Economy and International Relations. See "The Soviet Peace Offensive: A Chronology," *Radio Liberty Research*, May 4, 1982.

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organized protest. The growing impact of organized popular movements in the West, exemplified by the anti-Vietnam War movement in the United States and Western Europe in the late 1960s and early 1970s, was considered by the Kremlin. Brezhnev was undoubtedly referring to the success of these movements when he stated in 1975:

> One can say with confidence that the present changes in the world situation are largely the result of the activities of public forces, of the hitherto unparalleled activity of the people, who are displaying sharp intolerance of arbitrary rule and aggression and an unbending will for peace.[48]

In the late 1970s, Soviet optimism regarding the utility of carefully organized campaigns in Western societies was reinforced by the success of the neutron-bomb campaign in West Germany; Soviet propagandists announced that President Carter was forced to abandon his plans "chiefly because of the European public protests."[49] At the same time, growing political disaffection in Europe was accompanied by widespread disillusionment and rejection of many mores and norms of Western industrial societies by vocal, politically active minorities. Numerous movements developed around ecological, feminist, antinuclear, and other issues that encouraged pacifist and neutralist tendencies in society.

These trends, observed in most Western countries, were particularly pronounced in West Germany. In brief, West Germany had a far greater commitment to détente and *Ostpolitik* than did the other European powers, which led to greater disillusionment over the collapse of détente and an unfortunate tendency to look for and find the culprits in the West and in the United States, rather than in Moscow. This disillusionment, coupled with West German nuclear sensitivities, the strong anti-militaristic sentiments of the younger generation, and residual guilt from the Nazi era, created an atmosphere of perceived acute insecurity and a reluctance to accord legitimacy to NATO defense measures. Such attitudes encouraged, and in turn were re-enforced by, a noticeable rise in anti-Americanism, present only in a latent form heretofore, which now became a common denominator in the peace movement and among most intellectuals.[50] Thus, political trends in the Federal Republic at the beginning of the 1970s seemed propitious for Soviet penetration and manipulation.

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[48] Cited in J. A. Emerson Vermaat, "Moscow Fronts and the European Peace Movement," *Problems of Communism,* November-December, 1982.

[49] Col. M. Ponomarev, "Military-Political Review: United States Trampling on Its Partners," *Krasnaya zvezda,* September 7, 1981.

[50] For a perceptive analysis of the remarkable shift in attitudes toward America among German and French intellectuals in the 1980s, see John Vinocur, "Intellectual Europe Changes Sides on U.S. as Hero or Ogre," *New York Times,* May 16, 1984.

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Organizational Structure and Instrumentalities

One of the decisive advantages of Soviet "campaigning" is that most of the necessary organizational framework is already in place before the campaign begins. This framework usually consists of a central steering authority in Moscow; an elaborate network of international front organizations, most with their own branch organizations at the national level in the target country; and the entire infrastructure of Communist and Communist-controlled organizations.

The key decisions regarding a campaign are almost certainly made at the very top of the Soviet political hierarchy — the Politburo or the Defense Council.[51] The strategy and tactics for the campaign are then formulated in the International Relations Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU, presided over for some thirty years by Boris Ponomarev.[52] This department, the most important coordinating organ of Soviet foreign political activities, is assisted by the International Information Department, responsible for foreign political propaganda, and Service A of the Foreign Intelligence Directorate of the KGB, whose charter is disinformation, forgeries, and covert operations in support of foreign political objectives.[53] Little is known about the specific activities of these command organs, but the role played by the major Soviet front organizations is more transparent. The most important front organizations in the INF campaign were the World Peace Council (WPC), the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), and the Christian Peace Conference (CPC).

The World Peace Council. The WPC, perhaps the best known and well organized of the Soviet fronts, was founded in 1949 and currently has over 137 affiliates around the world.[54] The WPC has twice been expelled from Western countries because of espionage and subversive activities — from Paris in 1951 and from Vienna in 1957. Headquartered

[51] According to Defense Intelligence Agency analysts, the Defense Council is the top decision-making body in INF "active-measures" matters. See Wynfred Joshua, "Soviet Manipulation of the European Peace Movement," *Strategic Review*, Winter 1983.

[52] For details on the International Relations Department, see John J. Dziak, "Soviet Perceptions of Military Power," National Strategy Information Center, 1982; also see Lilita Dzirkals, Thane Gustafson, and A. Ross Johnson, *The Media and Intra-Elite Communications in the USSR*, The Rand Corporation, R-2869, September 1982.

[53] Apart from Ponomarev, the two most important people in Soviet "campaigning" are Ponomarev's first deputy, Vadim Zagladin, who is in charge of nonruling Communist parties and, according to Soviet ex-KGB Major Stanislav Levchenko, the moving force behind Soviet "active measures" in Europe, and Leonid Zamyatin, chief of the International Department and at the same time chairman of the Soviet-FRG Friendship Society. See *Der Spiegel*, No. 7, February 14, 1983. On the International Information Department, see Dzirkals, Gustafson, and Johnson, *The Media and Intra-Elite Communication*.

[54] For a detailed description of WPC organizational structures and activities, see Helmut Baerwald, *Missbrauchte Friedenssehnsucht* (Bonn: Osang Verlag, 1983), pp. 49-60. In 1979, as part of a Soviet effort to encourage a peace movement in America, A "U.S. Peace Council" was organized under WPC auspices. It was said to be particularly important because it showed other peace organizations "how to break the chains of anti-Soviet prejudices." (*Problems of Peace and Socialism*, No. 11, 1982.)

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in Helsinki, its nominal president is an Indian Communist, Ramesh Chandra, though its de facto leader is Vitaly Shaposhnikov, a member of the WPC presidium and also Ponomarev's deputy in the International Department in charge of International Social Organizations, i.e., Soviet fronts. The WPC is subsidized directly by Moscow and is engaged in a wide array of anti-Western activities. In the words of its president:

> It is the most powerful, representative and largest international solidarity movement of our time. There is no liberation struggle, no struggle against imperialism, colonialism, neocolonialism, racism and racial discrimination in which the World Peace Council does not play an important role.[55]

The WPC's most pronounced role in Western Europe is in the mobilization of "men and women from different political orientations in their struggle for better understanding and cooperation for peace" and the coordination of mass organizations' activities. The WPC-organized New Stockholm Appeal presented 700 million signatures to the first special United Nations session on disarmament in 1978. As far back as 1973, the "World Congress of Peace Forces" in Moscow set the tone programatically for the strategy of "popular front" coalitions later pursued in the neutron-bomb and INF campaigns.[56] The specific involvement of the WPC in Germany, though indirect and concealed in the activities of its West German branch, the "German Peace Union" (*Deutsche Friedens* Union), was decisive and multifaceted.

The World Federation of Trade Unions. The WFTU, one of the oldest Soviet fronts, was founded in 1945. It is based in Prague and claims 206 million members in ninety national organizations.[57] Since the late 1970s, particularly since its 1978 Congress in Prague, the WFTU has made the "struggle for peace and disarmament" its major priority. An International Trade Union Committee for Peace and Disarmament was set up in 1981 with the specific purpose of influencing and infiltrating Western non-Communist unions, an effort that became pronounced during the INF campaign. Under its auspices, some 1,000 trade union delegations journey to the Soviet Union each year, while 800 Soviet delegations are sent abroad.[58]

The Christian Peace Conference. The CPC, founded in 1958 and located in Prague, has local affiliates in eighty countries. The CPC gained considerable importance among Soviet fronts during the INF campaign due to the important role played by Western churches in the broad-

[55] Cited in Ortwin Buchbender, et al., *Sicherheit und Frieden* (Herford: E. S. Mitter and Sohn Verlag, 1983), p. 368.

[56] Ibid.

[57] See Genady Nikolaev, "The World of Labour for a World at Peace," Special Supplement to *New Times*, Moscow, 1982, p. 14.

[58] Ibid.

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based peace movement in Europe. Its propaganda activities have been assisted by a new Soviet "Committee for Relations with Foreign Religious Groups Working for Peace" set up by the International Department under the chairmanship of Soviet propagandist Metropolitan Filaret and presented as an independent body of concerned churchmen.[59] The CPC is assisted in West Germany by the Berlin Conference of European Catholics, whose president is a member of the WPC presidium.

Other well-known fronts that played a role in the campaign are the World Federation of Scientific Workers, the Women's International Democratic Federation, the International Democratic Federation, the International Organization of Journalists, and the World Federation of Democratic Youth.[60] These fronts are estimated to cost the Soviets $63 million a year, a conservative figure that does not include the costs of active participation in specific campaigns.[61]

The DKP and Its Allies

Subordinated to the Soviet front organizations and serving as their "transmission belts" are numerous West German Communist and Communist-controlled organizations. The most important by far is the German Communist Party (DKP). Originally founded in 1918 as the Communist Party of Germany (KPD), it was outlawed by Hitler's regime in 1933 and was reconstituted in 1945. Judged subversive and unconstitutional by a federal court, it was outlawed again in 1956, and finally reestablished under its present name in April 1969. As an autonomous part of the legitimate West German political landscape, the DKP is a negligible factor. With a membership of about 44,000, it has seldom been able to attract more than a minute percentage of the electorate (0.2 percent in the 1983 election).[62] Its importance stems almost exclusively from its complete subservience to the Soviet Union and the East German Communist Party (SED) and its ability, through superior organization, discipline, and professionalism, to influence leftist political forces in the FRG. Consisting of a party center in Dusseldorf, twelve regional and 200 district

[59] *The Economist Foreign Report,* February 2, 1984, p. 4.

[60] For a list of all Soviet fronts, see Richard F. Staar, "Checklist of Communist Parties and Fronts, 1981," *Problems of Communism,* March-April 1982.

[61] See "CIA Study: Soviet Action and Propaganda," Hearings before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., February 6 and 19, 1980, p. 79. The Soviets admit that the WPC and other organizations' activities are funded under the auspices of the Soviet Peace Committee. The chairman of this committee, Yuri Zhukov, has claimed that 80 million Soviet citizens contribute to the "Soviet Peace Fund." A *Pravda* article of May 1982 revealed that Soviet citizens work without pay one day a week, donating their wages to the "peace fund," but this is likely to be a propaganda statement. See *Pravda,* May 31, 1982.

[62] For details, see *Bundesverfassungschutzbericht,* 1983, Bonn, April 1984.

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bureaus, a party school, a political foundation, and a research institute,[63] the DKP as a whole is controlled and financed (to the tune of some 60 million DM) by the SED — more specifically, by the "Department West" of the central committee of the SED.[64] Apart from its direct involvement in the peace movement, including the full-time activities of some 400 highly trained professionals, the DKP has influenced the movement primarily by orchestrating and directing the involvement of a large number of front organizations with a combined membership of about 90,000, which played a key role in the anti-INF campaign.[65]

There are two types of DKP fronts: direct subsidiary organizations and organizations strongly influenced or controlled by the DKP. The most important subsidiary organizations are the German Socialist Working Youth (SDAJ), the Marxist Student Association Spartacus (MSB), and the Young Pioneers.

German Socialist Working Youth. The SDAJ, founded in 1968, currently has about 15,000 members, 40 percent of whom (including most of the leaders) are also DKP members.[66] Its activities are focused on young people, especially in the labor unions. The SDAJ is a member of the Soviet "World Federation of Democratic Youth."

Marxist Student Association Spartacus. The MSB was founded in 1970 to carry out Communist propaganda and organizational work among West German university students. It has 6,000 members, 70 percent of whom are DKP members. It is also an institutional member of the Soviet "International Student Federation."

The Young Pioneers. Founded in 1974 and ostensibly a children's organization, the Young Pioneers organization is controlled by DKP functionaries and has 3,500 members.

Among fronts of the second type, DKP-controlled organizations, a particularly active role in the peace movement was played by the German Peace Union (DFU), the Committee for Peace, Disarmament, and Cooperation (KFAZ), the German Peace Society–United Military Service Opponents (DVG–VKG), the Association of People Persecuted by

[63] See Baerwald, *Missbrauchte Friedenssehnsucht,* p. 86.

[64] The actual transfer of funds is accomplished either through secret couriers or through East German-owned companies in the FRG. Apart from subsidizing the DKP, the East German SED directly supervises most of the training and indoctrination of West German cadres. Some 3,000 DKP functionaries, for instance, have graduated from the party academy "Franz Mehring" in East Berlin, which trains only West German cadres. Also subject to indoctrination and recruitment are the thousands of FRG citizens who visit the GDR as part of DKP-organized delegations. In 1982, for example, 800 West German delegations with some 10,000 members visited East Germany, while 4,000 children spent their vacations in camps under the auspices of the SED youth organization. For details see "Die DKP und die SED sind Bruderparteien," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,* December 20, 1982; "Die Firmen der SED sind die Bankschalter der DKP," *Die Welt,* November 2, 1983; and *Bundesverfassungschutzbericht,* 1983.

[65] *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,* April 9, 1982.

[66] Baerwald, *Missbrauchte Friedenssehnsucht,* p. 88.

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the Nazi Regime–Union of Anti-Fascists (VVN–BDA), and the Christians for Disarmament (CfA).

The German Peace Union. The DFU is a branch of the World Peace Council, set up in 1960 as an umbrella organization to coordinate the activities of "peace-loving" forces in the FRG. About one-third of its membership consists of leading functionaries of the DKP and other Communist organizations. The DFU sponsored some of the most important initiatives of the anti-INF "campaign from below," including the so-called "Krefeld Appeal."[67]

The Committee for Peace, Disarmament, and Cooperation. KFAZ, founded as another umbrella organization in April 1974, has become the leading organizer and guiding force in peace-movement demonstrations and activities. It does not possess a formal organizational structure or by-laws, but is guided by a coordinating bureau dominated by Communists and their sympathizers who are not elected, but are appointed by consensus. It has been particularly active in carrying out the guidelines of the WPC, of which it is a leading regional affiliate.

German Peace Society–United Military Service Opponents. Also organized in 1974 and with about 22,000 members, this is the largest of the DKP-controlled organizations. About one-third of its presidium is made up of Communist and KFAZ officials.

Association of People Persecuted by the Nazi Regime – Union of Anti-Fascists. The VVN – BDA is one of the oldest Communist fronts, having been set up directly by the Soviet Union in East Berlin in February 1947. Dominated by Communists, but including social democrats and trade unionists as well, the VVN-DBA is an institutional member of the WPC.

Christians for Disarmament. The CfA was organized under the auspices of the Soviet "Christian Peace Conference and World Peace Council" in 1977. The group has the task of infiltrating and exploiting the religious segments of the peace movement. Organizationally, it is under the jurisdiction of the German Peace Union, and it has been particularly active in the evangelical church.

A great number of lesser-known groups also assisted in the anti-INF campagin, including the Democratic Women's Initiative, the Association of Democratic Jurists, and the Union of Democratic Scientists. All of these organizations are German branches of the respective Soviet international fronts.

In West Germany there are thirteen active DKP-affiliated organizations with 27,000 members and fifty DKP-controlled groups with

[67] Ibid., pp. 92-93. The Krefeld Appeal is described later in this section.

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an estimated 70,000 members.[68] The campaign was also assisted by the numerous "Societies for Friendship" with Soviet bloc countries. An important propaganda role was played by the "Generals for Peace and Disarmament," a group of former high-ranking NATO officers that claims to be independent but is essentially a tool of the WPC. (Three of its members belong to the WPC and one, General Costa Gomes of Portugal, is even a WPC Vice President.)[69]

The policies and initiatives of the pro-Soviet front are promoted and assisted by a media and print propaganda apparatus that produces an astounding volume of materials. In 1983, the DKP controlled fourteen publishing houses and thirty book dealerships under an umbrella organization called the Working Group of Socialist and Democratic Publishers and Book Dealers. This organization published three daily, sixty-one monthly, forty-seven bimonthly, and 1,404 quarterly publications, with a total output of 37.5 million items. In the same year, the group produced over 500 new book titles of its own and distributed about 1,000 East German and Soviet titles. A film distribution agency and a recording company also work full-time in the agitation and propaganda campaign. The large democratic parties do not have anything that even approaches the size and sophistication of this DKP propaganda apparatus.[70]

A direct and important, albeit lesser-known, role is played by the KGB, with its traditional expertise in disinformation, subversion, and recruitment of agents of influence. A recent report on security by the Federal Office for Protection of the Constitution *(Bundesverfassungschutz)* indicated that the number of KGB agents among Soviet diplomatic officials increased cosiderably in the early 1980s, so that by now more than half of the Soviet diplomatic officials are KGB. Nearly 500 Soviet and East

[68] See Gerd Langguth, *Protestbewegung* (Koln: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1983), p. 58. This book is easily the best single source of information on the origins, evolution, and political tendencies of the various West German protest movements of the left.

[69] The idea for this group reportedly originated at a 1980 congress of the WPC in Sofia. The group was set up in April 1981 with the help of a Dutch peace research center and the Washington-based Center for Defense Information, headed by retired U.S. Admiral Gene La Rocque. Initially, it was administered in West Berlin by Gerhard Kade, a veteran WPC official and a vice-president of the WPC research organization, the International Institute for Peace. In 1983, the leadership role was taken over by retired British Brigadier Michael Harbottle. Among the group's most important propaganda contributions are the publication of a starkly pro-Soviet book entitled *Generals for Peace* (published by the DKP publishing house Pahl-Rugenstein in Cologne) and a "Memorandum" to the U.N. Special Session on Disarmament in the summer of 1982. The activities of the "peace" generals collectively and individually have had considerable propagandistic impact in the peace movement, confirming the advice given to a Comintern congress in 1938 by its then-Secretary General Georgi Dimitrov: "One sympathizer is worth more than a dozen militant communists. A writer of reputation or a retired general are worth more than 500 poor devils who won't know any better than to get themselves beaten up by the police." (See Baerwald, *Missbrauchte Friedenssehnsucht,* pp. 60-64; *The Daily Telegraph,* October 31, 1984; and *Die Welt,* November 1, 1984.)

[70] For a detailed account of DKP-controlled publishing activities, see Wilhelm Mensing, *Maulwuerfe in Kulturbeet* (Osnabrueck; Edition Interform, 1983), pp. 109-37. Also see *Bundesverfassungschutzbericht,* 1983, pp. 58-60.

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European intelligence officers, plus some 2,300 East German agents, are reportedly operating in the FRG.[71] Direct involvement in the peace movement in support of DKP activities is said to be one of the KGB's main tasks at present. At least one Soviet agent has already been expelled from Germany for trying to recruit agents to influence the anti-nuclear movement.[72] KGB officers have also been expelled from Norway, Denmark, and Holland for similar activities.[73]

In the "campaign from below," the KGB engaged in skillful disinformation activities designed to enhance distrust in the United States. In late 1981, for instance, a forgery containing an alleged U.S. plan for nuclear strikes in Western Europe in the event of war with the Soviet Union, entitled "Holocaust Again for Europe," was circulated among peace groups.[74] It has also been alleged that Soviet intelligence is actively supporting and trying to manipulate extremist groups on both sides of the political spectrum, including the Red Army Faction and the neo-Nazis, to encourage polarization and political instability in the FRG.[75]

Finally, Moscow exerts a direct influence on the West German political scene through the federation of FRG – USSR friendship societies that presently coordinates the work of thirteen regional affiliates.[76]

Strategy and Tactics of Penetration

While the Soviet Union and its allies possessed the requisite organizational infrastructure to conduct the "campaign from below," they needed to overcome two critical weaknesses. First, despite organizational sophistication and ample financing, the infrastructure was numerically weak and could hardly hope to mount a significant effort on its own. Second, many potential opponents of INF who were the natural targets of the campaign were not likely to welcome direct Soviet or Communist sponsorship. The solution to this dilemma was a popular-front strategy allowing the Soviet-sponsored elements to infiltrate, coopt, and exploit and peace movement while remaining largely in the background. This strategy, usually carried out by the Comintern, has been a key part of

[71] "KGB Offiziere auf Friedenskundgebungen der DKP," *Die Welt am Sonntag,* June 26, 1983.

[72] See "Expulsion of Soviets Worldwide, 1983," *Foreign Affairs Note.* U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, D.C., January 1984.

[73] *Neue Zuercher Zeitung,* November 28, 1981; and *Aftenposten,* June 24, 1983.

[74] *U.S. News and World Report,* January 11, 1982.

[75] Such allegations were made, for example, by the chief of the department for State Protection of the Federal Criminal Office (Bundeskriminalamt — BKA), *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,* February 20, 1982. Earlier, West German security officials alleged that terrorist groups such as the radical left Red Army Faction and the neo-Nazi Defense Sport Group Hoffmann had received training and support from Soviet clients in South Yemen and the Palestine Liberation Organization. See *International Herald Tribune,* May 29, 1981.

[76] *Bundesverfassungschutz,* 1983.

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the Soviet foreign political arsenal since the very beginnings of the Soviet state. A high-ranking Comintern functionary, Dmitry Manuilskiy, provided the following succinct description of the strategy at the Seventh Comintern Congress in 1935:

> The proletariat in all countries, supported by the Soviet Union, has to build the broadest possible popular front for the anti-war struggle and bring the masses together in a unified front against the warmongers. But this requires the communists to switch from the old primitive methods of short-term, isolated anti-war campaigns to a strategy of a broad, coordinated struggle for peace, which — based on the peace-promoting policies of the Soviet Union — would incorporate all anti-war forces at the national and international level and include the most diverse forms of action such as street demonstrations, parliamentary actions, international conferences of workers' organizations, and the creation of a wide network of anti-war organizations, etc. It is no longer sufficient at present to fight for peace with the obsolete weapon of small campaigns, since the communists are already capable of using the heavy artillery of the broadest mass movements against the danger of imperialist war.[77]

The popular-front strategy was articulated openly at the very beginning of the campaign in late 1979 at a Conference of Soviet Peace Champions in Moscow. It became the major focus of WPC activities leading to the convening of a "World Parliament of Peoples for Peace" in Bulgaria in September 1980, where the need to "create a worldwide anti-war front, able to materialize the anxiety of hundreds of millions of people in mass actions to prevent war" was emphasized, and an action program for 1981 was adopted which underlined "the urgency of bringing together in common mass actions, people belonging to different political parties and tendencies."[78]

It was particularly important for the Soviets to use the opportunities presenting themselves through the "anti-war positions of socialist and social-democratic parties and other mass organizations."[79] Indeed, throughout the campaign in West Germany, an effort was exerted to ensure the widest possible programmatical and practical cooperation with the left wing of the German Social Democratic Party and its youth organization.[80] A similar strategy was pursued toward the Green party, which emerged as one of the more important forces in the peace movement. During the initial emergence of the Greens as an organized, political force, both the Soviets and the West German Communists were extremely

[77] Cited in Baerwald, *Missbrauchte Friedenssehnsucht,* pp. 116-17.

[78] *XX Century and Peace,* November-December, 1980, cited in J. A. Vermaat, *Moscow Fronts,* p. 6.

[79] "Communique of the Conference on Ideology of the Ruling Communist Parties," *Pravda,* November 4, 1981.

[80] As insightful analysis of SPD attitudes toward INF will be published in a forthcoming Rand report by John Van Oudenaren on nuclear policy in the Federal Republic of Germany.

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critical and dismissed them as "utopians" and "political charlatans."[81] Yet, once the Soviet campaign against INF started and the key role of the Greens was recognized, both the West German Communists and the Soviets promptly discovered their "progressive orientation on a number of issues" and "began doing everything to strengthen the anti-militarist positions of the Greens and consolidate the new party's links with the mass anti-war movement."[82] Strengthening the anti-militarist positions has apparently involved efforts to infiltrate the Greens' organization and influence its course from within. According to the Hamburg branch of the Federal Agency for Protection of the Constitution (*Bundesverfassungschutz*), the leadership of the Greens in Hamburg by mid-1982 was dominated by Communist-oriented elements.[83] A number of Communist functionaries have also been identified among the Greens' leadership in West Berlin and Wiesbaden.[84] This is not to say that the DKP has been able to control or manipulate the Greens at will. On a number of occasions, Greens' leaders and organizations have taken issue with the blatantly pro-Moscow course of Communist-controlled elements. Nonetheless, the Greens' anti-INF and anti-American attitudes were so dominant that anti-Soviet criticisms remained muted and the campaign was remarkably one-sided.[85]

The Soviet-controlled elements in West Germany sought to build and promote the popular front by emphasizing the areas of agreement between the various participants of the peace movement; these efforts ususally consisted only of expressing opposition to INF and disregarding or minimizing the many issues of ideological, political, and tactical disagreement — a strategy that came to be known as "minimal consensus" *(Minimalkonsensus).*

Church-oriented groups in the German peace movement became the focus of particular attention in Soviet efforts to put together a viable anti-INF coalition. Realizing the crucial role played by churches and believers, the Soviets advocated a strategy of "broad contacts and joint actions," through which they hoped that the "mass of believers

[81] A. S. Pokh and A. B. Trukin, "The Green Party in the Political Arena of the FRG," *Rabochiy klass i sovremenii mir,* No. 3, May-June 1983, translated in *JPRS 84530,* No. 1466, October 13, 1983, p. 74.

[82] Ibid. Also see Y. G. Kyuchik, "The Greens: The Present-Day Protest by the Middle Strata," *Sovetskoye consuparstvo i pravo,* No. 11, November 1983, translated in JPRS-UPS-84-006-L, February 15, 1984.

[83] See Joachim Wagner, "Wer von linksaussen beeinflusst in Hamburg die Grunen?" *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,* July 16, 1982.

[84] A detailed account of the attempted penetration of the Greens by communist elements is found in Jean-Paul Picaper, "Vers le IVe Reich," *La Table Ronde,* Paris, 1983.

[85] A Soviet observer has noted approvingly that for the Greens in general the cold war question, "What are we going to do if the Russians come?" is now being supplemented by the urgent question, "What are we going to do if the Americans stay?" (See L. Istiyagin, "Dominant in the Antiwar Struggle," *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodniye ofnosheniga,* No. 10, October 1983, p. 134.)

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could become an active force for the anti-imperialist struggle and profound social change."[86] In the process of encouraging such "joint actions," Soviet propagandists skillfully appealed to the pacifist leanings of some of the believers. Though pacifism has been traditionally condemned by Marxist-Leninist theoreticians as utopian, unscientific, and harmful, it has consistently been used to demoralize and undermine the defense will of Soviet adversaries abroad. This imperative was expressed by Lenin in a terse admonition to foreign minister Chicherin prior to the Geneva conference in 1922:

> We communists have our communist program (the Third International); but we still consider it to be our duty to support (even if the odds are 10,000 to 1) pacifists in the other, i.e., bourgeois, camp. . . . This will both have bite and be "polite" and help demoralize the enemy.[87]

The actual task of coopting religious members of the pacifist peace movement was entrusted to an organization controlled by the German Peace Union and created specifically for this purpose, the Christians for Disarmament (CfA), and the DKP front KFAZ, particularly active in the mobilization of noncommunists. Thanks to their efforts, the DKP and its proxies infiltrated and achieved a remarkable degree of cooperation with the two largest Christian peace organizations active in the peace movement, Action Reconciliation Peace Services (*Aktiongemeinschaft Dienst fuer den Frieden,* AGDF), and the Catholic Initiative Church from Below (*Initiative Kirche von Unten,* IKVU); both strongly supported the Communist-initiated Krefeld Appeal.[88]

The success of the popular front strategy depended importantly on securing the greatest possible cooperation from the politically powerful German trade unions, and a considerable effort was expended toward that end. The German Trade Union Organization (*Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund,* DGB), incorporating seventeen independent unions with 7.9 million members, is one of the strongest political forces in the country. The West German trade unions were a target of penetration for the Communist party (70 percent of the party members belong to unions)

[86] N. Kovalskiy, "Averting the Threat: Believers Are Also in the Ranks of the Anti-War Movement," *Pravda,* April 26, 1983, translated in JPRS, No. 83624, June 7, 1983, p. 23.

[87] Cited in J. A. Emerson Vermaat, *Soviet Fronts.* Pacifism remains, however, a commodity strictly for foreign consumption and is vigorously combatted at home. Thus, an authoritative (unsigned) article in *Pravda* on November 6, 1981, took issue with alleged failures of the ideological apparatus to combat pacifist sentiments among the Soviet population and admonished that "our propaganda must decisively rid itself of the traces of pacifism that are occasionally to be found in some instructional or propaganda materials." There have also been strong attacks against pacifism in the East European countries that seem to be more susceptible to it. See, for instance, "Youth Daily Attacks Pacifism in GDR, Hungary," in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *FBIS–EEU,* No. 226, November 22, 1983.

[88] *Texte zur Inneren Sicherheit,* p. 8; and *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,* February 11, 1982.

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long before the anti-INF campaign,[89] but infiltration efforts were greatly expanded during the campaign. The professed objective was a "progressive alliance of working people" against NATO's INF deployment. In several cases, the DKP was able to achieve a tactical alliance with individual unions, some of which — the Union of Metal Workers (I.G. Metal), the Union of Printing Workers (I.G. Druck and Papier), and the Union of Bank, Trade, and Insurance employees — openly criticized the INF deployments.[90] In other instances, joint DKP and trade-union protest demonstrations were organized.[91] Overall, though the DKP and its allies were never able to coopt the union movement for their purposes, as the campaign intensified there was a noticeable shift to the left in DGB attitudes, prompting a member of the presidium of the DGB to exclaim: "Often the impression was created that positions and initiatives that contradicted the policy of the DKP and its ideological field could not be carried out or translated into concrete activities in the organization."[92]

In general, the effort of the "campaign from below" to mold the diverse elements of the peace movement into a monolithic anti-INF entity was less than successful. Nevertheless, it played a leading organizational role in the movement's activities that was far out of proportion to its numerical strength.

Operations and Influence

The pro-Soviet elements in the peace movement achieved remarkable success in influencing the movement. Up to three million West German citizens participated in the various peace-movement activities. Although only 3 to 5 percent of the participants were extreme leftists or Communists, this small core made up 20 percent of the participants in the key demonstrations, 40 percent of the demonstration coordinators, and well over 50 percent of the demonstration organizers.[93]

The specific INF movement activities in West Germany fell into three basic categories: initial appeals and signature-gathering petitions; mass demonstrations; and direct action, including blockades of barracks and military installations and other acts of civil disobedience, even including sabotage.

[89] A detailed account of Communist infiltration tactics and influence in the trade union movement is found in Ossip K. Flechtheim, et al., *Der Marsch der DKP durch die Institutionen,* (Frankfurt am Main; Fisher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1980).

[90] See Hugo Mueller-Vogg, "Die Krefelder und ihre Freunde," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,* January 5, 1983.

[91] Hugo Mueller-Vogg, "Der DGB im Sog der Friedensbewegung," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,* June 29, 1982.

[92] Ibid.

[93] These figures represent the official estimates of the West German Ministry of the Interior as published in *Texte zur Inneren Sicherheit,* p. 7.

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In all of these activities, the pro-Soviet coalition played a decisive, often leading role, although it usually remained in the background. The coalition's modus operandi was perfectly exemplified by its involvement in and manipulation of the Krefeld Appeal.

Initiated in November 1980 at a meeting attended by representatives of many political and professional groups in Krefeld, the appeal was directed at the federal government and, under the slogan "Nuclear death threatens all of us — no to nuclear missiles in Europe," demanded that the government withdraw support for the INF deployment. At the same time, a parallel signature-gathering initiative was undertaken. With their anti-NATO character carefully camouflaged, these efforts were presented as the result of a broad consensus and promptly gained considerable popular support. By June 1981, a million signatures were collected, and two years later the Krefeld Appeal was reportedly endorsed by four million West German citizens, making it one of the most successful — if not *the* most successful — drives of its kind in West German history.[94] In reality, the Krefeld Appeal was conceived, financed, and carried out by DKP-controlled groups, with Moscow's help, prompting a centrist labor union journal to call it the "greatest tactical achievement of the DKP since its founding."[95] The initiative was conceived by, or perhaps suggested to, the DFU leadership during visits to Moscow and East Berlin in January and May 1980; it was then coordinated with the DKP at several meetings.[96] The chief organizer was Joseph Weber, a DFU presidium member and a man with some thirty years' conspiratorial experience in the Communist movement.[97] The appeal itself, an invitation to a meeting to discuss it, and a carefully prepared list of invitees, excluding well-known Communists, were presented at a DFU presidium meeting in September 1980.[98] The forum took place on November 15, 1980, and

[94] See Baerwald, *Missbrauchte Friedenssehnsucht*, p. 147.

[95] *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, June 29, 1982.

[96] See Baerwald, *Missbrauchte Friedenssehnsucht*, pp. 142-143.

[97] For an interesting account of the behind-the-scenes activities of the DKP and Joseph Weber regarding the Krefeld Appeal, written by an ex-DKP operative, see Klaus Rainer Roehl, "Die Geschaefte des Herrn Oberst," *Spontan*, No. 4, 1981, pp. 4-10; and Werner Kahl, "Die Krefelder Geschaefte des Oberst Weber," *Die Welt*, June 1, 1981. Weber, a former Wehrmacht colonel, has been involved in pro-Communist activities since the late 1940s and, by his own admission, was tried seven times for subversion and espionage in West German courts. In a remarkably open interview in a Soviet newspaper, he describes his likely recruitment by the Communists upon his return from POW camp as follows: "At the recommendation of an acquaintance I went to a reception by the communists in the municipal administration. I didn't believe that anybody would want to help a Hitlerite colonel and a staff officer at that. However, the communists, my former enemies, sympathized with my problems. After some checking, my name was deleted from the list of Nazis and other war criminals subject to prosecution." (See Yu. Makartsev, "Mamaev Kurgan," *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, June 18, 1981.)

[98] This carefully planned strategy is revealed in an internal memorandum sent to DFU members soliciting their cooperation in recruiting prominent non-Communists for the Krefeld meeting. Its key passage reads: "Since this is not going to be a DFU meeting as such, but we are only the initiators, we would like to approach the most prominent people possible and win them over as co-inviters to the

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immediately after the public issuance of the appeal, the DFU withdrew into the background. It was replaced by the KFAZ, which took over the management of the initiative, while the DKP itself directed the signature-gathering.[99]

A different strategy was pursued in organizing the mass demonstrations that became the trademark of the anti-INF campaign. Aware of their numerical weakness vis-à-vis other groups in the movement, such as the Greens, the pro-Soviet coalition focused on influencing events at the preparatory stage, where they could dominate the proceedings with their superior discipline and instant availability of cadres, as well as their financial clout. This tactic was pursued at mass demonstrations on October 10, 1981, and June 10, 1982, that each attracted some 300,000 demonstrators. The October 10 demonstration was organized primarily by the two church-oriented organizations, the ASF and the AGDF (themselves infiltrated to a considerable extent), but the preparatory coordinating committee was packed with DKP sympathizers. At least twenty-six of the seventy organizations participating were DKP-influenced. As a result, the tenor of the demonstration remained markedly anti-NATO and anti-American without much reference to the Soviet Union. Three of five march columns at the Bonn demonstration were under the command of DKP elements, and at least six of fifteen official speakers were pro-Soviet.[100]

The DKP elements were even better prepared and more successful in dominating the organizational preparations for the June 10 demonstration, organized to protest a NATO summit meeting and the visit of President Reagan to the FRG. Early preparations began in February 1982, when fifteen peace-movement organizations met at the invitation of Klaus Mannhardt, a top KFAZ official.[101] Two weeks later, the DKP presidium issued a statement denouncing Reagan's visit as a "provocation" and urged action.[102] Then on April 4, the representatives of thirty-seven organizations met in Bonn to discuss holding an international peace demonstration on June 10. More than two-thirds of the 800 participants at the conference belonged to DKP-controlled groups, allowing the party to completely dominate the proceedings. Four of the six members elected to the key "coordination committee" were from the DKP coalition, and all attempts to introduce resolutions even mildly critical of the Soviet

meeting and co-signers of the Appeal." (See Dokument No. 4 in Gottfried Linn, *Die Kampagne gegen die NATO-Nachruestung*, [Bonn: Hohwacht Verlag, 1983], pp. 78-79.)

[99] The most detailed analysis of the DKP involvement in the Krefeld Appeal is found in Guenther Wagenlehner, "Eine 'breite Volksbewegung?: Analyse und Dokumentation zum sogenannten 'Krefeld Appeal,' " *Der Heimkehrer*, September 15, 1981. The Office of the Protection of the Constitution in Nordrhein-Wesfalen under whose jurisdiction Krefeld lies also documented the decisive role of the DKP in its *Bericht* for the first half of 1981. See General Anzeiger, October 13, 1981.

[100] Baerwald, *Missbrauchte Friedenssehnsucht*, pp. 153-54.

[101] *Unsere Zeit*, February 27, 1982.

[102] *Unsere Zeit*, March 3, 1982.

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Union — for example, efforts by Rudolf Bahro, a prominent Green and ex-GDR dissident, to express support for the East German peace movement — or against the suppression of Solidarity were easily voted down.[103] As a result, the demonstration, which took place under the slogan "Stand up for peace! Strengthen the resistance! No to new nuclear missiles in Europe!" and drew an estimated 350,000 demonstrators, was characterized by a strident anti-INF and anti-American note.

The same tactics characterized the preparatory stages of the last series of demonstrations before the INF deployments were to take place. At the main "action conference," in April 16-17, 1983, in Cologne, more than half of the 700 general participants as well as of the speakers in the thirteen working groups and in the main plenum were DKP-oriented.[104] In two follow-up preparatory meetings, "People's Assembly South" and "People's Assembly North," the pro-Soviet factions were in the majority by 60 and 75 percent, respectively.[105]

The so-called "Easter Peace Marches" *(Ostermaersche),* another form of anti-INF protest, started in 1982 and were dominated by the pro-Soviet coalition. Easter Marches in West Germany originated as part of a campaign against nuclear armament of the Bundeswehr organized by the SPD in 1957. Attracting considerable attention, these marches were organized every year until 1970 though the SPD abandoned the anti-nuclear campaign in 1959 as a result of its Bad Godesberg program, which saw a shift toward party support of the Western Alliance.

After falling increasingly under Communist control in the 1960s, the Easter marches were revived again under DKP auspices as part of the anti-INF movement in 1982. They took on a mass character in 1983.[106] As on previous occasions, the key organizational role was played by DKP-controlled fronts rather than by the party itself. As in the Krefeld Appeal, the German Peace Union (DFU) was the main organizer, actively assisted by the KFAZ and DVG–VKG. A direct indication of the DFU's leading role is the fact that all regional organizational centers for the Easter Marches, as well as the national organizational headquarters,

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[103] See Linn, *Die Kampagne gegen die NATO-Nachruestung,* p. 20.

[104] Ibid., p. 29.

[105] See *Texte zur Inneren Sicherheit,* p. 16. At the "People's Assembly North," the main issue of discussion was whether the main demonstrations should take place in Hamburg (as advocated by the DKP group) or in Bremerhaven (as suggested by the independents). The DKP modus operandi in imposing its will on the assembly is described by an independent participant as follows: "On the other hand, the DKP had overmobilized to such an extent that even some of its functionaries were embarrassed. Of the 1200 participants at the conference two-thirds belonged with certainty to its sphere, many of them having been bussed [*sic*] for the purpose. The advocates of Hamburg were so unwilling to compromise that a confrontation was inevitable. Speakers who spoke in favor of Bremerhaven at times couldn't finish a single sentence without being booed and shouted down." (See *Atomexpress-atommuellzeitung,* Summer 1983, p. 3., cited in Linn, Die Kampagne gegen die NATO-Nachruestung, p. 42.)

[106] For Communist and East German involvement in the Easter Marches during the 1960s, see Werner Kahl, "Die Ostermarsch-Bewegung und die Rolle von Ost-Berlin," *Die Welt,* April 10, 1984.

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were located in the respective DFU offices.[107] The organizers were able to stage some ninety marches throughout the country, claiming participation of 500,000. These marches attracted the support of not only the Greens and other anti-establishment groups, but also of several unions and some SPD regional organizations.[108]

The "campaign from below," with its well-thought-out strategy and skillful organizational techniques, decidedly influenced the West German peace movement in a direction congenial to Soviet interests, prompting a Soviet observer to note with satisfaction in late 1983:

> To the credit of the basic nucleus of the present anti-war movement, it has been able, surmounting its internal weaknesses and rejecting the diversionary promptings of unbidden "well-wishers" to ascertain the central, truly decisive element at this stage of the struggle to ensure peace and security in Europe. This element, as the absolute majority of anti-war organizations acknowledges, is prevention of the deployment in Western Europe of new American nuclear weapons and the conversion of Europe into a nuclear-free zone.[109]

Conclusions

The Soviet campaign against INF failed to prevent the implementation of NATO's dual-track decision, and INF deployments in the FRG began on schedule in late 1983. This has prompted many Western observers to dismiss the campaign as an inept and wasted effort of little relevance to NATO and its future dealings with Moscow. This is a shortsighted view. Although the Alliance's ability to carry out the deployments and the decline of the peace movement thereafter testified eloquently that NATO remains a viable alliance enjoying the support of the majority of West Europeans, the Soviet campaign was hardly a failure. It was a highly competent effort that holds a number of important lessons for NATO and the West.

First and foremost, it demonstrated a remarkable organizational and political capability that enabled the Soviets and their allies to exploit large numbers of non-Communists in a country that had been considered essentially free of Communist — let alone Soviet — influence. This in itself is significant, since it has been increasingly assumed in the West that the Soviet Union, burdened by an increasingly ossified ideology and challenged by various Eurocommunist deviations, was no longer a relevant political factor in West European societies. Moscow's ability to

[107] This was revealed on March 25, 1983, by the West German Ministry of the Interior, which stated that the marches were "largely controlled by communists loyal to Moscow." See *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,* March 26, 1983.

[108] Ibid.

[109] L. Istyagin, "Dominant in the Antiwar Struggle," *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodniye oinosheniya,* No. 10, October 1983, p. 134.

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mount a propaganda and "active-measures" campaign of the magnitude of the "campaign from below" is quite impressive. It also demonstrates the effective work and coordination of the various Soviet fronts, whose important role in Soviet foreign political activities is often underestimated or even dismissed. The anti-INF campaign illustrated the parallel activities of and coordination among the different elements that make up the means and instrumentalities of Soviet foreign political pursuits.

The INF campaign also achieved some perhaps unexpected results that are likely to have long-term detrimental effects on the West German political landscape and on alliance cohesion. The campaign undoubtedly contributed to the noticeable shift to the left of the SDP, as well as some of the labor unions. In mid-1984, the SPD in effect repudiated nuclear deterrence and flexible response, the cornerstones of NATO doctrine.[110] In a remarkable about-face from its positions during the Schmidt administration, the SPD openly encouraged its members to support the peace movement, which continues to be unabashedly anti-NATO, and even offered to finance its activities.[111] This has led to increasing political polarization, largely destroying the long-held consensus on security objectives in NATO's key European member.

The failure of the campaign to prevent the INF deployments did not precipitate either the collapse of the peace movement or the end of Soviet influence in it. Though the movement lost much of its momentum as well as most of its less-committed supporters when the first Pershings and GLCMs were emplaced, it continues to be highly visible and capable of attracting tens of thousands of sympathizers. It has also become more radical and more willing to engage in violence to achieve its objectives. By all indications, it will remain on the scene for some time.[112] The influence of the DKP and its allies and their ability to mobilize the movement for their purposes have not visibly decreased and may have been enhanced following the general post-deployment decline of the anti-INF movement. At several "action conferences," the pro-Soviet faction of the movement was even more dominant than it had been prior to the deployments.[113] As part of its longer-term strategy to exploit the peace movement for its own political agenda, the DKP attempted to institu-

[110] See "SPD fuer Abkehr von der Nuklearabschreckung," *Neue Zuercher Zeitung*, May 22, 1984.

[111] See "SPD Unterstuetzt Herbstaktionen der Friedensbewegung," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, September 11, 1984; and Guenther Bannas, "Die Finanzen der Friedensbewegung: Die SPD engagiert sich mit Personen und Geld," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, Sept. 12, 1984.

[112] For instance, in late September 1984, some 30,000 demonstrators protested NATO's yearly fall maneuvers. The demonstrations were accompanied by a number of well-planned acts of vandalism and sabotage against U.S. military installations. See "Kostspielige Stoeraktionen gegen die NATO-Manoever in der Bundesreupublik," *Neue Zuercher Zeitung*, October 2, 1984.

[113] See, for instance, Georg Paul Hefty, "Das naechstemal im Palast der Republik," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, February 14, 1984; and "Die SS 20 vergessen und vergeben: Das DKP-Umfeld beherscht die Friedensbewegung," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, May 8, 1984.

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tionalize the anti-INF protest by helping set up a Communist-dominated electoral alliance called the "Peace List" *(Friedensliste)* for the European Parliament elections in mid-1984 and subsequent West German elections.[114] The campaign in general seems to have created opportunities for continuing DKP influence, and has provided it with a political legitimacy among the West German left that it did not enjoy before. This in itself is a considerable achievement.

Despite the nominal failure of the anti-INF campaign, nothing in the experience is likely to discourage Moscow from future use of "campaigning" as a time-tested and effective tool of Soviet foreign policy.

[114] See "Ausbruchversuch aus dem 0.2 Prozent Getto: Die DKP und die 'Friedensliste' — Ein Buendnis auf Dauer," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,* June 2, 1984.

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SOUTHEAST ASIA AND U.S. GLOBAL STRATEGY: CONTINUING INTERESTS AND SHIFTING PRIORITIES

by Richard K. Betts

Asia has been a permanent arena of strategic concern to the United States throughout the twentieth century. Since 1939 the importance of Europe has usually ranked ahead of the Pacific in the thinking of American leaders, but since 1945 Asia has presented more frequent crises and violent challenges — most obviously, two frustrating wars in Korea and Vietnam. Europe has been more central but more stable; Asia has been secondary but more volatile and less susceptible to external controls by the superpowers.

Within the vast expanse of Asia, the Northeast has been a more dominant concern than other regions. Japan and China are intrinsically vital elements in U.S. security. The former is the largest liberal capitalist democracy outside the United States, both a fraternal and competitive force, with unrealized military potential. The latter is poor, populous, and ideologically uncongenial, but a check on Soviet global ambition. In Korea, the large U.S. military presence on the ground has institutionalized the peninsula as a significant factor in Pentagon planning. In contrast to Vietnam, the war there marked the beginning rather than the end of a continuous commitment.

The importance of stakes in Northeast Asia is matched by moderation in the means appropriate to pursuing stable security, which makes it easier for strategists to embrace the enterprise than if it threatened to involve a fiasco like the Vietnam War. Buffered by water, Japan is easier to defend militarily than the area of comparable importance — Western Europe. Maintaining a security relationship with China is a delicate and uncertain task, but a problem primarily of diplomatic management rather than direct commitment of U.S. military power. Having to defend Seoul against another attack from Pyongyang would be an unfortunate eventuality, but it could be accomplished with more efficiency and confidence than the defense of the Saigon regime in the 1960s.

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Southeast Asia's current position in U.S. strategy presents a different, murkier picture. Military strategists or political leaders at the highest level, while not Asian specialists, recognize the importance of China, Japan, and Korea; but they do not usually see a direct or vital link between the dominant concerns related to that part of Asia and the region to the south. In this context, American military and political initiatives toward Southeast Asia are overwhelmingly conditioned by two facts. First, as a superpower, the United States frames these issues in global terms, and Southeast Asia competes for attention not only with Northeast Asia but with the rest of the regions of the world as well. Second, U.S. strategy and military policy still labor under the painful hangover of the Vietnam War. This creates a potential tension between trends in objective interests and subjective recognition of those trends. While the Reagan administration reasserted U.S. power and cited the overcoming of the Vietnam syndrome in such actions as the invasion of Grenada, not even the most strident hawks were willing to focus much attention on the vulnerability of Thailand.

The first fact abets the second. With a plate full of trouble spots and commitments around the world, there is no compulsion for strategists to fasten on current problems in Southeast Asia, when none but Kampuchea has yet burst into flame, and when attempts at preventive activism (such as in Central America) would more clearly raise the spectre of the experience of the 1960s in Vietnam. Yet the West has a substantial and growing interest in Southeast Asia:

> ASEAN is a counter to a Russian-backed expansionist Vietnam; it is an important trading partner . . . ; it is a moderate and generally friendly grouping within the more radical Third World; its strategic waterways control the access from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean; it will be . . . the most rapidly growing region of the world in the 1980s; it provides to the Third World an example of rapid growth via a free market economic system; it is the first successful regional grouping in the postwar history of Southeast Asia. . . . A great deal more needs to be done to acquaint the American people with the strategic importance of this region in the post-Vietnam war era.[1]

This is recognized, and when asked whether U.S. interests are important, those involved with security policy say yes. In bureaucratic jargon, however, this is a "throwaway" line. The practical issue is the *relative* ranking of these interests compared to other areas of concern. In these terms, Southeast Asia is a low-level concern of high-level policy makers who, though concerned in principle about the region, are far more concerned in practice about others. Among geographically defined priorities, Southeast Asia competes for fifth place with South Asia and South

[1] Donald S. Zagoria and Sheldon W. Simon, "Soviet Policy in Southeast Asia," in Zagoria, ed., *Soviet Policy in East Asia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), p. 172.

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America — after Western Europe, the Middle East, Central America, and Northeast Asia. South America ranks higher in political terms but lower in military terms, since external Communist military threats are so limited by geography. The only region that probably ranks lower strategically is Africa.

In part, this relative inattention reflects the apparent international stability that characterizes the region, apart from Indochina. Kampuchea, a source of anxiety, has become a nagging problem rather than a crisis. Even if that picture of stability were to change, unless other priorities fade in significance — through improbable events such as dramatic new détente with the Soviet Union and Cuba or settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict — focus on Southeast Asia is likely for some time to remain restricted to middle and lower levels of the policy-making apparatus, and that focus will be primarily on *internal* instabilities with growth potential. The major example in this respect is the Philippines. The 1984 appointment of the U.S. Ambassador in Manila, Michael Armacost, as Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs might symbolize greater sensitivity to local problems in the high echelons. But personnel actions do not change the fact that high officials only have so many hours in a day, and other priorities remain until events force change in the priorities. In Washington today, no revision of strategy toward Southeast Asia is imminent. Danger lies in the possibility that a regional crisis could occur, which would compel belated adaptation under stress.

The Strategic Landscape

U.S. stakes in Northeast Asia are well recognized, and commitments to Japan and South Korea (ROK) are clearly established. There are critical ambiguities in regard to China — over the quality and intensity of economic and military cooperation, and over Taiwan. But these ambiguities are recognized as necessary, to be managed delicately rather than resolved decisively, because they cover the pursuit of contradictory interests. Relations with Japan and China are matters of high policy, and the maintenance of deterrence in Korea is a well-institutionalized process. None of this can be said confidently about Southeast Asia.

If U.S. strategic interests in Southeast Asia were simple, clear, prominent, immediately compelling, and mutually consistent, the foregoing characterization of security planners' attitudes would be different. The characterization is valid, however, because of the diversity of the interests, the diversity of the region, and the lack of perception of near-term threats. To winnow prospects for change from the confusion or indifference of non-specialist policy makers, let us consider the interaction

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between global, regional, and subregional interests, and between political aims and military conditions. Much of this can be subsumed under two considerations. First, apart from Japan, the strategic significance of Asia as a whole is still seen as largely derivative — that is, how events there affect the worldwide balance of power between the West and the Soviet Union. Interests intrinsic to Southeast Asia are primarily economic, and the linkage of economic and military concerns does not appear as clear as in Europe, Japan, or the Persian Gulf. Second, long-term political or ideological goals and short-term strategic requirements are not fully compatible in some cases. But the relative stability of most of the area, and the diverse character of the interrelationships between political and strategic aims, creates an inertia unconducive to decisive redefinition of priorities.

Derivative Interests

In the 1950s and 1960s, Asia was a theater of high strategic interest in its own right. Containment of China was the second U.S. global priority, after containment of Soviet power. For this period these priorities overlapped in the characterization of the "Sino-Soviet Bloc" as a unified global threat. (Consider one example of the operational consequences of this assumption. Until 1961, the U.S. nuclear war plan only provided for a comprehensive strike against *all* of the Warsaw Pact and the People's Republic of China (PRC); no programmed option existed for sparing the PRC in the unanticipated event that it was not involved in the Soviet aggression that would provoke the U.S. nuclear retaliation.)[2] To the extent that Soviet and Chinese threats were differentiated, in the East the PRC was the primary concern. Moscow had negligible capacity to project its armed forces into the region, and Maoism appeared a greater political challenge. Except for minor cases such as the Soviet airlift of food and fuel to Laos in 1960-61,[3] China was seen as the principal external threat in Korea and Southeast Asia. During the Eisenhower administration, Beijing was even elevated to near-parity with Moscow in terms of global strategy, as "Asia Firsters" in the Republican party challenged the traditional priority of Europe in U.S. policy. Throughout the Cold War in Asia, the Soviet Union was an indirect military threat (providing supplies to North Korea

[2] Desmond Ball, *Politics and Force Levels: The Strategic Missile Program of the Kennedy Administration* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), pp. 190-91. In 1960, the commandant of the Marine Corps, General David Shoup, was considered a disruptive gadfly when he protested to the secretary of defense, "Sir, any plan that kills millions of Chinese when it isn't even their war is not a good plan. This is not the American way." (Quoted in Fred Kaplan, *The Wizards of Armageddon* [New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983], p. 270.)

[3] See Charles A. Stevenson, *The End of Nowhere: American Policy Toward Laos Since 1954* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972), pp. 118-49.

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and guerrilla movements), while China was the direct threat (by virtue of its perceived potential for invading neighboring countries). U.S. military involvement in Indochina in the 1960s was spurred by the derivative interest of worldwide containment and the Munich analogy, but even more by the regional interest of preventing Chinese expansion.

All that had changed by the early 1970s. Exploitation of the Sino-Soviet rift became the centerpiece of the Nixon administration's global strategy. Courting Beijing in order to construct a triangular diplomatic balance, while the bulk of Soviet military power remained at some remove from most of the region, meant that the strategic warrant for allocating a large portion of U.S. military forces to the area was cancelled. When Nixon withdrew one American army division from Korea, his secretary of defense, Melvin Laird, pressed for further removal of the one remaining division.

For friendly Southeast Asian countries the shift in orientation of U.S. global policy, coinciding with the end of the Vietnam War, complicated the strategic calculus. Both China and a newly united Vietnam represented potential threats of attack or subversion, but the United States was not about to deal with either, as it had in the previous era. The bitter legacy of the war precluded direct action against Vietnam, except possibly in the event of attack on Thailand, and even then Washington might well rely on Beijing to provide the principal counterpower.

Today the United States has four main strategic interests in Asia, all of which reflect the reduced military priority of the whole area and the even smaller priority of Southeast Asia. First is the cautious encouragement of Chinese military modernization as a prop to global containment of Moscow. The motive of tying down close to fifty Russian divisions in the Far East outweighs concern with the Soviet threat in East Asia itself. The Soviet forces opposite China were created de novo, not diverted from Europe. If military rapprochement with China were to occur, and Moscow did not demobilize the extra forces, they would become available for allocation to contingencies in the West or the Middle East, radically changing the global balance with the United States and its allies. Second is more vigorous encouragement of increases in Japanese military power, to relieve U.S. forces of some burdens in the region. Both U.S. policies are mixed blessings to most of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), but to Washington these anxieties merit massage rather than resolution by compromising other aims. The third interest is continued maintenance of the U.S. deterrent presence in South Korea. Fourth is maintaining access to local air and naval base facilities. This includes those in Japan, which are crucial to defending South Korea and to naval operations throughout the northern Pacific, but access to these bases is

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not problematic at present. The other principal bases are the huge infrastructures at Clark Field and Subic Bay in the Philippines. The import of Philippine bases, however, has more to do with global than regional interests. (As Soviet use of Cam Ranh Bay increases, however, the regional rationale for the Philippine bases re-emerges.) These bases currently provide the only suitable staging point for operations that would shift forces from the Pacific into the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf, which superseded Asia as the theater of second military priority (after Europe)[4] following the Iranian revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The supply line from Subic to Diego Garcia is 11,000 miles.

In the 1980s, U.S. security policy has been preoccupied with five main politico-military issues:

(1) Improving the overall military balance with the Soviet Union, particularly in intercontinental and European theater nuclear systems, and in conventional forces oriented to the Persian Gulf. Northeast Asia is significant in this regard because more Chinese and Japanese strength would weigh heavily in the global equation, enabling Washington to concentrate on commitments outside Northeast Asia and even beyond the Pacific; the small size of ASEAN military establishments means that even their marked improvement would have little impact.

(2) Nuclear arms control. Northeast Asia figures indirectly in this problem since a deal on forces in Europe must not allow Moscow to displace SS-20s to the Far East, increasing the threat to Japan and China. (This is almost an academic point in 1985, since arms control appears virtually dead for the foreseeable future.) Although Soviet missiles can cover parts of Southeast Asia, this is scarcely ever mentioned, and the problem is subsumed under whatever constraints are obtained because of sensitivities in Tokyo and Beijing.

(3) Marxist-Leninist movements in Central America. Hypersensitivity to the U.S. "back yard" is objectively a bit anachronistic in an era of intercontinental striking power, but is reinforced by the perception that instability in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala is on the verge of exploding out of control. If Communist insurgency threatened to triumph in several Southeast Asian states at once, attention could come to focus on that region again despite the legacy of the Vietnam War.

(4) The Middle East. Association with Israel and concern about Gulf oil are problems in their own right, and the region has long been recognized as the superpowers' potential equivalent of the Balkans before

[4] In recent years Central America and the Caribbean have become an important area of concern, but geographic proximity and relative weakness of adversary conventional forces in the area preclude the need to divert a large portion of logistical or combat resources from other commitments.

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World War I — a concern regularly heightened by crises such as events in Lebanon and the Iran-Iraq war.

(5) Repair of the Atlantic Alliance in the wake of controversy over intermediate-range missile deployments. These tensions are no less manageable than those with Southeast Asian friends, but NATO is the centerpiece of U.S. foreign policy.

To most American strategists, power relationships in Asia are significant primarily for how they inhibit Soviet power and ease U.S. operations on a worldwide scale. China is important for diverting the Russians from Europe and the Middle East; Vietnam is dangerous as a base for Soviet force projection, but by now this is viewed as much in terms of the global "proxy" balance (including Cuba), as in terms of the local balance of power; and the waterways of Southeast Asia are most important as a medium through which U.S. power can pass between the Pacific and theaters to the West. This analysis may appear to exaggerate the indifference of U.S. security policy to purely local interests (and it does not fully define the attitudes of officials outside the Defense Department), but, even if it implies a sort of naive callousness toward Southeast Asia, the fact remains that the agenda of high politics is overloaded. Top decision makers more often view the region deductively (according to its place on the global chessboard) than inductively (according to internally generated issues). A comprehensive vision of strategy, though, has to appreciate the relationship of more particular local interests to the global framework, even as ideas popular in the early 1970s — détente and diffusion of power — have given way to the reinvigoration of worldwide containment.

Intrinsic Interests

The biggest American interest in Asia is the security of Japan, the largest market economy in the world after the United States itself, and the third most populous democracy (India is the first). U.S. and Japanese interests in the economic sphere are two-edged. They are large trading partners but also competitors irked by each other's protectionist measures, which, though limited, provide potent sources of domestic discontent. Economic competition helps fuel U.S. demands that Japan increase its national defense effort, which is less than a sixth of Washington's in proportional terms (percentage of GNP allocated to military functions). This disparity, combined with the one-sided defense commitment (the United States is legally obligated to defend Japan, but the reverse is not true) makes the "free ride" criticism of Tokyo a potent argument: U.S. workers in threatened industries feel they are subsidizing the econ-

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omy that is taking their jobs. Japan's best buffer against pressure is that no one argues for a military role fully proportional to economic resources — this would make Japan *the* superpower in Asia. As long as the issue of security burden-sharing is about the *degree* of acceptable disparity, it is easier for Tokyo to temporize and fend off criticism by making steady military increases in the right direction, though still grossly disproportional compared to the U.S. burden.[5]

The overwhelming proportion of U.S. interests in Southeast Asia is economic. The fact that trade with nations of the Pacific now outstrips that with Europe, while NATO still remains Washington's primary commitment, reflects this. The canonical rationale for the huge U.S. military presence in Western Europe has been the combination of its economic importance, political and cultural affinity, and the concentration of Soviet military power poised on the inner German border. The continuing import of the latter two factors, which are absent in Asia except for China and Japan in part, overrides the shift in relative economic significance. A subtle resurgence of anti-European "unilateralist" sentiments became visible among some figures in the Reagan administration, but not to the point of revising strategic priorities.

In South Korea the stakes are mixed. The inertia of tradition since the peacetime stationing of U.S. forces there after the war of the early 1950s plays some role in rationalizing continued military presence despite the ROK's authoritarian politics, which make it no more attractive an ally than Franco's Spain was in Europe. Deterrence has worked in Korea for thirty years, a reasonable argument goes, so why change the situation? By now, though, the deterrent function of U.S. troops is exerted not against the major Communist powers, but for the most part against North Korea. Were the Pyongyang regime to appear as sober and cautious as Moscow or Beijing, Seoul's superiority over the North in war potential could seem grounds for complete devolution of responsibility for defense on the peninsula. The ROK has over twice the population of the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea (DPRK), almost four times the GNP, and an impressive rate of economic growth (over 7 percent in 1982, while that of many NATO nations was negative). These very facts — 40 million people (two-thirds the population of West Germany) and a steadily increasing share of the collective economic status of the West — make the security of the ROK arguably a much more direct interest for the United States than has ever been formally acknowledged. Commitment has usually been justified as a derivative interest — to symbolize the solidity of global containment and to prevent Communist conquest from

[5] For more extensive discussion see Richard K. Betts, "Washington, Tokyo, and Northeast Asian Security: A Survey," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 6, no. 4, December 1983, pp. 5-30.

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making the peninsula a "dagger pointed at the heart of Japan." (The metaphor has always been more colorful than meaningful. A Communist Korea would scarcely present any greater military threat to Japan than the Soviet possession of Sakhalin already does.) The old strategic rationale that sees South Korea as a domino rather than as a value in its own right has not caught up with economic reality.

In a sense the population and economic dynamism of Southeast Asia should make the above argument applicable to that region too, as well as to Taiwan. ASEAN has a population greater than that of the United States and a GNP of almost $200 billion; from 1979-1981, U.S. exports to ASEAN increased about 30 percent, and from 1977-1982, total two-way trade more than doubled.[6] With regard to the mainland countries of the association, however, inertia has worked in the other direction since the United States was so badly burned in its attempt to prop up the dominoes of Indochina. The offshore countries — Indonesia and the Philippines — are virtually secure against external aggression. The New People's Army (NPA) is emerging with frightening speed as a challenge to the government in Manila, but even in the Philippines — and certainly in Indonesia — internal threats to stability are as much non-Communist as the type of subversion that could prompt U.S. military intervention on grounds of containment. Taiwan is comparable to South Korea, though less populous, but the fact that the PRC's stake in Taiwan is very different from its attitude to South Korea means that the U.S. interest in Beijing compromises its interests in Taipei.

Apart from the economic interest of trade, more a matter to be handled by American diplomats and businessmen than by strategic planners, there are two related concerns that overlap with global strategy and lie in the gray area between intrinsic and derivative interests: Indonesian oil and maritime access to straits. Neither of these is a "vital" interest — that is, one of the top few on the list of worldwide interests — and the threats to them are hypothetical and remote.

After 1973, global energy transfers to the industrial democracies became wrapped in the issue of security. For strategists, however, this was less a global issue than a Middle Eastern one since both the largest sources of supply and the greatest potential threats to them — from internal instability, Soviet aggression, or both — lay in the Persian Gulf. Were supplies from the Gulf cut off, even in a global war, there would not necessarily be a comparable threat of a cut-off from Indonesia (the Soviet navy's hands would probably be too full with other missions to concentrate on commerce interdiction in that area). Indonesia has a relatively small proportion of world oil anyway. Oil sources exist around

[6] *U.S. Department of State Bulletin,* October 1982, p. 33.

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disputed territories like the Spratly Islands but they are not large enough to matter strategically in themselves; for the United States they are more significant as a potential source of conflict among regional states which could involve Washington against its will. Moreover, the West's adaptation to the rise in oil prices through conservation, reserve storage, and energy diversification, not to mention the oil glut of the early 1980s, has made dependence on oil imports less acute.

Maritime access is more a legal and political issue than a strategic one. The U.S. rejection of the Law of the Sea Treaty, and refusal to recognize Djakarta's full claims to jurisdiction over straits in accord with the Indonesian "archipelagic principle" (*Wawasan Nusantara*) are sources of diplomatic abrasion but are not likely to turn into real impediments to transit.[7] If worst came to worst, and commercial voyages were inhibited, circumventing waterways even as crucial as the Malacca Straits would not be a disastrous problem. The West managed to survive quite comfortably for years when the Suez Canal was closed after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War.

Indonesian claims present no practical danger to commerce anyway, since Djakarta has no objection to innocent passage. The United States resists these claims on principle — the general right of freedom of the seas — but also for pragmatic military reasons. Accepting demands for prior notification of transit by warships is impossible, given the need for flexibility in wartime operations. This is a remote concern, but there is also an immediate day-to-day problem — the use of straits as routes for ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) moving from Pacific bases to firing stations in the Indian Ocean. Without maintenance of secrecy about their location the whole purpose of SSBNs — to serve as an invulnerable retaliatory force — is vitiated. Dependence on the Indian Ocean as an area from which to fire, however, is declining as older SSBNs with intermediate-range Poseidon missiles are replaced by Trident submarines with long-range missiles that can cover Soviet targets from areas closer to U.S. home waters.

When Indonesia first promulgated the archipelagic principle in 1957, the Soviets did not oppose it. But that was in an era when their relations with Sukarno were warm and they had no significant "blue water" naval interests. Neither condition now applies. The USSR has as great a stake in freedom of navigation as the United States. It needs the sea routes to supply isolated portions of Siberia, and its navy is far more dependent than the American on rights of egress through straits to reach open ocean. The West controls most choke points. Thus Moscow joined

[7] See Michael MccGwire, "The Geopolitical Importance of Strategic Waterways in the Asian-Pacific Region," ORBIS, Fall 1975, pp. 1058-76.

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Washington in supporting Article 38 (on free transit) of the United Nations Law of the Sea Conference (UNLOSC) draft convention, while it was China (still lacking a global navy) that supported coastal states' demands to regulate passage. Nevertheless, Moscow backed Indonesian claims when Washington insisted that it would consider all major straits to be international waters.[8] Apparently the Russians see more value in compromising general political principle for diplomatic purposes; given Indonesian assurance of access and inability to detect or identify submarines transiting without notification, and the fact that in wartime the superpowers would ignore local legal impediments anyway, this sort of pragmatism entails few costs. Moreover, the USSR does have some interest in keeping U.S. naval forces out of certain sea areas, since it wants to create protected "bastions" for its own SSBNs.

Soviet economic interests in non-Communist Asia have grown too, though the significance of this change is not reciprocal to the West. The relative importance of Soviet trade with Asia fell from 1955-1978, but this was largely due to the break with the PRC. Initially Moscow traded almost entirely with Communist countries, but this proportion was down to 45 percent by 1978. This reflected the basic change in policy from fostering a Communist trading bloc to acceptance of an integrated world economy. The largest amount of new trade in Asia has been with Japan. Apart from Vietnam, however, all Southeast Asian countries plus Australia and Japan send less than 4 percent of their exports to the Soviets and receive less than 1 percent of their imports from them.[9] In terms of intrinsic interests in Asia, the Russians' are primarily military and, concentrated in border areas with China, outside Southeast Asia. Derivative political and strategic interests in Southeast Asia are — virtually by definition — inverse to those of the United States.

The essential point is that intrinsic U.S. economic interests in Southeast Asia have been increasing as its military capability in the area has been declining. (This is a potential problem only if the perceived decline in Communist military threats to U.S. clients since the 1960s were to be reversed.) In the early Cold War era viewing the region as a derivative interest made sense for two reasons: first, the relative economic interest in Europe was greater; second, the Sino-Soviet alliance made the region an element in the global bipolar balance sheet. Today, the relative economic stakes have shifted and the regional strategic equation is blurred between tripolarity (the U.S., USSR, and PRC) and multipolarity (given

[8] Yaacov Vertzberger, "The Malacca/Singapore Straits," *Asian Survey* 22, no. 7, July 1982, pp. 609, 613, 615; Susumu Awanohara and Rodney Tasker, "Indonesia's Golden Pond," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, January 6, 1983, pp. 12-13.

[9] Ed. A. Hewett and Herbert S. Levine, "The Soviet Union's Economic Relations in Asia," in Zagoria, ed., *Soviet Policy in East Asia*, pp. 203-206.

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the rise of nonalignment). In the future, in view of comparative Asian growth rates and the prospectively greater (and possibly ambiguous) role of Japan, these trends could accelerate. While the Soviet Union's economic stakes are growing to a lesser degree, its military capabilities have grown more significantly. Though only a modest portion of their steady worldwide buildup, the relative shift is large because it proceeded from next to nothing in the region while the United States scaled down tremendously from the high level of the 1950s and 1960s. In short, there is a steadily emerging gap between objective U.S. intrinsic economic interests and derivative strategic interests as perceived by strategic planners in Washington. This may not be especially problematic in regard to the Soviet Union itself, since direct combat is unlikely apart from a war that began elsewhere, but it highlights the import of local political conditions. One reason that the shift in U.S. commercial interests has not produced a comparable shift in strategic commitment to ASEAN as compared to Europe and Japan is that the other ingredient of affinity — liberal democratic governance — is missing.

Ideological Interests

The United States promotes the spread of democratic regimes as a fundamental part of its foreign policy. This goal is often hampered by and subordinated to the strategic requirements of East-West competition; negative denial of Communist influence or control over pro-Western authoritarian states takes precedence over positive assertions of idealism. Ideological values, however, are not simply a humane goal to be dispensed with whenever they fail to coincide immediately with realpolitik. Broadening the ideological affinity of foreign countries contributes to the strength of the Western security coalition and the stability of the balance of power.[10] Indeed, the political democratization of the two greatest industrial nations apart from the superpowers — West Germany and Japan — was the greatest achievement of World War II and the most potent reinforcement of the economic and military power of the Western alliance vis-à-vis the Soviet bloc. Preserving public support within the West for the principle of containment, and within unstable authoritarian regimes allied with the United States, is also easier to the extent that the policy is seen as morally purposive rather than a cynical lust for power. (Active support for democratization is also a power-oriented hedge against ouster

[10] Though he takes the point too far, Michael Doyle presents an intriguing analysis of the historical spread of democracy which notes: "Even though liberal states have become involved in numerous wars with nonliberal states, constitutionally secure liberal states have yet to engage in war with one another." (Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 12, No. 3, Summer 1983, p. 213; italics deleted.)

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of authoritarian governments — such as in Manila or Seoul — by credibly reducing more popular successors' excuses for animosity toward Washington.) The overwhelming rationale for the revolution in expansion of U.S. power — rejection of isolationism and commitment to containment after 1945 — was a reversion to the old Wilsonian ideal: making the world safe for democracy. Two island anchors of Western alliance in the Pacific — Japan and Australia — are liberal democracies, but Japan's military role is restricted to defense of its own territory, and both countries remain peripheral strategic actors in Southeast Asia. The six ASEAN nations and South Korea have authoritarian governments more akin to what Sukarno called "directed democracies" than to forms resembling the American ideal.[11]

Promoting the liberalization of friendly regimes is the long-term American strategic interest, but it does not follow that the current dearth of democracy is palpably damaging to U.S. interests. One reason for promoting democracy is the perception that this would make local governments more stable though that is more an article of faith to Americans than a demonstrable fact. In any case, preventing realignment or dealignment of those countries — through a change of policy by the regime or a change of regime — is the short-term imperative. The short-term interest does not overwhelm others, however, because in most of Southeast Asia (Thailand excepted) external Communist military threats are potential rather than immediate, and the strategic equation is not starkly bipolar as in other regions of contest. Indeed, the most volatile local antagonisms are between the Communist powers themselves. After 1975, conflict in Indochina was no longer primarily ideological; its essence became classic *raison d'état.*[12] Communism in Southeast Asia is now less a threat to the West than it appeared in the 1960s since it has been sapped of transnational solidarity. The ideological component of danger is indirect at best. Marxism-Leninism provides a source of discipline, cohesion, and motivation for revolutionaries that can overrun traditional societies where other social forces are particularistic, centrifugal, or lacking in national consciousness. (This was much of the U.S. problem in the Vietnam War, where the American clients lacked the cooperative qualities for collective action and sacrifice that the Communist Vietnamese exhibited.) Only if internal Communist insurgencies in Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines were to fare far better than in recent years would this dimension of the political danger loom large. As it is, inter-Communist conflict on the mainland and the island nations' geographically ordained

[11] "Southeast Asia's Boom Belt," *World Press Review* 30, no. 2, February 1983, p. 31 (reprinted from *Wirtschaftswoche*).

[12] Michael Leifer, *Conflict and Regional Order in South-east Asia,* Adelphi Paper no. 162, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Winter 1980, p. 2.

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security from invasion present Washington with the chance to pursue a balance of power policy *and*, with some exceptions, long-term political-ideological objectives.

The most obvious limitations are still in Indochina. Thailand's direct exposure to hostile Vietnamese armies on its eastern border, together with the low degree of U.S. involvement (and thus leverage) make the issue of ideological intervention moot; internal Thai stability, whether based on authoritarian or democratic forms, will remain the prime concern. U.S. pretensions to promoting human rights are also compromised by association with the Khmer Rouge, although the official U.S. position is that it supports the tripartite coalition and not the Pol Pot forces; Sihanouk and Sonn Sann were received in Washington in 1982, and there has been no official contact with the Khmer Rouge.[13]

Outside of Indochina the task of combining political and security goals in Asia presents the greatest problem in three countries: Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines. More than in most of Southeast Asia — where the limits on U.S. military involvement, presence, or aid also constitute limits on leverage — the United States is perceived to have some significant responsibility for the political status of these countries.

Each of the three countries reflects a different form of the problem. Korea and the Philippines both have active, visible, and potentially powerful protest movements as well as a large U.S. military presence and a formal alliance with Washington. Taiwan has none of these; opposition to the Kuomintang regime is more underground, and U.S. bases had dwindled even before the derecognition of 1978. The ROK and Taiwan both face significant external Communist threats. The Philippines does not (Manila faces an internal Marxist threat, which until recently had been managed off and on for decades and was less potent a challenge to the regime than Moro separatism or the middle-class protestors who identified with Benigno Aquino. In 1983 President Marcos said, "Communism in the Philippines is not getting worse. . . . It is just like malaria."[14] This nonchalant view is no longer tenable). U.S. military forces in Korea are more a potential lever because their presence is more vital to Seoul than to Washington, but bases in the Philippines are more a hostage because their relative value is reversed.

Domestic political pressure inside the United States to compromise global strategic interests for the sake of local political concerns is not potent in regard to Seoul or Manila (for one thing, there are no significant ethnic constituencies for these countries as there are for, say,

[13] U.S. Department of State, "Kampuchea After 5 years of Vietnamese Occupation," Current Policy no. 514, September 15, 1983, p. 3.

[14] Quoted in "Philippines: A Fighting Stance," *Asia Week*, July 22, 1983, p. 12.

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Greece and Israel), but it is in regard to Taipei. The Reagan administration has roots in the old China Lobby which have been weakened, but not severed, by the appeal of securing Beijing as a tacitly allied counterweight to Moscow, and Taiwan still has significant support within Congress.

Taiwan no longer plays a direct role in U.S. military strategy since U.S. troops and bases have been withdrawn and normalization of relations with Beijing obviated the old treaty obligation to defend the island. U.S. reservations opposing settlement of the dispute between the island and the mainland by force, however, leave open the tacit possibility of U.S. involvement should Beijing attempt to invade. Moreover, Taiwan retains importance to U.S. strategy in political terms. It is one of the prime symbols of economic success that validates the capitalist model of national development for the Thrid World; and though its regime is authoritarian, it is freer, with more potential for liberalization, than the PRC. Forcible absorption of Taiwan by the mainland would be a disaster for American diplomacy. So Washington will continue to try to bolster the island's defense capability with military sales but will have great difficulty meeting some of Taipei's requests — such as purchase of F-16 or F-20 fighter aircraft — given commitments to Beijing to limit the quantity and quality of such transfers over time.[15] An uncomfortable degree of tension remains between Washington's de facto stakes in Taiwan and its de jure commitments.

These variations make consistent integration of U.S. security and political policy difficult at any time, and inconsistencies are compounded by the volatility of American domestic politics. In one decade, from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s, there have been four different U.S. administrations, each with a different tilt. The Nixon doctrine, linked with a global détente policy toward Moscow, downplayed both ideological issues and military concerns. It scaled down security commitments in Southeast Asia, kept them constant in Korea,[16] and juggled them ambiguously in a diplomatic balancing act between Beijing and Taipei. The Ford administration, beset from the Republican right wing by 1976, remained discreetly indifferent to human rights questions, but began moving

[15] See Peter Samuel, "A Wary Eye Towards China, Taiwan Asks for U.S. Arms," *Defense Week,* March 12, 1984, pp. 10-11; and A. Doak Barnett, *The FX Decision* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1981). Analysts on Taiwan have gone to great lengths to make a case for their need (see *Military Requirements for Advanced Aircraft,* Parts I-IV, Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University, Republic of China, June 1983), and Taipei has indicated the possibility of undertaking manufacture of sophisticated planes on its own (Michael Weisskopf, "Taiwan, Nearing Limits of U.S. Arms Supply, to Build Own Jets," *Washington Post,* March 31, 1984), but the latter course will be an extraordinary economic and technical challenge.

[16] Nixon did withdraw a division, in consonance with the Guam Doctrine's overall emphasis on emphasizing arms aid to allies and reducing their reliance on U.S. military manpower, but the pledge to commit American forces against a North Korean attack was not modified.

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toward a reinvigorated global security posture, although this shift did not focus on Asia.

Inconsistency and hesitancy reached a peak under the Carter administration. Initially it took a relaxed view in the security dimension and an aggressive stance in favor of internal political reform among friendly authoritarian states. By the middle of the administration the balance of concern shifted implicitly, though priorities were not consciously realigned (President Carter never being able to admit that all good things could not go together). Reassessment of North Korean strength, along with pressure from Tokyo as well as from American hawks, reversed the decision for partial military withdrawal in Korea; and the triple crisis in 1978-1980 that focused anxiety on the military balance in the Persian Gulf (the fall of the Shah and seizure of hostages, the oil price rise, and the invasion of Afghanistan) placed a higher premium on bases in the Philippines. The liberal human rights policy was also compromised for strategic reasons — in Kampuchea, where Washington accepted the legitimacy of the deposed Khmer Rouge government over the Vietnamese-imposed Heng Samrin regime, and toward Taiwan, when full normalization with the People's Republic was undertaken.

The Reagan administration clearly placed priority on security; Patricia Derian's rhetoric was replaced by Jeanne Kirkpatrick's. Human rights concerns complicated the shift, however, in regard to Taiwan, where continued U.S. arms sales to support the island's ability to resist absorption by the mainland damaged relations with Beijing, and tentatively in regard to the Philippines, where unrest after the Aquino assassination made even some of the most conservative U.S. officials worry about a dangerous analogy between Marcos and the Shah.

Of the three countries, the Philippines augurs the greatest danger. Callousness toward Taipei will continue to be overlooked, given the primacy of Beijing in global strategy. Ironically for the Kuomintang, Taiwan might gain liberal American allies were it able to display a political democracy as impressive as its capitalist economy, but sentimental support from the small coterie of right-wing Republicans will be an irritating nettle in U.S. policy rather than a determinant. The immediacy of the North Korean threat not only constrains the priority any U.S. administration will place on liberalization in Seoul; it also keeps a substantial portion of the democratic movement from turning its frustration in a strongly anti-American direction. In the Philippines, however, the lack of external threat means first, that a future upheaval could indeed undermine U.S. security interests in the country, and second, that political support within the United States for active intervention on behalf of a beleaguered authoritarian clique in Manila would be weak.

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There is little prospect for resolution of contradictory security and ideological goals. Consistent priorities can exist only at the extremes of overwhelming or negligible strategic focus on the region, and neither is possible. U.S.-Soviet détente, even in a form as moderate as that of the early 1970s, is not likely to be reconstructed in the foreseeable future, and even then the global strategic competition would endure. And if U.S.-Soviet confrontation worsens, Asia will still remain a secondary or tertiary arena from Washington's viewpoint, so military stakes in the region will not swamp all others.

Military Trends

In the course of the 1970s, U.S. military power relative to that of the Soviet Union declined. Both the extent and significance of that decline on a global level have been hotly contested analytically and politically within the United States. The military equation in Korea has not changed much.[17] Although Carter withdrew a small part of the 2nd Division (which had remained after Nixon withdrew the other division), this makes little difference in the basic function of U.S. forces there — to serve as a tripwire. The biggest problem would be if the United States became engaged in a war elsewhere — for example, the Persian Gulf — which siphoned reserves that would otherwise go to Korea in event of war. In Asia overall, and especially Southeast Asia, the extent of the U.S. military decline is recognized as clearly greater than in the world as a whole, yet there is also less anxiety and controversy about it among American strategists. The huge reductions in U.S. deployments in the region resulted in large part from the end of the Vietnam War. Reductions went substantially below prewar levels, but Sino-American rapprochement provided an excuse.

For a brief period after the fall of Saigon, Phnom Penh, and Vientiane in 1975, Asia appeared to be more stable than at any time since World War II. Doubts rose at the end of the decade with the controversy over President Carter's plan to withdraw ground forces from Korea, civil conflicts in the ROK after the assassination of Park Chung Hee, the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea, and the punitive Chinese attack on Vietnam, but these events did not materially alter the comparatively relaxed attitude toward the U.S. military role in the region. The decision to withdraw troops from Korea was reversed, taking that controversy off the agenda of debate, and no American policy makers con-

[17] See Charles Sorrels, *Planning U.S. General Purpose Forces: Related to Asia* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Budget Office, June 1977); and Stuart E. Johnson with Joseph A. Yager, *The Military Equation in Northeast Asia* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1979).

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sidered direct military action an option for dealing with the Kampuchea problem. Regionally oriented U.S. policy makers were not very concerned with military instruments, and military-oriented policy makers were not very concerned with the region.

In principle, the danger that this situation could change is well recognized, but the buffers against reallocation of military resources remain strong. Soviet military power on the ground is far removed from Southeast Asia and checked by China in Northeast Asia. The tentative entente between Washington and Beijing holds the potential for risk in event of Sino-Soviet conflict, but the uncertainty of U.S. intent to aid China leaves room for maneuver. Vietnam's military power is alarming to the extent that it is seen as a surrogate for Soviet expansion. As long as Vietnam remains focused on Kampuchea, however, this challenge will not be seen as significant enough to override the U.S. experience of the 1960s in Indochina. Soviet use of Vietnamese facilities at Cam Ranh Bay and Danang worries U.S. strategists, but exploitation remained below the objective potential of the bases. The Soviets' use of the facilities, however, has been gradually expanding in a fashion that suggests a more daunting Soviet presence as time passes. The bases markedly improve Soviet reconnaissance and intelligence collection capability, roughly doubling aerial coverage in the Western Pacific. A few TU-16 bombers were stationed at Cam Ranh at the end of 1983, and several more in late 1984, as well as MiG-23 fighters for air defense and mid-air refueling aircraft. Access to Cam Ranh has enabled Moscow to station attack submarines in the South China Sea for the first time. More extensive use of operating bases in Vietnam would do much to alleviate the Soviet navy's problem of exit through narrow straits around Japan.[18]

This potential, along with the overall burgeoning of the Soviet navy, represents a challenge to the Reagan administration's shift toward a maritime strategy based on offshore firepower. Such a strategy is of questionable military utility even with unimpeded use of the sea. In another Korean War the balance of ground forces and land-based air power would be most critical. Air bombardment and naval gunfire can support allied troops on land and damage the logistical train for enemy ground forces (say, Vietnamese armies invading Thailand), but they cannot be decisive. Massive air war in the 1960s hampered but did not stop North Vietnamese reinforcement and supplies for combat in South Vietnam. And if it faced Soviet naval forces in combat, the U.S. Seventh Fleet would have to

[18] Michael Leifer, "The Security of Sea-lanes in South-east Asia," *Survival* 25, no. 1, January/February 1983, p. 20; Richard Nations, "The Reason Why," *Far Eastern Economic Review,* May 9, 1985, p. 44; "Admiral Crowe on Defending the Pacific," *Pacific Defence Reporter,* November 1983; Karen DeYoung, "New Arms, Troops Expand Soviet Military Role in Southeast Asia," *Washington Post,* December 21, 1983.

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allocate most of its assets to self-defense, with little to spare to support friendly armies on land.

These constraints suggest that a maritime strategy offers meaningful help to mainland countries — particularly Thailand — only at the lowest of three levels of conflict: a limited Vietnamese probe not aimed at decisive defeat or occupation of Thailand. With fewer than 200,000 troops now in Kampuchea, and tied down by guerrilla warfare, a Vietnamese attack on Thailand *might* be contained by Thai forces with U.S. fire support. At the other extreme, though, the problem would not be much of a concern — in a direct U.S.-Soviet military conflict Communist advances on the ground in Southeast Asia would be near the least of Western worries. Perhaps the most problematic contingency, therefore, is the intermediate one: a major war between Vietnam and Thailand, without a Soviet combat role, where U.S. commitment to Bangkok is brought into play but naval and air power is insufficient to save the day. The best hope in this instance is that the Chinese threat in the North would prevent Vietnam from transferring the bulk of its army westward. Considering the Chinese attack in 1979, subsequent allusions to the possibility of a "second lesson," and artillery exchanges in the mid-1980s, it is entirely plausible that Beijing would launch another offensive against Hanoi if it struck into Thailand.

Changes in military technology are not likely to bear much on this problem. The Reagan administration is changing the tactical capabilities of U.S. forces relevant to this sort of contingency only in incremental ways, and not with the dramatic innovations that could lie on the horizon for other elements of strategic power. One is the planned expansion of the navy to 600 ships, including additional aircraft carrier task forces. Another is the recommissioning of battleships which — if unthreatened by Soviet bombers — can add to power projection by coastal gunfire and long-range cruise missiles. The latter are a useful technical innovation, but cruise missiles offer decisive firepower only when they carry nuclear ordnance. Conventionally armed cruise missiles can help strike fixed targets that are too well defended for manned aircraft to attack. Otherwise, cruise missiles' per-unit cost makes them unattractive substitutes for manned aircraft; and their low numbers (they cannot be reused, as aircraft can) mean that in a prolonged war they would be quickly exhausted.[19] The development of various other sorts of precision-guided munitions make prospective use of tactical airpower more effective than it was in previous wars, but not enough to replace the ability of ground forces to

[19] See Richard K. Betts, "Complexities, Uncertainties, and Dilemmas," in Betts, ed., *Cruise Missiles: Technology, Strategy, Politics* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1981), pp. 513-16, 537-40.

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take and hold territory. Though poorly equipped, the Vietnamese army dwarfs not only Thailand's, but all of ASEAN's combined, and with a million men it is even larger than the whole U.S. Army and Marine Corps.

Unless Washington were to repeal the Nixon Doctrine and prepare for a combat role in Southeast Asia comparable to the 1960s, purely military considerations would appear to recommend a major buildup of ASEAN military forces. This could be unwise in the full context of local economic and political conditions.[20] But although the Reagan administration's global policy has been dominated by military resurgence, its Southeast Asia policy has not. This again reflects the extent to which the region is seen as a strategic backwater, and the probability that strategic problems in the area will continue to be addressed by muddling through rather than by an ambitious new master plan.

Local Interests and U.S. Aims

In Northeast Asia, local friends' strategic interests concide fairly closely with what Washington wants to provide. There are tensions between Tokyo and Washington over economic issues — trade and defense burden-sharing — but no basic disagreements over security objectives (barring the views of Japanese Socialists, who have never been able to gain power). Seoul's security policy is completely aligned with U.S. commitment, and almost all the freedom of maneuver in the strategic relationship belongs to the Americans. There is less identity of overall interests between Washington and Beijing, but the USSR provides the basis for cautious tacit alignment. Neither the Americans nor the Chinese want to be fully committed to each other's support, in order to retain some room for maneuver with Moscow, and the Taiwan problem represents future grounds for conflict. The common interests of the present, though, argue against precipitate action by either side to resolve underlying sources of disagreement.

U.S. security interests in Southeast Asia are largely derivative, only partially overlapping those of friendly local countries. For most of the regional states — Thailand being a conspicuous exception — the divergences are only a latent source of tension in the relationship for the same reason that makes the area a low military priority for the United States: the low level of external Communist threat. In the late 1970s Southeast Asian governments realized, as three observers note:

> That American intervention is most likely to occur in the least likely contingencies, such as large-scale conflict among major powers and is least likely to materialize

[20] See William Overholt, "Progress and Politics in Pacific Asia," *International Security* 7, no. 4, Spring 1983, p. 190.

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in the most likely contingencies, such as insurgencies or local armed conflict between neighboring countries. In other words, the United States is still seen as a formidable global power, but is no longer considered the custodian of a particular regional order in Southeast Asia.[21]

The image of American skittishness has receded more recently, but there is still little reason to expect conventional military intervention against domestic threats. The relaxed American view of the international military equation was reflected in statements by Secretary of Defense Weinberger during a trip in late 1982. Though representing the most hawkish U.S. administration of the postwar era, Weinberger said that defense expenditures by ASEAN countries were high enough, and there was no need to press them (as the administration was pressing other allies) on security matters.[22] There is a latent tension, however, in this situation. Washington has positive relations with ASEAN and can afford to remain strategically relaxed because the area is relatively stable; residual concern about containment in the area is covered by vague faith in China's deterrent role. However, if that role were to be exercised, strains would arise between U.S. and ASEAN interests. If the stability of regional order is challenged, the destabilization may be compounded. In short, the congruence of U.S. and local interests could be most compromised when it is most needed.

Coordinating Strategic Objectives

The anti-Soviet powers in Northeast Asia share the U.S. view of an appreciable Soviet threat in that region; so coordination of military aims has been relatively close. That most of the Southeast Asian states share the relaxed view of external military threat in their region is reflected in the tentativeness and ambiguity of local defense cooperation measures that could substitute for formal alliance with Washington. This low-profile approach is also due to the desire to maintain a non-provocative image toward the Communist powers. A network of bilateral cooperation — "sharing intelligence, efforts to standardize command systems and bilateral exercises"[23] — substitutes for multilateral forms that would appear too much like a revived SEATO. Other ASEAN states resisted Singapore's suggestion of expanded cooperation because it would seem too close to a pact. Since 1971 there has been a formal Five Power Defense Arrangement linking Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, New Zealand, and Britain, but it is weak, characterized by the U.S. Defense Department's Richard

[21] Guy J. Pauker, Frank H. Golay, and Cynthia E. Enloe, *Diversity and Development in Southeast Asia* (New York: McGraw-Hill, for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1977), p. 45.

[22] William Branigin, "Weinberger Tries to Allay Fears of Japan," *Washington Post*, November 4, 1982.

[23] Michael Richardson, "ASEAN Extends Its Military Ties," *Pacific Defence Reporter*, November 1982.

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Armitage as "dormant" since inception and "a relatively innocuous grouping."[24] Cooperation among the member countries did increase in the early 1980s, but more in bilateral terms than under the formal aegis of the "Arrangement."[25]

In terms of military strategy in the region, the U.S. shift to an offshore posture based on air and naval fire power recalls the Eisenhower administration's stance, although that differed in terms of both its applicable power and its target. Strategy in the 1950s was directed against China and based on early resort to nuclear weapons, even though U.S. conventional capabilities deployed in the region then were far greater than today. The lesser amount of U.S. fire power now deployed is linked to the changed role of China; Washington has implicitly ceded the role of deterrence on the ground (against Vietnam) to the PRC.

The U.S. withdrawal from the Vietnam War was less worrisome to Indonesia than to Thailand because a "blue water" strategy covered the island nations. In the Philippines, Marcos wanted the Mutual Security Treaty, not to deter conventional attack, but to cover territorial claims that conflict with other countries, such as in the Spratly Islands.[26] (The fact that Washington would not agree is related to Marcos's irritating jockeying over renewal of base agreements.) U.S. strategic interests, while not identical to those of the archipelagic countries, are generally complementary to their interests, and especially to those of other offshore countries relevant to the region — including Japan, Australia, and New Zealand (though not Taiwan). The offshore countries are both more important and less vulnerable. None have intense conflicts with Communist states or "irreconcilable differences among themselves. Thus, although the United States has formal security treaties with all but Indonesia, the potential demand for military help in defending against external attack is low."[27]

This is far less true on the mainland. Thailand has the least assurance of outside assistance commensurate with the security threats it faces. After U.S. disengagement from Vietnam, Thai leaders sought to combine non-provocation of Hanoi and balance of power diplomacy by

[24] U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, *Hearings: U.S. Policy in Southeast Asia,* 97th Cong., 1st sess., 1981, p. 40. The Arrangement "has sometimes seemed preoccupied with keeping Singapore and Malaysia on sensible terms." Bruce Grant, *The Security of South-East Asia,* Adelphi Paper no. 142 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Spring 1978), p.2.

[25] See Warwick Beuther, "On Parade Down Under," John McBeth, "A Cosy Relationship," Susumu Awanohara, "The Ties That Bind," and V. G. Kulkarni, "Room for Manoeuvre," all in *Far Eastern Economic Review,* July 21, 1983, pp. 40-42; and W. B. Pritchett, "Defending Australia and Its Interests,"*Pacific Defence Reporter,* July 1982, p. 59.

[26] Sheldon W. Simon, *The ASEAN States and Regional Security* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1982), p. 114.

[27] Leslie H. Brown, *American Security Policy in Asia,* Adelphi Paper No. 132 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Spring 1977), p. 11.

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phasing out SEATO, proclaiming an independent foreign policy, and seeking Soviet intercession with Vietnam; Kriangsak's visit to Moscow in March 1979 was the first ever by a Thai prime minister. This was, as Michael Leifer put it, a policy of "flawed neutrality."[28] The Thais could not accept the Soviet proposal for a collective security arrangement because this would alienate the PRC; after the Vietnamese border incursion in June 1980, Chinese support was needed all the more as a deterrent. Yet, decisive reliance on Beijing was not a comfortable option: "China is a permanent factor in the region, and while the Soviet Union continues to support Vietnam, Thai efforts to benefit from Chinese protection in the absence of countervailing U.S. support, entail a subordination that has previously been temporary."[29] Moreover, while greater political distance from Washington was required to reassure Hanoi in the late 1970s, fastening the residual U.S. security commitment under the Manila Treaty was important as Vietnamese troops probed in the early 1980s; Washington sent an emergency consignment of weapons after the border crossing, more a token gesture than a meaningful boost to Thai capabilities. And in 1983, the Soviets reportedly gave Bangkok assurances that the Vietnamese would not attack.[30] Yet in May 1985 the Thais spent two weeks in a combat operation to eject 1,200 Vietnamese troops that had crossed the border. So Thailand has reason to pursue multiple avenues of support, and each avenue is likely to produce only limited or tentative results: diplomatic pressure from Moscow on Hanoi, military pressure from Beijing on Hanoi, and military assistance from Washington.

From the U.S. point of view, the only country in Indochina that does not pose difficult choices for balancing acts is the one that is least important: Laos. This was the only fallen domino of 1975 with which Washington retained diplomatic relations. Vientiane poses no aggressive threat and is buffeted by two insurgent movements (supported by China and Thailand); so the United States can stand back and offer "proper" relations, sweetened by token assistance. (Congress banned foreign aid but the Reagan administration used exempted disaster relief funds for a hospital and offered to find buyers for T-28s flown to Thailand after the 1975 Pathet Lao victory.)[31] There is an unpleasantly heavy Vietnamese and Soviet presence in the country, but this is almost a superfluous threat to China and Thailand given their borders with Vietnam. Any degree of civility between Washington and Vientiane is worse for Moscow and

[28] Leifer, *Conflict and Regional Order in South-east Asia*, p. 29.

[29] Leszek Buszynski, "Thailand: The Erosion of a Balanced Foreign Policy," *Asian Survey* 22, No. 11, November 1982, pp. 1041, 1038.

[30] Nayan Chanda, "Fueling New Hopes," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, March 3, 1983.

[31] Martin Stuart-Fox, "National Defence and Internal Security in Laos," in Stuart-Fox, ed., *Contemporary Laos* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982), pp. 240-241; Paul Quinn-Judge, "Picking Up the Pieces," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, July 14, 1983, p. 14.

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Hanoi than for any other countries involved. Laotian weakness facilitates a welcome but scarcely significant bit of diplomatic amity.

It is impossible for the United States to establish a similar diplomatic relationship with Hanoi as long as the Vietnamese occupy Kampuchea and threaten Thailand, but the desire to avoid military entanglement in Indochina has led the U.S. to take a position that gives friendly local states mixed feelings. The United States refused overtly to give military aid to Sonn Sann's forces, the stronger non-Communist element of the tripartite anti-Vietnamese coalition in Kampuchea. (At this writing, proposals are afoot in Congress to provide small amounts of aid.) Singapore reportedly has supplied Sonn Sann and Sihanouk's National Army with light arms, but the U.S. position by default gives greater weight to the PRC's support for the Khmer Rouge. For most of ASEAN, solving the Kampuchean problem must not result in an improvement of Beijing's regional power position.[32] American diplomacy can dance around this issue, but it does represent a conflict between U.S. global anti-Soviet interests and local ASEAN interests.

Malaysia and especially Indonesia are the most opposed to a Chinese role in regional security, seeing Vietnam as a lesser threat. Not only does Djakarta blame the PRC for the coup attempt and upheaval of 1965, but animosity toward domestic Chinese populations is present throughout Southeast Asia. It was well noted that the Chinese attack on Vietnam in 1979 was provoked in part by Hanoi's actions against indigenous Chinese. Although Beijing reduced support for Communist insurgent movements after the 1970s, its continued insistence on separating state-to-state and party-to-party relations left local capitals wary, and, thus, unenthusiastic about U.S. inclinations toward de facto alliance with the PRC.[33] Reconciliation between China and Hanoi would have ambiguous implications for both the United States and ASEAN. Weaning Hanoi away from Moscow would be beneficial for Washington in global terms, but might be worrisome locally if the two Communist states could then cooperate in subverting the region.

In the near term, some regional observers have seen a silver lining in the Indochinese cloud. To court ASEAN, Vietnam gave up support for insurgencies in Thailand and Malaysia, and to compete, China muted

[32] William Branigin, "Noncommunist Rebels reportedly Attack Vietnamese in Cambodia," *Washington Post*, October 12, 1982; Justus M. van der Kroef, "Kampuchea: The Diplomatic Labyrinth," *Asian Survey* 22, No. 310, October 1982, pp. 1019-22.

[33] Donald S. Weatherbee, "The View From ASEAN's Southern Flank," *Strategic Review* 11, no. 2, Spring 1983, pp. 58-59; Juwono Sudarsono, "Security in Southeast Asia: The Circle of Conflict," in Robert A. Scalapino and Jusuf Wanandi, eds., *Economic, Political, and Security Issues in Southeast Asia in the 1980s*, Research Papers and Public Policy Studies No. 7 (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1982); Overholt, "Progress and Politics in Pacific Asia," p. 187; William R. Heaton, "China and Southeast Asian Communist Movements: The Decline of Dual Track Diplomacy," *Asian Survey* 22, No. 8, August 1982, pp. 779-800.

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its support too, even though the insurgent Communist parties favored Beijing in its conflict with Hanoi. Especially in Thailand the rebel forces declined markedly.[34] The "appeasement option" — allowing Vietnam to satisfy itself with domination of Indochina — also appealed to some. But if absorption of the neighboring countries were accomplished, Vietnam "would assume a different kind of interest in the political fortunes of Thailand than if Kampuchea and Laos had assumed the role of genuine buffer states. In other words, for Vietnam, Thailand would then come to assume the role of buffer state."[35] As long as Hanoi and Beijing are in conflict ASEAN remains in a bind, though, because uncompromising resistance could lead not only Vietnam to aid insurgents again, but its patron, the USSR as well. The Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister reportedly dropped warnings to this effect in Singapore.[36]

If Chinese-Vietnamese détente happened as part of a Sino-Soviet reconciliation this would be a negative development for both U.S. and ASEAN interests, as multipolar equilibrium reverted toward a more challenging bipolarity. On balance, though, U.S. and ASEAN interests converge in a compromise status for China: sufficient weakness to preclude an independent and aggressive military posture, but sufficient strength to resist Moscow and inhibit Hanoi. If Chinese military development shortchanges naval and air power, and strengthens ground forces without providing mobility and logistics necessary for long-range operations, such a reasonable compromise would be feasible. But it would still be an unstable equilibrium: the line between too little and too much Chinese strength is impossible to draw, and the uncertainty is tolerable only as long as China's potential is not called into play.

Other alternatives to U.S. power for bolstering the Western security position are Japan and Australia (New Zealand could offer little even if it had not cracked the alliance in 1985 by refusing visits of nuclear-powered U.S. ships), but three problems limit this option. First, it would only supplement the U.S. offshore strategy, leaving the issue of deterrence on the ground. Second, only Japan has enough potential power to weigh significantly against major Communist states; and third, to ASEAN an enhanced role for Japan is far preferable to one for China only as long as Japan's potential is not fully developed. One Australian official's proposal for a joint peace-keeping force with Japan to allow removal of Vietnamese troops — though promising as a symbol of Australian willingness to accept wider responsibilities — is neither feasible nor desirable

[34] Nayan Chanda, "Indochina Shot ASEAN on to the World Stage," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, August 13, 1982, p. 44.

[35] Leifer, *Conflict and Regional Order in South-east Asia*, p. 27.

[36] Marian K. Leighton, "Soviets Still Playing Dominoes in Asia," *Wall Street Journal*, October 14, 1983.

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to most local nations. Singapore's foreign minister approved a Japanese buildup for purposes of *self*-defense because it would relieve the U.S. of some missions, allowing it to redeploy resources elsewhere in the Pacific, but as Weatherbee notes, most of ASEAN fears that U.S. rhetoric about Japanese " 'burden-sharing' is a euphemism for 'burden-shifting.' No Southeast Asian country wants to see Japan become a surrogate for absent American power."[37] When the dimensions of the new 1,000-mile Japanese defense perimeter were clarified — by stating that it extends from Tokyo and Osaka rather than the lower tip of Japan, and southward but not westward — regional anxieties were muted. But a much greater Japanese military role will be acceptable only if it is integrated in a broader Western alliance and subordinated to U.S. forces' command. This in effect would replace ANZUS (the Australia-New Zealand-United States treaty) with a more potent pact, utilizing Japanese strength while controlling it, in a manner similar to the full integration of West Germany in NATO, which was necessary for European acceptance of German rearmament. However, such integration is not feasible for Tokyo for domestic political reasons since it constitutes formal alliance.[38] Ironically, the arrangement that would assuage fears of Japanese activism is resisted by the Japanese polity precisely because it wants to avoid activist entanglements. And the realistic domestic political limits on prospective Japanese military buildup are such that a radical increase in Tokyo's security role in the foreseeable future is a moot question.

The basic problem blocking full congruence of ASEAN and American interests is that local strategic reality is more multipolar than the global overlay that dominates U.S. concerns. China is not a formal ally in the Western coalition against the USSR, but coincidence of interests makes her tacitly so. This coincidence is less significant for some of ASEAN because the USSR does not threaten them markedly more than China does. Even those facing the Vietnamese threat have a stake in not provoking Moscow, which can help restrain Hanoi, when the alternate choice of Chinese help would offer either too little (failing to deter Vietnam) or too much (replacing Vietnam as the hegemonic threat). Although ASEAN resists the Soviet collective security proposal, the ASEAN scheme for a neutrality zone (ZOPFAN) therefore has a natural appeal that could be acceptable to Washington if feasible. ZOPFAN, however, could only *reflect* a prior solution to the problems that could motivate external

[37] "Australian Asks Cambodia Peace Force," *New York Times,* May 16, 1983; "Straight-Talking Shogun," *Asiaweek,* May 20, 1983, p. 29; Weatherbee, "The View From ASEAN's Southern Flank," p. 60.

[38] William W. Tow, "The JANZUS Option: A Key to Asian/Pacific Security," *Asian Survey* 18, no. 12, December 1978; Simon, *The ASEAN States and Regional Security,* p. 124.

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intervention, not cause it, and the feasibility of isolating the region is dubious.

Domestic Security and International Security

In Northeast Asia, doubts about internal stability affect U.S. interests in regard to Korea and China. If Washington has much leverage on either government or opposition in Seoul, it is hard to discern. Pyongyang, on the other hand, has often acted recklessly, and it is difficult to predict how that pattern might change under Kim Il Sung's successors. The potential for change in PRC politics that affects U.S. policy is not any danger to the regime itself, but the question of whether Deng Xiaoping's moves toward liberalization and good relations with Washington will endure or whether the old guard might succeed in reasserting itself.

Alan Goodman has persuasively argued that there are four sources of instability in Southeast Asia — a Western power vacuum since U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, Vietnamese adventurism since then, insurgent movements, and societal change — and that the last of these is the greatest problem. Elements of this problem include a crushing urbanization severely straining governmental services and legitimacy; fragmenting racial, religious, and ethnic tensions that could accelerate dangerously at any time in several countries; and trends in elite competition and exclusion.[39] The United States faces three difficulties. First, it has little reason to become involved other than indirectly through economic aid. Second, Americans could do little to affect the course of these developments even if they tried to intervene politically, through covert operations or otherwise. But third, some of these developments could metastasize and spill over into the East-West conflict dimension that does interest Washington, or produce worrisome forms of non-Communist nationalism. Interstate conflicts in ASEAN have declined in recent decades, but some have not been fully or permanently resolved (such as the Philippine claim to Sabah). New aggressive nationalists in power, whether rightist or leftist, could resurrect such antagonisms.

Weak leadership in Thailand, and aging strongmen in Singapore, the Philippines, and Indonesia highlight the issue of succession, which in turn makes the diverse insurgent or protest movements that are now manageable potentially more problematic.[40] Autonomous Islamic groups in Thailand and the Philippines, or prospective Muslim unrest in

[39] Remarks at a conference at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, April 16, 1982.

[40] "Insurgency has deep roots in South-east Asia and utopianism a respected place in its folklore." Grant, *The Security of South-East Asia*, p. 28.

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Indonesia[41] might worry U.S. policy makers more than they should, because of facile analogies to the threat of "Islamic fundamentalism" as seen in Iran or the Middle East. But in combination with the large number of Communist and other insurgent movements in the region — the NPA in the Philippines, five different groups in Indonesia, more than can be counted in Burma, and residual Communist guerrillas in Malaysia and Thailand — the variety of threats to government control in the event of a regime crisis is substantial.

The dangers represent the prime security threat to local states and, thus, a current divergence between their principal strategic concerns and Washington's. For reasons of comparative disinterest or importance, Washington cannot deal with potential threats of this sort and can only file them until their potential may be actuated. The only realistic hedge would be to modify support for present governments, in case their replacements blame Washington for the sins of the *ancien regime,* but this contradicts the aim of cooperation and solidarity (against external Communist powers) with the governments that now determine the regional order. In short, vis-à-vis the most likely sources of change, the United States is in the position that always makes strategists uncomfortable: the reactive position. Analytical consciousness of potential threats does not necessarily offer a basis for policy change when interests at different levels conflict. Perhaps correctly, but in any case probably, U.S political initiatives will remain focused on the regional international order, and on the external Communist powers, continuing to develop positive relations with local governments.

Working at the Margins

As long as current common interests in Northeast Asia endure (strategically, with China and South Korea, and more generally, with Japan), compatible strategic stances should also endure. The most visible potential complication is how the Taiwan tangle is handled. In Southeast Asia, as long as U.S. posture and commitments in the region do not revert to those of the 1950s and 60s — confronting *all* the Communist powers in Asia — some divergence between U.S. and ASEAN strategies will endure. This makes the integration of political and security goals in U.S. strategy in both parts of Asia more a diplomatic challenge than a military one. This should involve a discreetly discriminatory approach to the local states, for example not expecting much from Indonesia (which is more

[41] See "Thais Press Attacks on Guerillas," *New York Times,* April 22, 1982; and Sidney R. Jones, "'It Can't Happen Here': A Post-Khomeini Look at Indonesian Islam," *Asian Survey* 20, no. 3, March 1980, pp. 311-23.

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independent vis-à-vis the U.S.-Soviet conflict and more anti-Chinese) and seeking more from Singapore (which also has the potential for partially offsetting reduced access to Philippine bases).

Managing Strategic Competition

Containing Soviet power appears relatively manageable in Southeast Asia because that region is no greater a priority for Moscow than for Washington. The Soviet military buildup in the area has been impressive, but it is not proportionally larger than elsewhere; Moscow too has a "Europe First" principle, and now more than Washington it has a "China Second" requirement for deterrence. In earlier times the principal Soviet interest in the area was an extension of the global move to exploit neutralism and Third World nationalism to circumscribe Western power whenever possible. This was consistent with Moscow's June 1969 proposal for a regional collective security system. The USSR still faces a network of bilateral and multilateral anti-Communist treaties — between the United States, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, and Thailand, and between Britain, Singapore, Australia, New Zealand, and Malaysia — as well as extensive U.S. bases in Japan and the Philippines. The collective security scheme would break up this Western coalition and give the USSR regional access as a security guarantor, and thereby the chance to inhibit operation of U.S. conventional forces between the Pacific and Indian Oceans. When reiterated in 1972, the proposal was explained as similar to Soviet treaties with Egypt, Iraq, and India.[42]

The Soviet collective security proposal has not fared well. After 1975 ASEAN governments tentatively saw some balance-of-power value in limited Soviet presence because it would induce the United States to remain involved and, together, would limit Chinese influence. But the collective security proposal excluded other external actors and, thus, the possibility of real balance of power.[43] Unilateral Soviet moves have not produced dramatic results either. Lack of economic and political influence make the overall superpower balance — the "correlation of forces" in Soviet terms — still unfavorable to Moscow, despite military gains. The military progress, Indochina aside, has not yielded comparable political

[42] Leszek Buszynski, "The Soviet Union in Southeast Asia: Motives, Limits, and Opportunities," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 4, no. 3, December 1982, pp. 273-74, 278-79; Zagoria and Simon, "Soviet Policy in Southeast Asia," pp. 154-55.

[43] Les Buszynski, "The Soviet Union and Southeast Asia Since the Fall of Saigon," *Asian Survey* 21, no. 5, May 1981, p. 549.

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advances because of the enduring pro-Western character of the regional equilibrium.[44] This is due to:

> . . . (1) the new cold war among the Communist states, (2) China's dramatic turn to the West, (3) the gradual reassertion of Japan, (4) the end of the period of American 'drift,' (5) the development of ASEAN, (6) the Korean stand-off, and (7) the dynamic economic growth in the region that could lead to a new Pacific-Asian trading-community. . . . The Soviets are faced in the Asia-Pacific region with countervailing military power, regional cohesion, and socio-economic resilience. . . . The main Soviet interests in the region are likely to remain essentially conservative ones. Moscow's principal goal will be to prevent the emergence of an anti-Soviet coalition in the region.[45]

Indochina is an important exception to this reassuring equilibrium. Vietnam is the linchpin of Soviet influence in Southeast Asia: it is by far the most militarily powerful state in the region; it is a southern bulwark against China; and it provides valuable access to facilities at Cam Ranh and Danang. Vietnam's value is mitigated by its drain on scarce Soviet resources — $3 to $4 million in aid each day, as of late 1983[46] — and by some modest tensions with Hanoi. Vietnam has still not formally granted the Russians permanent bases; it embarrassed them with incursions into Thailand and has opposed attempts to extend their influence in Laos and Cambodia.[47] These tensions are of minor significance, however, compared to the tightening of alignment since the late 1970s and the joint interests Moscow and Hanoi share against Washington and Beijing.

Putting a wedge between Vietnam and the Soviet Union would be attractive, but, even if feasible, it could involve potential problems for the regional balance of power. Before the conflict between Hanoi and the Khmer Rouge regime and the PRC there may have been some chance for fostering distance between Vietnam and the Soviet Union. In the first couple of years after the fall of Saigon, Vietnam maintained some visible independence from the USSR, did not castigate ASEAN as an imperialist surrogate, did not support the Soviet collective security proposal, and still had hopes of securing Western aid for national reconstruction; but by 1978, Vietnam was a member of COMECON and had a friendship treaty making it a regular member of the Soviet bloc.[48] In the interim, which was still painfully close to the humiliating debacle of 1975 that had

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[44] Evelyn Colbert, "Changing Relationships in Southeast Asia: ASEAN, Indochina, and the Great Powers," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 4, no. 1, June 1982, p. 84; Donald S. Zagoria, "The Soviet Dilemma in East Asia," in Scalapino and Wanandi, eds., *Economic, Political, and Security Issues in Southeast Asia in the 1980s,* pp. 208-209.

[45] Zagoria, ibid., pp. 209, 215-16.

[46] U.S. Department of State, "The Soviet Role in Asia," Current Policy No. 521, October 1983, p. 3.

[47] Buszynski, "The Soviet Union in Southeast Asia," pp. 284-285. See also Leif Rosenberger, "The Soviet-Vietnamese Alliance and Kampuchea," *Survey* 27, no. 118, Autumn-Winter 1983.

[48] Simon, *The ASEAN States and Regional Security,* pp. 50-51.

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climaxed decades of U.S. effort to preserve the independence of South Vietnam, it was impractical for the Carter administration to move swiftly toward rapprochement; especially since at the outset it was expending some domestic political capital in doing so toward Cuba. After hostility between Hanoi and Beijing intensified, a U.S. initiative toward Vietnam could have upset negotiations on normalization with the PRC. Washington no longer holds the main chips in the game; détente with Hanoi depends on resolution of the Kampuchea problem and on détente between Hanoi and Beijing.

The Soviets might be able to pressure the Vietnamese toward concessions on Kampuchea, but this is scarcely conceivable unless it was part of a Sino-Soviet reconciliation, which would not serve U.S. interests in the overall strategic competition. To the extent that the inter-Communist conflict creates the potential for crisis and escalation, however, such a deal might partially offset the losses on the global chessboard. It is easy to forget, after the fact, that the Chinese attack on Vietnam in 1979 was potentially far more dangerous than generally recognized, in that it raised the spectre of war between the USSR and PRC. In retrospect, Soviet restraint in support for its client was more prudent than Americans had a right to expect. When China struck, Moscow noted its treaty obligations and urged Beijing to stop. The PRC stated publicly that the war was limited and punitive, and Soviet officials indicated to diplomats that they would refrain from intervention as long as the Chinese effort did indeed remain so limited.[49] In effect, keeping the crisis from reaching the flash-point required keeping Chinese intervention from forcing a resolution of the Kampuchean situation. In this respect China holds more of the cards than either of the superpowers in regard to Indochina, even as the United States became the "pivot" in the overall triangular relationship after 1969.[50] And the embarrassing ineffectiveness of the Chinese attack did as much to tarnish its perceived deterrent role as to reinforce it. Yet to have done better would have heightened the risks of global conflagration. Thus, China cannot function as a U.S. proxy to reverse Vietnamese hegemony in Indochina without threatening wider U.S. interests in stability; at best it may contain Vietnam within Kampuchea. There is no practical active strategy to keep that local sore point from festering.

Unhappily, then, it could be that continuing instability in Kampuchea goes hand-in-hand with wider stability in Asia and between the superpowers. (For example, the unsettled situation in Kampuchea inhibits the outbreak of conflict over claims in the Spratlies and Paracels, since

[49] King C. Chen, "China's War Against Vietnam, 1979: A Military Analysis," *Journal of East Asian Affairs* 3, No. 1, Spring/Summer 1983, pp. 249-52.

[50] On evolution of the controlling power in triangular diplomacy see Gerald Segal, "China and the Great Power Triangle," *China Quarterly* No. 83, September 1980, pp. 493-99.

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"neither China nor Vietnam wish to alienate any claimant member states" of ASEAN.)[51] For the United States, in these respects as in others previously noted, the extent of global strategic interests and the limits of desired strategic entanglement in the region indicate an interest in being able to "use" the region without being fully "responsible" for it. The Philippine base issue highlights this ambiguous aim.

Philippine Bases

Controversy about U.S. military bases in the Philippines is an old story. Even Filipino arguments that they endanger the country's security by making it a nuclear target go back a long way.[52] (The United States neither confirms nor denies the presence of nuclear weapons at overseas bases, although circumstantial evidence suggests that such weapons may indeed be stored in the Philippines. In March 1978, for example, the U.S. commander at Subic Bay issued orders about what to do in the event of nuclear materials accidents, although this instruction could relate to ship reactors.)[53] In capsule form the nuclear storage question reflects the objective difference — beyond symbolic sensitivities about national sovereignty — in Philippine strategic interests in the bases.

Washington justifies the bases in terms of regional interests but these are weak compared to their wider role.[54] The Marcos government, thus, has more than just mercenary reasons for driving a hard bargain in renewal of the base agreements (a $900 million aid proviso was the price tag in the 1983 revision). Some of the tactics used, however, are worrisome, at least symbolically. Less than a week after Marcos told visiting American congressmen that they could remove U.S. bases if the Philippine price was too high, Foreign Minister Carlos Romulo released a Soviet letter seeking closer relations. Manila's shift to a more independent policy toward the Third World, and its greater stake in the Arab world for overseas jobs and oil, raise doubts about whether Washington would be assured the free use of Subic and Clark in the event of a Middle East crisis (use of Clark was barred for offensive missions during the Vietnam War).[55] The 1979 agreement provided for review and revision every five

[51] Leifer, "The Security of Sea Lanes in South-East Asia," p. 16. See also Marwyn S. Samuels, *Contest for the South China Sea* (New York: Methuen, 1982), chapters 5-6, 8.

[52] George E. Taylor, *The Philippines and the United States: Problems of Partnership* (New York: Praeger, for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1964), pp. 234-46.

[53] "Asia's Horizon of Terror," *Asiaweek*, May 27, 1983, pp. 39, 41.

[54] For criticisms of standard arguments see Robert Pringle, *Indonesia and the Philippines: American Interests in Island Southeast Asia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), pp. 67-75.

[55] "Philippines, After Rebuff to U.S., Wooed by Soviets," *Baltimore Sun*, July 15, 1983; William Branigin, "Manila's Policy Shift Brings Bases' Value Into Question," *Washington Post*, September 15, 1982.

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years, which could make bargaining a near-constant ordeal for the United States.

Some have argued that removing the bases would not only be feasible but strategically advantageous as well, increasing U.S. freedom of action as much as constricting it. George Kahin wrote that the Reagan administration committed the United States to support Philippine forces anywhere in the Pacific, which could make Washington complicit in Philippine claims in the South China Sea that conflict with Vietnam, the PRC, and Taiwan (this overstated the U.S. commitment, but there is certainly some potential relationship between reliance on Philippine territory and entanglement in Philippine policy). He also argued that operational constraints from shifting to facilities in Guam, Tinian, and Australia would be manageable.[56] Political access to such alternate locations would indeed probably be more reliable, and there have been moves in that direction already; in 1981 Australia agreed to let U.S. B-52s and KC-135s operate out of Darwin into the Indian Ocean. But anti-nuclear sentiments in the Australian Labour Party raise questions about the future stability of such arrangements. And there are political impediments even on Guam.[57] As long as U.S. stakes in bases are primarily for Middle East contingencies or global conflict with the USSR, and local stakes are regional in nature, the balance of potential risks and benefits for *any* host to U.S. bases could seem uncertain; the assurance of sufficient American help in regional conflicts may not seem much greater than the possibility that the host country could be attacked in a wider conflict.

Uncertainties work against spending the $2 to $3 billion to build new facilities elsewhere when they would pose operational constraints greater — even if manageable — than from the Philippines. As a former U.S. commander in chief in the Pacific, Admiral Long, put it, "In the end we would have less capability for more money than we have now." [58] The natural inertia that goes with high sunk costs in the Philippine infrastructure makes a large change in Pacific basing unlikely even under a different U.S. administration that might be more concerned with the political issues. The danger in such inertia is that a crisis could force hasty and ineffective adaption. The base issue could explode if Filipino politics degenerate, or use of the facilities could be most impeded just at the time they were most needed — for example, a U.S.-Soviet confrontation in

[56] George McT. Kahin, "Remove the Bases From the Philippines," *New York Times,* October 12, 1983.

[57] Robert Trumbull, "U.S. Military Plans for Guam Run Into Snags," *New York Times,* April 21, 1985.

[58] Quoted in Jack Cushman, "Relying on Marcos," *Defense Week,* September 6, 1983, p. 12. There are problems beyond finance or distance in relocating in Micronesia, such as doubts about sufficiency of local labor forces. "Admiral Crowe on Defending the Pacific." See also Alvin J. Cottrell, "Key U.S. Bases in the Philippines," *National Defense,* December 1982, pp. 35-36.

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the Persian Gulf. The most prudent and realistically imaginable compromise between inertia and reform is not an immediate decision to close shop in the Philippines, but creeping reorganization. Infrastructure might be gradually diversified, shifting some functions to other locations to distribute political risk, incrementally reducing the concentration at Subic and Clark. This would entail some penalty in peacetime operational efficiency, but that is outweighed by greater reliability for the wartime contingencies. Even small skeletal new installations, if sprinkled around, would provide a useful hedge by creating a basis for expansion should the need arise. This course is fiscally attractive as well (limiting cost and spreading its impact over a longer period), and it would provide counterleverage against Filipino compensation demands (demonstrating willingness to readjust). This would preserve the connection with Manila while attenuating support for the Marcos government, which offers some hedge against a change of regime.

Diffusion of Deterrence

There is little reason to believe that the gap between increasing economic interest and reduced military presence in Southeast Asia will be closed in advance of a crisis that would make the advisability of such a shift too obvious for overloaded American policy makers to ignore. The change in relative economic importance of Asia and Europe will not yield any decisive shift of U.S. strategic focus because the underlying historical and cultural sources of the priority of Europe are overwhelming. To the extent that policy makers focus on a linkage between economic interests and military strategy, the focus will be on the Middle East and Persian Gulf, where political ignition points for crisis are clearer than anywhere else. To the extent that more military attention and effort are devoted to Asia, it will be more in Northeast Asia, where power on all sides is more concentrated, and the inertia of tradition reinforces recognized strategic interest to maintain U.S. presence on the ground (in Japan and Korea). There is still too much strategic urgency to go around in the world for Southeast Asia's military and political priority to come into line with its economic priority. Though this conservative view will appear an irresponsibly misbegotten curse if a great regional crisis eventuates, it reflects the current blessing of relative stability. Stability and conservatism (and thus lack of major change in U.S. policy) are sides of the same coin. Dangers that are potential more than actual have to take second place to current challenges elsewhere.

Two countries on the Asian periphery, however, should have a different view. Japan and Australia, in strategic terms, are naturally more

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oriented to the region than is the United States.[59] They are also politically in concert with most U.S. goals. And since the rising economic importance of Southeast Asia to the United States is a reflection of the global diffusion of power, it is reasonable to consider adapting through diffusion of strategic responsibility. As noted previously, there are ample barriers to shifting U.S. military burdens to these countries. Japan is inhibited by the feelings of its own citizens as well as Korea's and ASEAN's. Australia lacks capacity let alone will to become a great power.

Consistent with the characterization of the regional situation as relatively stable and prospective changes in U.S. posture as probably modestly incremental, it helps to think in terms of incrementalism in the diffusion of strategic functions. This could mean steady encouragement of Japan to increase its foreign aid, to the point that it could help improve indigenous Korean and ASEAN defense capabilities. Tokyo has already used its foreign aid in Southeast Asia as an excuse for resisting U.S. pressure for higher Japanese defense expenditures. Washington might embrace this principle that such aid is indeed a security function, point out that total Japanese aid is still trivial in terms of overall U.S. and Japanese security spending, and counter citations of domestic sensitivity against building national military power by accepting a radical increase in subsidies for friendly Asian forces as a substitute for Japanese military increases beyond those already planned by Tokyo. For Australia, the U.S. aims might be first to encourage a more assertive leadership role for Canberra in the Five Power Defense Arrangement, and second, to cooperate in the creeping diversification of U.S. base facilities suggested earlier. If these aims are diplomatically too ambitious, one can only conclude that the two U.S. allies in the Pacific who represent the greatest combination of political stability, economic development, and compatibility of purpose do not see more reason to bolster the Western position in Asia than Washington does.

[59] For a contrary view see Harry Gelber, "Australia's Role in the Years Ahead," *Pacific Defence Reporter*, December 1982/January 1983, p. 43, and for optimistic reflections on a Pacific concert see Gelber's "Australia, the Pacific, and the United States in the 1980s," *Comparative Strategy* 3, no. 2 (1981), pp. 97-116.

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

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THE DAWN OF REAL COMMUNISM: PROBLEMS OF COMECON

by Jan S. Prybyla

> Have we reached real communism yet,
> or is it going to get worse?
>
> —East European saying

The Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA or COMECON) was founded in January 1949 as Moscow's symbolic response to the Marshall Plan. Besides the Soviet Union, the founding members included Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Rumania. They were joined later by Albania and East Germany. In 1961 Albania stopped attending the council's meetings, but did not formally withdraw from the organization. Albania's ire was caused, among other things, by Khrushchev's suggestion that, in line with the contemplated intraregional specialization, Albania was to devote its energies to becoming a socialist garden, supplying bananas to the other members. Albania's departure was compensated for by the arrival of Outer Mongolia in 1962, Cuba in 1972, and Vietnam in 1978. While not an official member, Yugoslavia takes part in some of the council's joint projects and has close trade relations with the bloc. Afghanistan, Angola, Ethiopia, and Nicaragua attend COMECON meetings as observers.

For the first several years, in fact until the ratification of CMEA's charter in 1959, the organization was not more than a tool of Soviet propaganda. It met hardly at all until a year after Stalin's death. On Soviet orders, each country developed its economy along the autarchic lines of the Soviet-Stalinist model with its high rates of investment, rapid expansion of heavy industry, neglect of light industry, and exploitation of agriculture. In those early years, the theoretical fraternal mutuality of interstate relations within COMECON translated in practice into unilateral benefits drawn by the Soviet Union from its position of unchallenged political and military superiority.

The intra-bloc shocks of 1956 and Khrushchev's consolidation of power within the Soviet party and government in 1957 brought in their train a reappraisal of the purposes and functions of COMECON. At

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about this time, the Soviet Union began to realize, however reluctantly, that imperialism entails considerable costs — not just benefits — for the imperial power. The main purpose of COMECON, as set down in its charter, was to distribute resources for the benefit of the whole region. Specifically, the organization was to[1]

- emphasize increasing specialization among its members ("socialist division of labor");
- encourage technical advance and "intensive" (productivity-based) growth;
- reduce the wide income differentials between its more prosperous and poorer members; and
- enhance the region's military capability.

It is important to remember that the CMEA is not the same, not even remotely so, as the European Economic Community (EEC).[2] First, COMECON includes three underdeveloped economies, two in Asia (Mongolia, Vietnam), and one in the Caribbean (Cuba). The differences in income between the European and non-European members are substantially greater than those between the members of EEC. Moreover, by reason of its geographical dispersion, COMECON is not a regional integrative organization. Second, the CMEA is not an association of rough equals, as is the EEC. It is unequivocally dominated by the USSR. More subtly than in its earlier years, and more expensively for the USSR, COMECON remains a tool of the Soviets. Third, and most important, the economic structure of the CMEA reflects the systemic makeup of its members, which is quite different from that of the EEC and its members. To accomplish its aims, including economic integration, the EEC relies on and works through markets and the lure of profits for private initiative. Markets and private initiative are conspicuously absent in the national economies of COMECON member countries (except underground); the integrative task is carried out bureaucratically, through the manual coordination of national administrative plans. While the managing organs of the EEC are international bureaucracies, they are bureaucracies responsive to market discipline. Their organizational complexity pales into insignificance by comparison with that of COMECON.

The reappraisal of the purposes of COMECON and the formalization of its functions following the shocks administered to the Soviet empire by Poznań (1956), Warsaw (1956), and Budapest (1956) — heralded by Berlin (1953) — were followed by sustained consultations and elaborations of the COMECON concept over the following decades. These were spurred by movements of popular discontent in Warsaw and Prague

[1] "A Little Late in Learning the Facts of Life," COMECON Survey, *The Economist*, April 20, 1985, pp. 3-5.
[2] Ibid.

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(1968), Poland in 1970 and 1976, and the Polish Solidarity movement of 1980-81, and by individual regime claims on the USSR: Rumania since 1964, Hungary since 1968, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and various informal coalitions from 1983 onward.[3] The seriousness accorded the COMECON idea has been enhanced over the years by the troubles and tribulations of COMECON's individual members, particularly Poland and Rumania, but others as well. These problems began to be manifest clearly in the mid-1970s and have persisted since. So far, the national economies of Eastern Europe have found it difficult to solve or, at least, to diminish the severity of these problems. Going to COMECON for help has not been fruitful, since the organization mirrors the ills experienced by its members and merely projects them onto the international plane. In both instances (national and international) the main reason for both the problems and the snake-oil quality of the remedies has been the system of economic organization. The troubles are caused by the structural defects of central administrative command planning inherited from Stalin. The failure of the remedies applied so far has been due to the unwillingness of the Soviet Union to undertake a thorough systemic reform of its own economy, which would give the other members of CMEA (especially the Europeans) the green light to push ahead with more than repairs and partial renovations of their flawed economic structures. Let us look at some of the problems and what has been, or might be, done about them.

Growth Rate

Figure 1 resembles the charts hanging from the hospital beds of seriously ill patients. The bumpy curve dipping from around 8 to −2 represents the annual percentage rate of growth of net material product (NMP) of the East European COMECON countries from 1966 to 1982. Since 1982 the curve has risen, but not by much. The smooth and orderly line, which since the mid-1970s has been positioned well above the bumpy one (despite some compressing since 1981), represents the annual NMP growth rate as scientifically projected by these countries' five-year plans. The leader of the pack, the USSR, which (according to the Party Program of 1961) was to have approached full communism in 1980 reveals an evolution of its NMP growth rate shown in table 1. In the first quarter of 1985, Soviet NMP growth was about 2 percent.

Now, the NMP is merely a measure of vital signs, an aggregate of several submeasures and a broad reflection of others. It says that the patient is not in good shape, but it does not tell us which organs are most

[3] Charles Gati, "Soviet Empire: Alive But Not Well," *Problems of Communism,* March-April 1985, p. 83, Table 3.

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Figure 1



SOURCE: S. Levcik, *Le Temps Stratégique V,* Summer 1983, p. 14. "L'Europe de l'est: a-t-elle un avenir?"

affected or why. To find out about the "which," we must disaggregate the NMP and bring in other measurements: things such as industrial output, agricultural production, and factor productivity. These confirm what the NMP suggests, with factor productivity readings being particularly dis-

TABLE 1

USSR: GROWTH OF NET MATERIAL PRODUCT
(Average annual rate of growth percent)

1966-70	1971-75	1976-80	1981	1982
7.7	5.7	4.2	3.1	3.9

SOURCE: Philip Hanson, "Brezhnev's Economic Legacy," in *The Soviet Economy After Brezhnev,* NATO Colloquium 1984 (Brussels: NATO Economic Directorate, 1984), p. 44, Table 3.

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TABLE 2

USSR: GROWTH RATE OF FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY
(Average annual rate of growth percent)

1966-70	1971-75	1976-80	1981	1982
1.6	0.1	−0.4	−1.0	−0.5

SOURCE: Philip Hanson, "Brezhnev's Economic Legacy," in *The Soviet Economy after Brezhnev,* NATO Colloquium 1984 (Brussels: NATO Economic Directorate, 1984), p. 44, Table 3.

turbing. In the Soviet case (never mind Poland), the evolution has been as shown in table 2.

This is not impressive for a country on the verge of entering real communism, a condition, according to Marx (whose scientific projections rival those of figure 1), of the full flowering of material productive forces. In fact, today's Soviet industrial productivity is about half that of the capitalist United States, while Soviet agricultural productivity is at best one-quarter of the American.

Debts

Debts to the West

To cure their productivity ills and launch their economies on a path of intensive growth (growth resulting from qualitative improvement in factor performance), the COMECON countries, flying the banner of détente and with enthusiastic cooperation from Western bankers (sitting on piles of recycled petrodollars), exporters (gripped by recession), and governments, ran up a tidy hard currency debt in the 1970s and early 1980s. This debt now stands at more than $90 billion.[4] The loans were used in the West to procure modern equipment and that part of Western state-of-the-art technology not yet stolen by Soviet and satellite intelligence services. For Eastern Europe, the evolution of the debt situation can be seen in table 3.

[4] The USSR and other COMECON countries have been trying to move from extensive growth (growth due primarily to the addition of factors, especially labor and capital, of a given technological level) to intensive growth. This task has become more urgent with the emerging labor shortages (due to a falling rate of natural population increase) and the difficulty of raising the investment rate from its present already high levels. The investment rate is high, but the effectiveness of the investment low. Labor productivity is also low, i.e., there is an enormous waste (underemployment) of labor.

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TABLE 3

EASTERN EUROPE'S NET HARD CURRENCY DEBT TO THE WEST
(Billions of current U.S. dollars)

	1970	1975	1980	1981	1984
Bulgaria	0.7	2.1	2.5	2.1	2.5
Czechoslovakia	0.6	1.2	3.4	3.4	4.1
East Germany	1.4	4.8	11.2	11.0	12.3
Hungary	0.6	2.3	5.8	6.2	8.2
Poland	1.1	7.7	22.0	23.2	27.0
Rumania	1.6	3.1	9.3	9.7	8.4
Total	6.0	21.2	54.2	55.6	62.5

SOURCE: Charles Gati, "Soviet Empire: Alive But Not Well," *Problems of Communism,* March-April 1985, p. 77, based on Jan Vanous, Centrally Planned Economies Service, Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates, Washington, D.C.

Add to this a Soviet net debt to the West of around $30 billion in 1984, and you come up with a hefty sum indeed for a community struggling with a very prolonged depression (figure 1). A good number of these IOUs consist of bad debts in all but name. Most of Poland's debt is of that kind. Since 1981, Rumania has made an effort to pay up by enforcing Draconian austerity measures at home, including a slashing of residential electricity consumption, which last winter was one-fifth of that in the winter of 1981-82, and a mere 7 percent of national electricity output (27 percent in Hungary, 19 percent in Bulgaria). Officially, these are the "Years of Light" in Rumania (the twentieth anniversary of Ceausescu's rule), and the Rumanians ask: "If these are the Years of Light, why is it so dark?"[5] Rumania's efforts to pay off a part of the debt are atypical. The Poles simply reschedule theirs and get away with it year after year. The philosophically and politically puzzling aspect of the COMECON hard currency debt is the extent to which the debt is subsidized by Western taxpayers.[6] Of the $30 billion owed by the Soviets,

[5] Maxine Pollack, "Romanian Energy Shortage: Darkness at Noon," *Wall Street Journal,* April 10, 1985.

[6] "Subsidizing the Soviets," *Wall Street Journal,* May 14, 1984; and "Ivan the Credit Seeker," ibid., April 1, 1985. In early 1985, despite a general coolness in U.S.-Soviet relations, Soviet deputy foreign trade minister Vladimir Sushkov declared that he would very much like U.S. help in building a robotics factory in the Soviet Union. The high-tech robots, he explained, were needed to make blue jeans. See, J. Prybyla, "The Economic Crisis of State Socialism: Its Philosophical and Institutional Foundations," ORBIS, Winter 1983, pp. 869-887. See also Patrick Buchanan, "Care and Feeding of the Evil Empire," *Washington Times,* March 23, 1984. Thomas Theobold, the international head of Citibank has been quoted as saying: "Who knows which political system works? The only test we care about is: Can they pay their bills?" (*Wall Street Journal,* May 3, 1982.) Well, they can't.

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$20 billion is so supported, which puts the Soviet Union in first place in the world with regard to loans subsidized by Western taxpayers. Of the $20 billion subsidized, $6 billion consists of bank credits insured or guaranteed by Western governments; the rest are loans directly guaranteed by Western governments to their exporters of goods and high-tech services to the Soviet Union. Of the very shaky Polish debt, about half is subsidized by Western taxpayers in this way (this does not include concessionary International Monetary Fund loans and understates West German loans to East Germany, described by West Germany as "intra-German" credits).

Nevertheless, the massive acquisition by COMECON members of Western equipment and technology brought no visible improvement in COMECON productivity. In fact, matters seem to have gone from bad to worse, and COMECON's technological lag behind the West (in civilian employments) has grown since 1975. Why is that? The answer, while not obvious, is quite simple. Technology is a tool that is useless, or worse, if not properly integrated into the economic system of information, coordination, motivation, and property. For example, an advanced machine is no good if manned by drunken workers (the workers being inebriated because of a collapse of the motivational system). Or, again, the machine is no good if it should not have been imported in the first place, because it is uneconomical. That it was acquired, attests to the deficiency of the economy's information system. The machine will be no good if what it produces cannot be used up the line, or if the machine cannot produce what it is designed to produce because the needed inputs down the line are not there, or are of the wrong kind: that is a problem of faulty systemic coordination. So, trying to "catch up" by importing up-to-date technology is not as easy as it looks. Ultimately, technology is not an engineering but a sociocultural phenomenon.

But there is more than that. Not only is technology a sociocultural phenomenon, it is not socioculturally neutral. Modern technology is a product of the free-wheeling, competitive market and private property system of the West and of the entrepreneurial spirit that inspires it. It emerges from the uninhibited exchange of ideas, the importance attached to individual inventiveness, and the recognition of the individual's right to implement his ideas with a minimum of bureaucratic fuss and restriction. These qualities are diametrically opposed to those espoused by centrally planned economies and totalitarian polities. To function productively, market-produced technology requires a market-type systemic environment. It thrives on competitive, lateral, buyer-seller, person-to-person transactions, and works perversely in a system of protectionist, vertical, bureaucrat-to-bureaucrat relationships. Using capitalist technology to build socialism will not work. It is a waste of money and KGB manpower.

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By now, China half understands this and has introduced neomarket arrangements in agriculture. The East Europeans understand at the intellectual level but cannot do much about it. The economists in Novosibirsk understand. The Soviet party does not, or, in its entrenched self-interest, refuses to consider the revolutionary implications for the system.

Debts to the USSR

As the COMECON countries move toward real communism, things grow "curioser and curioser." One of the more curious is the pattern of trade between COMECON and the West, which is almost identical to the pattern that exists between underdeveloped and industrialized countries. COMECON, the USSR included, exports mainly raw materials, including energy (gas, oil) — something, the cynics would say, that even the worst economic system would find it difficult to spoil; it imports advanced equipment and high technology (the USSR also imports grain). With the emergence of the "four tigers" (Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore) and others waiting in the wings (Thailand, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Indonesia), COMECON has found it increasingly difficult to compete in world markets (not just in the developed capitalist countries' markets, but in Africa, Latin America, and noncommunist Asia) in such commodities as steel and petrochemicals. With few exceptions, therefore, (some East German and Hungarian manufactures) the COMECON countries have a hard time selling their manufactured products to the West even in competition with semi-industrialized market economies. The main reason is the comparatively low technological content and poor quality of socialist manufactures. Now, depending on the terms of trade between raw materials and manufactures, the situation might not be all that bad for COMECON. The problem, however, is that with the exception of the USSR (gas, oil) and Poland (coal), the East European economies are raw material / energy deficient. This gives a new twist to an already tangled situation.

What it means is that the East European economies are obliged (given their hard currency indebtedness) to import primary materials — especially energy — from the Soviet Union, and sell to the Soviets their manufactured products (and in the case of Hungary and Bulgaria, food). Because their industries are highly energy-intensive — smokestack affairs built in accordance with the Stalinist heavy industry strategy, and subject to few energy conservation measures since the early 1950s — they use a lot of fuel, as do the Soviets themselves (40 percent more than equivalent Western factories). In this context, raw materials and fuels are "hard"

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TABLE 4

TRENDS IN EAST EUROPEAN TERMS OF TRADE WITH THE USSR
(1970 = 100)

	1975	1980	1981	1982	1985*
Bulgaria	90	76	71	66	49
Czechoslovakia	86	77	71	65	48
East Germany	85	74	69	63	47
Hungary	81	68	64	60	44
Poland	95	83	78	74	55
Rumania	103	86	85	83	61
East Europe	89	77	72	67	49

SOURCE: Jan Vanous, "East European Economic Slowdown," *Problems of Communism*, July-August 1982, p. 5, Table 3.

* Vanous's estimate

goods: hard to get and hard priced, as we shall see. In exchange, the East Europeans sell to the Soviets their second best "soft" industrial manufactures (the best go to the West, when possible). Second best is not very good by international standards but better than what the Soviets themselves produce. On the consumer front, these goods are very popular with Moscow housewives.

If the terms of trade between hard and soft goods in East European-Soviet trade had been allowed to take their natural, world market-determined course, there would have been big trouble in Eastern Europe — big enough to make the Solidarity-Martial Law episode in Poland look like a family picnic. The deteriorating trend in this regard may be seen from table 4.

The implications of the figures in table 4 are these: in 1985, for the same amount of goods imported from the USSR, the East European countries had to export to the USSR twice as much as they did in 1970. The rise in the price of Soviet oil, after 1974, has been a major contributor to this situation.

Explorations by Marrese and Vanous reveal that the actual deterioration in East Europe's economic position vis-à-vis the USSR has been less than it would have been had changes in the world price of energy been allowed to translate themselves promptly into prices in East Europe-USSR trade, and had the Soviet Union seized the opportunity to sell more oil to the West (for dollars) and less to the East (for machines

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TABLE 5

EAST EUROPE'S DEBT TO THE SOVIET UNION, 1971-1981
(Billions 1981 U.S. dollars)

	Ruble credits	Implicit Trade Subsidies	Total
Bulgaria	1.3	17.8	19.1
Czechoslovakia	0.7	19.5	20.2
East Germany	2.2	33.5	35.7
Hungary	0.4	12.2	12.6
Poland	2.8	17.9	22.7*
Rumania	−0.5	1.0	0.5
East Europe	6.9	101.9	110.8

SOURCE: Jan Vanous, "East European Economic Slowdown," *Problems of Communism,* July-August 1982, p. 5, Table 3.

* Includes $2 billion dollar debt. USSR dollar credits to other East European countries are not known.

of below world standard).[7] Since 1975, according to these authors, the Soviet Union has granted its COMECON partners preferential trade treatment, which involved an implicit trade subsidy put for 1971 to 1981 at $100 billion (in 1981 dollars). That sum represents 92 percent of total "credits" (explicit and implicit) extended by the USSR to Eastern Europe during this period. Eastern Europe's debt to the Soviet Union between 1971 and 1981 (expressed in 1981 U.S. dollars) may be seen from table 5.

Two questions arise: first, how do the Soviets do it? And second, why do they do it? When OPEC raised its oil prices fourfold in the early 1970s, and with a concurrent steep rise in the world prices for other raw materials, nothing much happened to the price structure of intra-COMECON trade; not until 1975. At that time the Soviets proposed, and the others accepted, a pricing formula according to which intra-COMECON trade prices are changed every year on the basis of five-year moving averages of world market prices. Before that time intra-COMECON trade prices were kept unchanged during five-year periods and were

[7] Michael Marrese and Jan Vanous, "Unconventional Gains from Trade," *Journal of Comparative Economics,* Vol. 7, No. 4, December 1983, pp. 382-99; id., *Implicit Subsidies and Non-Market Benefits in Soviet Trade with Eastern Europe* (Berkeley, Calif.: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1983); id., "Soviet Subsidies to Eastern Economies," *Wall Street Journal,* January 15, 1982. The Marrese-Vanous thesis is plausible, but mired in the imponderables of the COMECON price system and the system of equally irrational exchange rates.

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based on world market price averages during the preceding five years. The lagged formula for the price of crude oil benefited the East European countries until the early 1980s. By 1983-84, world market prices of oil were falling, but under the lagged formula intra-COMECON prices continued to climb. While selling oil and other materials to Eastern Europe in the 1970s at discount prices (these goods could have been sold to the West at higher prices, earning hard currency), the USSR bought from Eastern Europe machinery and other industrial manufactures that, as already mentioned, were below world market standards. In other words, the USSR sold to Eastern Europe energy and raw materials at less than world prices and bought in exchange substandard East European producer and consumer goods at inflated prices (i.e., had the East Europeans tried to sell these goods at COMECON-type prices on the world market, they could not have done it). The willingness on the part of the Soviet Union to let the other COMECON countries accumulate both overt trade deficits and covert subsidies is how the Soviets did it.

As to why they did it. It is safe to assume that it was not done out of generosity and fraternal feelings for the East Europeans caught in a cruel economic vise. It was done to prevent worse things from happening than those that had already happened in 1956, 1968, 1970, 1976, and 1980-81. Rather than openly paying the unpopular East European regimes, the Soviets did so covertly in the form of preferential trade. The main benefits they derived, and continue to get from the hidden subsidization of their satellites, are political and military. These "nonmarket gains from preferential trade" include relative political tranquility in the bloc (self-enforced in Poland, for example, by the Jaruzelski regime); obedience in matters of international strategy laid down by the Soviet Union; military support for Soviet aims both within the Warsaw Pact and by proxy in Africa and Latin America (Cuba and East Germany have been zealous in this regard); and getting much of their "dirty work" in military and economic espionage and terrorism done by surrogates.

The East Europeans are thus trapped in a double dependency: on Western bankers and on the Soviet Politburo. The first they can dismiss with a shrug, as the Poles are doing, but perhaps not forever. While Western bankers, exporters, and governments have shown themselves very accommodating (new credits are being arranged), the reputation for de facto insolvency is bound to catch up with Eastern Europe sooner or later. That part of equipment purchased in the West during détente, and not standing idle because of systemic problems, will become idle as supplies of spare parts dwindle. Eastern Europe cannot afford to alienate Western economic interests, beyond a certain, if seemingly ever-receding, point. Dependency on the USSR is a more serious matter. The Soviets

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are demanding greater economic (on top of political and military) contributions from their East European dependencies: larger participation in Soviet megainvestment projects such as the Yamburg gas line from northern Siberia to Eastern Europe, and the huge mining and enrichment combine being built at Krivoi Rog. Soviet impatience mounts as oil, gas, and other materials have to be brought in from distant and climatically inhospitable places at rising cost, because of the progressive depletion of more favorably located areas in the western USSR (60 percent of Soviet oil production now comes from Siberia; 10 percent in 1970). The East Europeans would, no doubt, prefer to invest directly in their own obsolete economies, but they have little choice in the matter. Growing investment in joint projects — most of them located within the Soviet Union — makes the East Europeans increasingly reliant on the USSR both economically and politically.

The Soviets also insist these days on greater than hitherto intra-COMECON specialization to get at the potential benefits of comparative advantage. However, in the present irrational constellation of both domestic and intra-COMECON trade prices, it is not possible to determine what comparative advantage means and where precisely it lies. The resulting specialization will thus probably turn out to be administrative, that is, irrelevant from the standpoint of economic opportunity costs, which is what is at issue. In these circumstances, individual countries are likely to end up making economically wrong — sometimes harmful — choices of specialization.

Whichever way world market prices for raw materials and primary energy (especially oil) go, the East European COMECON countries run a good risk of feeling the pinch. If, for example, oil prices keep declining, the USSR, which derives 60 percent of its hard currency earnings from oil exports, will be tempted to sell more oil in world markets to make up for lost revenue and decreased capacity to import Western equipment and technology. Unless Soviet oil production ceases stagnating (which will be contingent in large measure on the successful application of Western know-how to oil exploration, development, and pipeline transportation from faraway Siberian places), declining world oil prices would mean, at best, an unchanged level of Soviet oil deliveries to East Europe. But there may be a cut, as there had been already at the time of the Polish troubles in 1981. This would be highly deleterious to East European economic growth, already faltering, as we have seen (figure 1). Should oil prices rise, Eastern Europe's terms of trade with the USSR ("soft" versus "hard" goods) would deteriorate still further, necessitating increased implicit Soviet subsidies (which are already causing wrath in the Politburo), outright credits, grants, or a politically dangerous economic

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belt-tightening in Eastern Europe, à la Rumania, only more so. The problem is that in most East European countries there is not much of a bulge for the belt to squeeze. As the Rumanians put it: "If we had more food, it would be like war."

It is difficult to determine exactly the exchange rate between economic subsidies through preferential trade and political-military favors granted by the beneficiaries in return, but, whatever it is, it now seems to have approached the limits of tolerance, certainly with regard to USSR-East European relations. It is doubtful that the East European regimes can extract much more from the USSR by subtly hinting, as they were wont to do, at the possible and probable political consequences of cutbacks in covert aid. It is also doubtful that significantly more can be extracted from the East Europeans in political tribute, without bringing about a serious deterioration in the political situation of the region. The only imminent alternatives for the Soviet Union and its European COMECON clients are a return to Stalinist-type repression or profound reform of the economic system in a marketized and privatized direction. Nobody, neither the givers nor the receivers, is happy with the present arrangement or the alternatives.

Debts to Everybody: Mongolia, Cuba, Vietnam

The three underdeveloped members of COMECON — Mongolia, Cuba, and Vietnam — receive implicit subsidies, explicit credits (at nominal interest rates of 0.5 to 2 percent per year), and grants from the USSR and Eastern Europe in return for political and military services that accrue almost exclusively to the USSR. These include Vietnam's provision of naval bases for the Soviet Pacific fleet and facilities for the Soviet air force; bugging the Chinese in Cambodia and elsewhere; rent-an-army services performed by the Cubans in Africa and Central America; naval bases for the Soviets in Cuba; stationing of Soviet nuclear armies in Mongolia, and so on. It is estimated that the cost of Cuba to the USSR comes to more than $4 billion a year. Vietnam costs another $2 billion per year, half of it in military aid, and Mongolia another billion. Most of this is bankrolled by the Soviets, but the East Europeans have had to chip in through contributions to the COMECON investment bank (which dispenses those low interest loans), and by purchasing Cuban sugar and other staple goods from Vietnam and Mongolia at well above world market prices. Their only benefits from the transaction so far are the (not overly welcome) services of some of Vietnam's more than 100,000 bonded workers, most of whom, however, were in the past sent to build the *Druzhba* pipeline in Siberia (15,000 Vietnamese workers are known to

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have been commandeered for Bulgaria in 1981).[8] Reportedly 60 percent of the earnings of these socialist *Gastarbeiter* are confiscated by the Vietnamese government and used to help pay off Vietnam's large and mounting debt to the USSR and Eastern Europe. In 1984 Cuban hard currency debts to the West came to $3.5 billion; the equivalent of $10 billion was owed to the USSR and Eastern Europe (mostly the USSR).[9] Actual debts to the USSR would be much higher if account were taken of implicit subsidies to Mongolia, Cuba, and Vietnam through the sale to them of Soviet oil at prices below those charged by the USSR to the European COMECON members, and the already mentioned overpayment (in terms of world market prices) for staple imports from the three. Despite the infusions of overt and covert aid, the Cuban and Vietnamese economies are doing poorly. According to the 1980 *World Bank Report,* between 1960 and 1979 (the span of Castro's rule) the average annual growth rate of the Cuban economy was *minus* 1.2 percent.[10] Roughly 30 percent of Vietnam's gross national product goes to the military. The average monthly salary of an official in Vietnam is 100 dong ($11 at the official exchange rate). A bowl of soup costs a day's pay. A new French bicycle costs $2,000: 15 years' pay at the official exchange rate.[11] No wonder black marketeering and corruption are endemic, and even more widespread than in Eastern Europe and the USSR. The basic causes are similar, and systemic.

Intra-East European Trade

Beset by difficulties in West and East, the European members of COMECON must of necessity (if not necessarily by choice) trade among themselves. This trade is essentially a series of bilateral barters of (third rank) manufactures against (third rank) manufactures, or of soft goods against soft goods, and a few hard goods (e.g., coal) against hard goods (e.g., food). The very best manufactures have been sent to the West. The second best went to Russia without love. What is traded among the satellites is whatever is left over. Country A determines what it has in surplus and what it is short of, and so does country B. You buy what is short and you sell what is long on the dialectical principle of "you show me yours, and I'll show you mine." It is not good economics, but the best that rationally price-less, marketless, privateless economies can come

[8] Doan Van Toai, "What's Become of Vietnam?" *Wall Street Journal,* May 24, 1982; Barry Wain, "Socialism Hasn't Improved Saigon," ibid., January 21, 1982.

[9] *Wall Street Journal,* July 12, 1984.

[10] But in 1981, the World Bank revised these figures to an incredible *plus* 4.4 percent. On the rather flimsy rationale for this change, see "Cuba's Incredible Economy," *Wall Street Journal,* December 30, 1981.

[11] *New York Times,* June 2, 1982.

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up with. COMECON can facilitate (or hamper) this exchange of information, by providing a bureaucratic marketplace for the convenience of members. Nobody wants to accumulate surpluses in intra-East European trade. Such surpluses are denominated in "convertible" rubles, which are not really convertible into hard goods from third parties, such goods having been pre-empted by national plans. Not even 2 percent of intra-COMECON trade is conducted in this peculiar multilateral fashion.

Chto delat'?

The problems of COMECON are problems of the quality of economic performance experienced by COMECON's component national units, the centrally planned economies of the USSR, Eastern Europe, and their beggar-bowl appendages in Asia and Latin America, projected onto the international plane, with practical outcomes that exceed the contributions of the individual diseased parts. The most intractable difficulties arise from the institutional deficiencies of administrative command planning, rooted in the economic system's totalitarian polity and the closed Marxist-Leninist thought structure. The economic arrangement had been conceived by Stalin. It has been practiced since Stalin's death with only surface modifications. The allocative inefficiencies (monumental resource waste), chronic shortages of what is needed side by side with surpluses of unwanted goods, poor quality of inputs (productivity) and outputs, sluggish innovation and slow diffusion of new technologies in the civilian sector, high consumer costs, absence of competition and uncompetitiveness of the system's manufactured goods on world markets — these and other troubles are not the result of an improper application of a proper principle of administrative central planning. They are not, as the comrades say, problems of "style of work." They are problems inherent in the planning principle and the institutional structure through which this principle manifests itself.

Two courses of action are open to try and cure COMECON's problems. The first is "business-as-usual." This is simply the application of intrasystemic remedies, replacement of worn-out or obsolete parts of the economic mechanism, adjustment here and there, and renovation of the more obviously unworkable parts. Such palliatives include market-uninformed insistence on greater intra-COMECON division of labor; pressure put on the East Europeans to invest in joint megaschemes that make bureaucratic sense, but little else; juggling official artificial exchange rates; covertly subsidizing, and so on. These administrative measures address themselves to the symptoms of COMECON's disabilities, but fail to touch the roots of the problem. Their proven inefficiency encourages those who

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argue for the reintroduction of Stalinist "discipline" and a return to the golden age of Stalinism.

The other solution is to carry out *economic* (not administrative) decentralization: to marketize information, coordination, and motivation, and to privatize property rights. This course of action amounts to systemic transformation, or true reform of structures.[12] The major obstacle in the way of such reform is the partocracy's insistence on retaining control over the economy, as part of the overall societal control. Reform would imply the self-liquidation of the bureaucratic hordes and their replacement by workably competitive markets. It would mean the reassertion of the individual as the moving force of the economy. *Ausgeschlossen!*

And so, we may reasonably expect the business-as-usual approach to prevail, accompanied by occasional popular outbursts, a little give, a little tightening of discipline, and discreet national maneuverings for positions of advantage. Problems will, therefore, cumulate until the threshold of tolerance is reached, at which point systemic reform will become a necessity.

[12] On the conceptual differences between adjustment of the system and systemic reform, see J. Prybyla, "The Chinese Economy: Adjustment of the System or Systemic Reform," *Asian Survey*, May 1985, pp. 553-86. A more thorough and extensive treatment of this question will be found in J. Prybyla, *The Bird in the Cage: Market and Plan Under Socialism*, forthcoming from the Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, California.

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THE IMPACT OF DEFENSE SPENDING ON ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: A SURVEY OF EVIDENCE AND PROBLEMS

by Steve Chan

What are the *domestic* motivations for and consequences of heavy defense spending? This question, interesting for both empirical and policy reasons, has prompted a series of recent investigations about possible trade-offs between military expenditures and other kinds of government spending, such as on welfare, health, and education.[1] Another group of studies, some from a neo-Marxist perspective, has suggested surplus capital, high unemployment, sagging economic growth, and the military-industrial complex as either the cause or the effect (sometimes both) of heavy defense spending in the advanced capitalist countries.[2] Still other analyses have examined the hypotheses that defense spending is influenced by pork-barrel politics, has been manipulated by politicians to

[1] See, for example, Richard C. Eichenberg, "The Expenditure and Revenue Effects of Defense Spending in the Federal Republic of Germany," *Policy Sciences* 16, June 1984, pp. 391-411; William K. Domke, Richard C. Eichenberg, and Catherine M. Kelleher, "The Illusion of Choice: Defense and Welfare in Advanced Industrial Democracies, 1948-1978," *American Political Science Review* 77, March 1983, pp. 19-35; Bruce M. Russett, "Defense Expenditures and National Well-Being," *American Political Science Review* 76, December 1982, pp. 767-77; id., "Some Decisions in the Regression Analysis of Time Series Data," in James F. Herndon and Joseph L. Bernd, eds., *Mathematical Applications in Political Science,* Vol. 5 (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1971), pp. 29-50; id., *What Price Vigilance? The Burdens of National Defense* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1970); Katheleen Peroff and Margaret Podolak-Warren, "Does Spending on Defense Cut Spending on Health? A Time-Series Analysis of the U.S. Economy 1929-1974," *British Journal of Political Science* 9, January 1979, pp. 21-40; David Dabelko and James M. McCormick, "Opportunity Costs of Defense: Some Cross-National Evidence," *Journal of Peace Research* 14 (1977), pp. 145-54; David A. Caputo, "New Perspectives on the Public Policy Implications of Defense and Welfare Expenditures in Four Modern Democracies: 1950-1970," *Policy Sciences* 6, June 1975, pp. 423-46; Jerry Hollenhorst and Gary Ault, "An Alternative Answer to: Who Pays for Defense?" *American Political Science Review* 65, September 1971, pp. 760-63; and Frederick Pryor, *Public Expenditure in Communist and Capitalist Countries* (Homewood, Ill.: Irwin, 1968).

[2] This segment of the literature includes Paul A. Baran and Paul M. Sweezy, *Monopoly Capital: An Essay on the American Economic and Social Order* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1966); Seymour Melman, *The Permanent War Economy: American Capitalism in Decline* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1974); id., "Ten Propositions on the War Economy," *American Economic Review* 62, May 1972, pp. 312-18; id., *Pentagon Capitalism: The Political Economy of War* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970); Michael Kidron, *Western Capitalism Since the War* (Baltimore: Pelican Books, 1970); and L. J. Griffin, M. Wallace, and J. Devine, "The Political Economy of Military Spending: Evidence from the United States," *Cambridge Journal of Economics* 6 (1982), pp. 1-14.

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enhance their re-election chances,[3] is a result of mutual partisan adjustment among the elites of the centrally planned economies,[4] or that it is a function of organizational inertia and domestic policy processes.[5] The results of these empirical studies have not been entirely consistent or conclusive. Nor have these results necessarily conformed to popular expectations. Thus, for instance, the evidence pointing to a trade-off between defense and welfare spending is not strong. Similarly, allegations of stagnant capitalist economies, congressional log-rolling, and corporate dependence on government defense contracts have received little empirical support as either the motivation for or the consequence of heavy military expenditures.[6]

Given this proliferation of the literature, it seems appropriate to pause and assess what we already have learned and to ask what we still need to know. This essay focuses on one segment of the literature; specifically, those empirical studies that examine the impact of defense spending on economic performance.[7] The evidence amassed to date is

[3] Some of the relevant studies are Miroslav Nincic, "Capital, Labor, and the Spoils of War," *Journal of Peace Research* 17 (1980), pp. 103-17; Nincic and Thomas R. Cusack, "The Political Economy of U.S. Military Spending," *Journal of Peace Research* 16 (1979), pp. 101-15; Stephen Cobb, "The United States Senate and the Impact of Defense Spending Concentrations," in Steven Rosen, ed., *Testing the Theory of the Military-Industrial Complex* (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1973), pp. 197-223; id., "Defense Spending and Foreign Policy in the House of Representatives," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 13, September 1969, pp. 358-69; Wayne Moyer, "House Voting on Defense: An Ideological Explanation," in Bruce M. Russett and Alfred Stepan, eds., *Military Force and American Society* (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), pp. 106-41; and Russett, *What Price Vigilance?* chapter 3.

[4] One particularly pertinent study is by Thomas R. Cusack and Michael Don Ward, "Military Spending in the United States, Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 25, September 1981, pp. 429-69.

[5] For some representative studies, see Gert Krell, "Capitalism and Armaments: Business Cycles and Defense Spending in the United States, 1945-1979," *Journal of Peace Research* 18 (1981), pp. 221-40; Charles W. Ostrom, Jr., "A Reactive Linkage Model of the U.S. Defense Expenditure Policy-Making Process," *American Political Science Review* 72, September 1978, pp. 941-57; and Hans Rattinger, "Armaments, Detente, and Bureaucracy: The Case of Arms Race in Europe," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 19, December 1975, pp. 571-95.

[6] See especially Krell, "Capitalism and Armaments"; Ron P. Smith, "Military Expenditure and Capitalism," *Cambridge Journal of Economics* 2 (1977), pp. 61-76; Morton H. Halperin, Jacob A. Stockfisch, and Murray L. Weidenbaum, *The Political Economy of the Military-Industrial Complex* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973); Steven Rosen, ed., *Testing the Theory of the Military-Industrial Complex* (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1973); Albert Szymanski, "Military Spending and Economic Stagnation," *American Journal of Sociology* 79, July 1973, pp. 1-14; Samuel C. Sarkesian, ed., *The Military-Industrial Complex: A Reassessment* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1972); and Russett, *What Price Vigilance?* chapter 3.

[7] I have purposefully excluded those studies that attempt to infer policy motives from observed spending behavior. The challenge to empirical analysis and inference is even more formidable for work in this area than for studies that "merely" try to assess the economic impact of defense spending. The imputed motives of policy makers (e.g., to stimulate a sagging economy, to boost their re-election chances), even if correct, need not necessarily be supported by the available evidence on their actual policy behavior or on the actual policy results. In other words, officials may not be able to carry out their intended or desired policies, and the actual outcomes obtained by their policies may fall short of their expectations or hopes. Conversely, even if the imputed motives were to be corroborated by actual policy behavior or results, this correspondence is likely to provide only a necessary but not sufficient condition for hypothesis confirmation, because the observed behavior or results may also be compatible with several alternative plausible explanations. In defense as well as other policy areas, decision making is often characterized by unclear policy preferences, uncertain solutions to problems, and fluid partici-

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"as likely to bewilder as it is to enlighten," as two analysts have recently remarked.[8] My purpose is therefore to summarize and interpret this evidence, to discuss some problems with prior research (including my own), and to suggest several issues for further investigation. The accomplishments and frustrations of previous analysts offer a foundation for developing an agenda for future research.

Some Sources of Disagreement

Differences of opinion about empirical phenomena often derive from, reflect, and provide the vehicle for staking out differences in epistemology, methodology, ideology, and even the sociology of a discipline. The research on the relationship between military expenditures and economic performance is no exception. Although numerous studies have suggested that defense spending can and does have an impact on economic performance, there is no consensus about the actual existence and nature of such an impact. Some scholars have also questioned the suitability of common statistical methodology, and the feasibility of obtaining valid and robust generalizations for a large number of countries or time points.

For example, Stephanie Neuman argued that "despite the volume of writing on the subject, we still do not know whether there is a causal relationship between military expenditures and development, much less what that relationship is."[9] In a similar vein, Gavin Kennedy observed that, for the less developed countries during the 1960s, "there [was] no obvious relationship between growth rates and percentage allocated to defence."[10] He argued instead that the relationship between military expenditures and economic growth will "depend upon circumstances," and will "not follow some general law applicable to all times and

pation by various actors. Described as "organized anarchy" by some analysts, decision making in such a context will involve a great deal of serendipity, confusion, trade-offs among competing goals, over- or underreaction to perceived problems, and mutual partisan adjustment. Consequently, rational-actor explanations, with their assumption of a unitary and purposeful actor in the single-minded pursuit of some clearly ranked goals, are apt to mislead. For a discussion of "organized anarchy" and the related "garbage can" model of decision making, see Michael D. Cohen, James G. March, and Johan P. Olsen, "A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice," *Administrative Science Quarterly* 17, March 1972, pp. 1-25.

[8] Karen A. Rasler and William R. Thompson, "Longitudinal Change in Defense Burdens, Capital Formation and Economic Growth," paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Atlanta, March 1984, pp. 1-2.

[9] Stephanie Neuman, "In Reply," ORBIS, Summer 1979, p. 478. See also her "Security, Military Expenditures and Socioeconomic Development: Reflections on Iran," ORBIS, Fall 1978, pp. 569-94; and the reaction from Dan Smith and Ron Smith, "Reflections on Neuman," ORBIS, Summer 1979, pp. 471-77.

[10] Gavin Kennedy, *The Military in the Third World* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1974), p. 180.

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places."[11] These scholars as well as others (e.g., Mary Kaldor)[12] are skeptical of what Neuman saw as "the field's obsessive focus on macrostatistical analyses,"[13] and favor more in-depth, country-specific case studies.

Most quantitative analysts are not insensitive to the validity of these observations and, more generally, to the need for developing more valid data and for conducting more discriminating analysis. Two of them commented that "if there can be any single conclusion about the effects of military expenditure on the economy, it must be that it depends on the nature of the expenditure, the prevailing circumstances, and the concurrent government policies."[14] However, problems such as the availability and quality of data on military spending or on economic performance, the sensitivity of the research design to cross-national and over-time variations, and the biases created by the author's ideology, are as pertinent to statistical studies as they are to nonstatistical studies.[15] Nor is in-depth, country-specific analysis in any sense incompatible with quantitative methods, as shown recently by some well-informed applications of sophisticated statistical tools to the study of the economic impact of military expenditures.[16] Thus, for these analytic issues, the division between statistical and nonstatistical studies appears to be a false dichotomy.

Nevertheless, because statistical studies tend to be more explicit than nonstatistical studies in their problem formulation and data treatment, variations in their results also tend to be more noticeable. These variations are due partially to the different data and methods used. For instance, Saadet Deger and Ron Smith found that the estimates of defense outlays made by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) and by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) can produce significantly different results.[17] For African countries, the negative impact of military expenditures on economic growth was about four times greater according to the ACDA data than according to

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[11] Ibid., p. 189. See also his *The Economics of Defence* (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1975); id., *Defense Economics* (London: Duckworth, 1983).

[12] Mary Kaldor, "The Military in Development," *World Development* 4, June 1976, pp. 459-82.

[13] Neuman, "Security, Military Expenditures and Socioeconomic Development," p. 571.

[14] Ron Smith and George Georgiou, "Assessing the Effect of Military Expenditure on OECD Economies: A Survey," *Arms Control* 4, May 1983, p. 15.

[15] For discussions of these and related issues, see Neuman, "Security, Military Expenditures and Socioeconomic Development"; and Michael Brzoska, "The Reporting of Military Expenditures," *Journal of Peace Research* 18 (1981), pp. 261-75.

[16] For example, see Rasler and Thompson, "Longitudinal Change in Defense Burdens, Capital Formation and Economic Growth"; Harvey Starr, Francis W. Hoole, Jeffrey A. Hart, and John R. Freeman, "The Relationship Between Defense Spending and Inflation," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 26, March 1984, pp. 103-22; and Ron P. Smith, "Military Expenditure and Investment in OECD Countries, 1954-1973," *Journal of Comparative Economics* 4, March 1980, pp. 19-32.

[17] Saadet Deger and Ron Smith, "Military Expenditure and Growth in Less Developed Countries," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 27, June 1983, pp. 347-48.

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the SIPRI data. For Latin American countries, the ACDA data suggested that these expenditures had a negative effect on economic growth, but the SIPRI data suggested a positive effect. Unfortunately, such discrepancies among the more popular data sets are not uncommon and have been demonstrated by other analysts.[18]

Contributing to the varying results of some quantitative studies are the small and different samples of countries used and the presence of outlying cases in these samples. For example, in an analysis based on a sample of eight advanced economies, Ron Smith found a positive correlation between defense burden and unemployment level.[19] However, after more countries were added to this sample, this statistical association disappeared.[20] Just as in the case of other measures of economic performance such as the rates of investment, inflation, and economic growth, the relationship between defense spending and unemployment among the developed countries tends to be affected by a few outliers — the United States and the United Kingdom usually at the one extreme, and Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany at the other. This feature of the data distribution also seems to distort the results for the developing countries.[21]

Third, cross-sectional and longitudinal research designs have tended to produce different results.[22] Among the advanced economies, intercountry comparisons appear to suggest that high military expenditures have curtailed productivity growth, whereas analyses of individual countries over time do not support this view.[23] The results based on cross-sectional designs are less trustworthy, as this approach is inherently limited in its ability to inform us about causal relationships. To tackle questions such as the impact of military spending on economic performance, we need dynamic analysis to determine temporal leads and lags, the reciprocal influences among the variables, and the over-time changes in the empirical parameters.

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[18] See, for example, Brzoska, "The Reporting of Military Expenditures"; and Cusack and Ward, "Military Spending in the United States, Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China."

[19] Smith, "Military Expenditure and Capitalism."

[20] See Eric Chester, "Military Spending and Capitalist Stability," *Cambridge Journal of Economics* (1978), pp. 293-98; and Ron Smith's reply, "Military Expenditure and Capitalism: A Reply," ibid., pp. 299-304. See also the other article in this debate by Keith Hartley and Pat McLean, "Military Expenditure and Capitalism: A Comment," ibid., pp. 287-92.

[21] Farid Abolfathi, "Arms Expenditures and Economic Growth: Is There A Linkage?" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Peace Science Society (International), southern section, Columbia, S.C., April 1979.

[22] Adne Cappelen, Nils Petter Gleditsch, and Olav Bjerkholt, "Military Spending and Economic Growth in the OECD Countries," *Journal of Peace Research* 21 (1984), pp. 361-73; and Lance Taylor, "Military Economics in the Third World," The Massachusetts Institute of Technology, mimeograph, 1981.

[23] Congressional Budget Office, *Defense Spending and the Economy* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1983), pp. 38-39.

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There is also no denying that ideology has played a part in the debate about the economic impact of defense spending. Neuman was surely right in observing that "research on the issue of security and development has been grounded in the ideological assumptions of the authors."[24] There is no shortage of studies designed to support or refute Marxist or *dependencia* perspectives. Similarly, numerous examples in the tradition of "the military as modernizers" can be cited. Yet, it is difficult to imagine how any social science theory or inquiry can be totally value-neutral in conception or implication.[25] While not calling for a total divorce from ideological premises, good social science requires an openness in revealing them, so that others can take these premises into account in evaluating the work.

Differences in epistemology, methodology, and ideology are sometimes reflected in the sociology of a discipline, such as the division between the quantitatively oriented and the case study-oriented researchers; the generational division, sometimes reflecting differences in graduate training and political views; and the national origin of researchers and the scholarly or policy community they address. Although some of these divisions are shifting and becoming increasingly blurred, it would be naive not to recognize that many researchers have advocated particular policies by their governments or international organizations, or have worked for or with governmental or nongovernmental agencies (e.g., ACDA, SIPRI, the U.N. Expert Group on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development). To the extent that the professional status of analysts is affected by the rise and fall in the political popularity of particular movements, policies, or governments (e.g., nuclear freeze, foreign arms sales, countries of one's specialization), they may indeed not be the most objective judges of the wisdom, effectiveness, and importance of these movements, policies, or governments. The potential for hidden biases is especially great when the choices of particular data, methodology, and substantive interpretation are not without implication for the analysts' continued access to, and recognition by, the pertinent professional reference groups or governmental agencies.

Decomposing the Problem

Thus, it is no surprise, given the diversity of research perspectives and approaches, that the literature offers no clear and simple

[24] Neuman, "Security, Military Expenditures and Socioeconomic Development," p. 583.

[25] Indeed, the core concern of social science research is about the persistence, change, and allocation of values, defined broadly to include resources, status, prestige, time and, of course, policy attention. For a discussion on the issue of ideology, see the exchange between Neuman and Smith and Smith cited in footnote 9, and the exchange between Kaldor, "The Military in Development"; and Alice H. Amsden, "Kaldor's 'The Military in Development' — A Comment," *World Development* 5 (1977), pp. 753-61.

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answer to the question: Does defense spending have an impact on economic performance? Depending on the researcher, the answer could be yes, maybe, or no, with different degrees of confidence. There is also considerable disagreement about the nature of this impact, if it exists. Suggesting a reciprocal relationship between military outlays and economic performance, some analysts feel that just as current defense spending can affect future economic performance, current or expected economic conditions can influence governmental decisions about how much to spend on defense. Again, views differ about the nature of this causal relationship. Proponents of the underconsumption theory of defense spending contend that deteriorating economic conditions prompt the elites of advanced capitalist countries to increase military outlays as a way to absorb surplus capital and stimulate demand. On the other hand, more mundane interpretations incline other analysts to observe that economic growth (as well as inflation and more effective revenue collection by the government) boosts the spending levels of all government programs, including the defense budget. The following discussion will concentrate on the economic consequences of military expenditures, as opposed to the motivations or conditions for these expenditures. A sense of the diversity of opinions about these consequences can be gained from a survey of some analysts.

According to Ron Smith, "the balance of the evidence does seem to be that [military expenditure] reduces growth."[26] On the other hand, Emile Benoit stated that "the evidence pointed strongly to the conclusion that, whether or not defense activities [i.e., spending] had had a *favorable* net effect on growth in the sample countries [developing countries during the 1950s and 1960s], they had certainly *not* had an *un*favorable one" (emphases in the original).[27] Similarly, whereas Mary Kaldor claimed that "there appears to be a strong association between high military spending, high rates of industrial growth, and foreign dependence,"[28] Alice Amsden voiced the objection that "certainly the most elementary statistical analysis of the data . . . on military burden (1972) and rates of growth in GNP *per capita* (average for 1963-1973) does not reveal *any* positive association between the two variables, strong or otherwise" (emphases in the original).[29] Still another participant in this debate, Stephanie Neuman, argued in 1978:

[26] Ron P. Smith, "Military Expenditure and Capitalism: A Reply," p. 304.

[27] Emile Benoit, *Defense and Economic Growth in Developing Countries* (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1973), p. xx. See also his "Growth and Defense in Developing Countries," *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 26, January 1978, pp. 271-80, "Growth Effects of Defense in Developing Countries," *International Development Review* 1972, pp. 2-10, and "A Rejoinder to Professor Dorfman's Comment," ibid., pp. 12-14.

[28] Kaldor, "The Military in Development," p. 475.

[29] Amsden, "Kaldor's 'The Military in Development' — A Comment," p. 757.

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There is as little evidence available to support the conclusion that military expenditures have negative consequences as there is for the opposite position. Although the observed rise in military expenditures is used to explain militarism, economic stagnation, instability, war, dependence and a slower rate of economic growth, it must be pointed out that no empirical relationship between the variables has as yet been established.[30]

As these divergent assessments — made before some of the more recent studies — suggest, we need to decompose the research problem into separate questions and ask: (1) What kind of impact? (2) How does this impact occur? (3) The impact of what (measures of defense burden) on what (measures of economic performance)? (4) When is this impact more likely to be felt? (5) Which countries are more likely to experience this impact? (6) What are the opportunity costs of this impact? (7) Which domestic groups and areas are more likely to benefit or to be hurt by this impact? and (8) What are the policy implications of this impact?

As this list implies, the theoretical possibility of an impact of military expenditures on economic performance is not generally contested. Rather, the debate revolves around when, how, for whom, and in what direction and magnitude this impact is likely to be actually felt, and whether it can be mitigated or compounded by government policies and socioeconomic conditions. The focus here will be on the first five questions on the list, as question six has been dealt with more fully by another area of the literature on the trade-offs between defense and welfare expenditures, and as question seven requires a more solid empirical understanding of the problem than we currently possess.

What Kind of Impact?

We are concerned in this regard with the direction (positive versus negative), magnitude (large versus small), timing (short-term versus long-term), and statistical significance of the hypothesized impact of defense spending on economic performance. Some aspects of these concerns, such as the difference between the immediate consequences of a one-time boost in military expenditures as opposed to the cumulative effects of persistently high levels of military expenditures, are related to the other issues to be discussed later.

Whether we use the term "impact," "consequence," or "effect," the analytic challenge is to arrive at valid causal inference: Whether and how a change in defense spending causes a change in economic performance. As noted above, many studies have employed a cross-

[30] Neuman, "Security, Military Expenditures and Socioeconomic Development," p. 583.

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sectional design that is not very effective for establishing cause and effect relationships. To illustrate, if one finds that military spending is positively correlated with economic growth, in itself this result cannot tell us whether economic prosperity produces increased defense outlays or vice versa. One also cannot be sure whether and how much of the observed change in economic growth should be attributed to the current level of defense outlays, as opposed to the lagged influence of past levels or changes in these outlays. Accordingly, cross-sectional analyses are less satisfactory and more problematic than longitudinal analyses.

One of the better-known cross-sectional studies was undertaken by Emile Benoit.[31] It focused on forty-four developing countries during two overlapping time periods, 1950-1965 (the A series) and 1960-1965 (the C series). After controlling for the effects of investment and bilateral economic assistance, Benoit's shorter C series showed a significant positive relationship between defense spending as a percentage of GNP and the growth rate of the civilian GNP. His longer A series failed to show a similar positive relationship. Because he did not find a positive relationship between defense burden and per capita GNP or between rises in the defense burden and rises in government revenues (as a percentage of national income), in Benoit's view the positive correlation in the C series indicated that higher military expenditures were more likely to be the cause rather than the effect of faster economic growth. His actual conclusion, however, was stated in rather cautious and tentative terms:

> We have been unable to establish whether the net growth effects of defense expenditures have been positive or not. On the basis of all the evidence we suspect that they have been positive, for the countries in our sample, and at past levels of defense burden, but we have not been able to prove this. Heavy defense expenditure does not, however, appear to have been associated with *lower* growth rates, even after adjusting for differences in foreign aid receipts and investment rates; and this, in itself, is something surprising (emphasis in the original).[32]

Nevertheless, Benoit's general discussion gives the impression that he viewed higher military spending as having had a net positive impact on the economies of the developing countries. His study has attracted substantial attention in the form of critiques and attempts at empirical validation.[33] The short temporal coverage of Benoit's C series,

[31] Benoit, *Defense and Economic Growth in Developing Countries;* as well as his other articles cited in footnote 27.

[32] Benoit, *Defense and Economic Growth in Developing Countries,* p. 4.

[33] In chronological order, these reactions to Benoit's study are Robert Dorfman, "A Comment on Professor Benoit's 'Conundrum,' " *International Development Review* 14 (1972), pp. 10-12; Everett E. Hagan, "An Observation on the Benoit and Dorfman Analyses," ibid., pp. 14-15; Kaldor, "The Military in Development"; Michael Brzoska and Herbert Wulf, "Rejoinder to Benoit's 'Growth and Defense in Developing Countries' — Misleading Results and Questionable Methods," University of Hamburg,

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and the discrepancy between the results based on this series and the longer A series, have caused concern among some critics. Another criticism has been that Benoit's data and analysis cannot discriminate between the short- and long-run effects of defense spending. In the view of one critic, "there is no evidence that the short-run defense burden influences the short-run rate of economic growth independently of the effects of long-run investment and long-run foreign resources."[34] Other analysts have objected to Benoit's use of bilateral foreign economic aid as a control variable. For example, Nicole Ball argued that Benoit should have employed a broader measure for the receipt of foreign resources, so that multilateral aid, foreign private investment, and foreign military aid and transfer payments would also be included.[35] The positive relationship found by Benoit between defense burden and economic growth could be spurious, because economic growth could be caused instead by the inflow of all sorts of foreign resources in the aggregate. There has also been considerable skepticism regarding Benoit's explanation that rising military expenditures stimulate private demand and encourage fuller utilization of existing production facilities in the developing countries. Several critics have argued that the main problem facing these countries is not inadequate demand and underutilized capacity, but the severe production bottlenecks in precisely those industrial sectors that will be further strained to cope with additional defense demands. Finally, several analysts have also objected to Benoit's functional specification of the analytic model and his measure of defense burden.[36]

Although the studies that attempt to verify Benoit's results do not always agree among themselves, on balance they have not supported his conclusion. Some failed to find any strong and systematic relationship between defense spending and economic growth among the developing countries.[37] Others actually discovered a significant negative relationship between these variables either for all the developing countries in the

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mimeograph, 1979; Riccardo Faini, Patricia Arnez, and Lance Taylor, "Defense Spending, Economic Structure and Growth: Evidence Among Countries and Over Time," *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 32, April 1984, pp. 487-98; Dan Smith and Ron Smith, "Military Expenditure, Resources and Development," University of London, mimeograph, 1980; Nicole Ball, "Defense and Development: A Critique of the Benoit Study," in Helena Tuomi and Raimo Vayrynen, eds., *Militarization and Arms Production* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), pp. 39-56; Ron Huisken, "Armaments and Development," in ibid., pp. 3-25; David Lim, "Another Look At Growth and Defense in Less Developed Countries," *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 31, January 1983, pp. 377-84; and Deger and Smith, "Military Expenditure and Growth in Less Developed Countries." Benoit's studies and his response to some critics are cited in footnote 27.

[34] Dorfman, "A Comment on Professor Benoit's 'Conundrum,' " p. 11.

[35] Ball, "Defence and Development."

[36] See, for example, Lim, "Another Look At Growth and Defense in Less Developed Countries"; and Faini, Arnez, and Taylor, "Defense Spending, Economic Structure and Growth."

[37] For example, Smith and Smith, "Military Expenditure, Resources and Development."

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sample or at least for some subsets of these countries.[38] While some analyses found a positive relationship for several countries such as the Middle Eastern oil exporters, this phenomenon was more the exception than the rule. None of the validating studies would support Benoit's observation that this is a widespread phenomenon among developing countries. On the other hand, the evidence in support of a negative relationship between defense spending and economic growth usually indicates a rather modest (albeit statistically significant) trade-off, and sometimes is derived from very small samples of subsets of the developing countries. Given the different ways that the analysts have measured defense burden, it is difficult to judge whether the observed trade-off is due to the annual fluctuations of defense spending or to its cumulative size over a period of time.

Compared with the research results on the developing countries, the evidence is clearer for the advanced Western economies. The results for these developed countries are also more trustworthy, because they are based on more reliable data and often on the more valid approach of time series analysis. As for the developing countries, the results suggest substantial cross-national and over-time variations in the relationship between defense spending and economic performance. In general, they do not support the view that defense spending encourages or facilitates sustained economic growth, but there are exceptions, such as when the pent-up demand and the expansion of production capacity during wartime result in a postwar economic boom. Also, in the short run military expenditures can stimulate demand and boost employment. In the long run, however, these expenditures are more apt to have a negative than a positive impact on investment, inflation, employment, balance of payments, industrial productivity, and economic growth. The evidence on the United States, the country that has attracted the most research attention, indicates especially significant costs in these regards.[39] For this

[38] For example, Lim, "Another Look At Growth and Defense in Less Developed Countries"; Deger and Smith, "Military Expenditure and Growth in Less Developed Countries"; and P. C. Frederiksen and Robert E. Looney, "Defense Expenditures and Economic Growth in Developing Countries," *Armed Forces and Society* 9, Summer 1983, pp. 633-45. For several studies on the developing countries that are unrelated to Benoit's analysis, see Fred M. Gottheil, "An Economic Assessment of the Military Burden in the Middle East," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 18, September 1974, pp. 502-13; Hossein Askari and Vittorio Corbo, "Economic Implications of Military Expenditures in the Middle East," *Journal of Peace Research* 11 (1974), pp. 341-43; and R. D. McKinlay and A. S. Cohan, "The Economic Performance of Military Regimes: A Cross-National Aggregate Study," *British Journal of Political Science* 6, July 1976, pp. 291-310.

[39] See Robert W. deGrasse, Jr., *Military Expansion and Economic Decline: The Impact of Military Spending on U.S. Economic Performance* (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe); Lloyd J. Dumas, "Economic Conversion, Productive Efficiency and Social Welfare," *Peace Research Review* 7 (1977), pp. 17-52; Clark Nardinelli and Gary B. Ackerman, "Defense Expenditures and the Survival of American Capitalism: A Note," *Armed Forces and Society* 3, November 1976, pp. 13-16; Kurt W. Rothschild, "Military Expenditure, Exports and Growth," *Kyklos* 26 (1973), pp. 804-814; Jong Ryool Lee, "Changing National Priorities in the United States," in Bruce M. Russett and Alfred Stepan, eds., *Military Force and American*

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as well as the other developed Western countries, heavy defense spending seems to have a particularly important impact in dampening capital formation and investment, which in turn reduces economic growth in the long run.[40]

The distinction between the short-run and the long-run impact of defense spending points to a major deficiency in the current literature. In some research using the cross-sectional approach, this distinction is ignored by using a country's average rate of economic growth over the several years in the sample. In longitudinal analyses, it is commonly assumed that defense spending will only have a rather immediate effect on economic performance. This assumption leads to the practice of correlating the observed values of these two variables in the same year, or with only a one-year lag. Yet, much of the impact of defense spending on the economy tends to be indirect and is apt to involve substantial time lags. The more important long-run negative effects of this spending can be concealed by its possible positive effects in the short run, if we use relatively short temporal units of observation.

Indeed, given the customary preference of officials to finance defense and war by running budget deficits rather than by cutting other programs or raising taxes,[41] much of the cost of this spending is shifted to future generations. Mounting public debts and future governmental obligations (e.g., pension and other financial support for war veterans and their dependents) are only the most visible part of these postponed costs. The displacement of civilian research and development by military needs imposes another kind of cost on future productivity. It would be naive to expect this displacement to have an immediate negative impact on a country's industrial efficiency and trade competitiveness in the world market. Rather, it would require a chronic underemphasis of civilian research and development to have such an impact. Moreover, this impact need not be constant over time, and is instead likely to involve cumulative and rising economic costs. In other words, there may very well be a threshold beyond which insufficient resource allocation to advance ci-

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Society (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), pp. 61-105; Szymanski, "Military Spending and Economic Stagnation"; and Russett, *What Price Vigilance?* Defense spending, however, has not been the main cause of high U.S. inflation. See Starr, Hoole, Hart, and Freeman, "The Relationship Between Defense Spending and Inflation"; and Kenneth E. Boulding, "The War Industry," *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science* 33 (1979), pp. 91-100. Although not mainly concerned with the economic effects of defense spending, two other useful studies on the United States are Arthur A. Stein, *The Nation at War* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980); and Lawrence J. Korb, *The FY 1981-1985 Defense Program: Issues and Trends* (Washington, D.C.: AEI, 1980).

[40] Rasler and Thompson, "Longitudinal Change in Defense Burdens, Capital Formation and Economic Growth"; and Smith, "Military Expenditure and Investment in OECD Countries, 1954-1973."

[41] Earl J. Hamilton, "The Role of War in Modern Inflation," *Journal of Economic History* 37, March 1977, pp. 13-19. For an estimate of the total monetary cost of the Vietnam War to the U.S. taxpayers, see Tom Riddell, "The $676 Billion Quagmire," *The Progressive* 37, October 1973, pp. 33-37.

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vilian technologies begins to exact an economic toll, and this toll will accelerate over time. And, just as it takes time for this toll to be manifest (such as in increasingly unfavorable balance of payments), it will take time to decelerate and reverse it.

To take another example, the prices of goods and services have a habit of accelerating and decelerating. People are more likely to develop inflationary expectations and adjust their consumption and saving behavior accordingly after a period of chronic and general price surges (as opposed to episodic and isolated price rises). Once entrenched, it would be more difficult for a government to dispel these expectations. The consumers' and the producers' inflationary psychology would in turn further increase the tempo of price rises, thus creating a self-fulfilling prophecy. In general, the research to date has not tried, and is not equipped, to capture or clarify such processes. Yet, as already mentioned, it seems quite unrealistic to expect that the economic impact of military expenditures will be conveniently restricted to the annual units of observation commonly used by the analysts, or that the nature and size of this impact will remain stable over time.[42]

How Does This Impact Occur?

In this regard, we need to distinguish between the first-order and second-order effects of military spending. As noted, the immediate direct impact of a rise in this spending is likely to be higher demand, production, and employment. These favorable effects, however, tend to be offset significantly by the indirect effects of military expenditures in reducing private saving and investment, which will hurt productivity and growth in the long run. Therefore, both the direct and indirect effects of these expenditures must be considered in a net assessment of their economic impact.

At the risk of some oversimplification, there are four main perspectives on this assessment. The first, the "modernization" model, is most closely associated with Benoit's research. In his discussion, Benoit acknowledged that military expenditures can have three unfavorable consequences: (1) income shift (increased military spending necessarily reduces the civilian domestic product); (2) productivity effect (compared with the civilian sector, the government sector is characterized by slower productivity increase); and (3) investment effect (military spending crowds out civilian investment). However, given his finding of a positive rela-

[42] See Rasler and Thompson, "Longitudinal Change in Defense Burdens, Capital Formation and Economic Growth"; and Nardinelli and Ackerman, "Defense Expenditures and the Survival of American Capitalism."

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tionship between defense burden and economic growth among the developing countries in his sample, Benoit stressed some compensating favorable factors: (1) the military helps to introduce the people of these countries to modern skills and attitudes; (2) the military's capital expenditures (e.g., for roads, bridges, airports) have alternative civilian values and help to strengthen a country's economic infrastructure; and (3) defense spending leads to mild inflation which in turn encourages fuller utilization of the existing production facilities. In Benoit's view, these indirect positive effects of defense spending outweigh its direct or indirect negative effects on economic growth. He also suggested that the military outlays of the developing countries are often tied to and subsidized, to some extent, by economic aid from their allies.

The second perspective, the "capital formation" model, stresses the importance of private investment as the primary determinant of future economic growth. To the extent that increased defense spending entails higher taxes or government borrowing in the capital markets, it absorbs funds that would otherwise have gone at least partly to investment. The cost-push inflation that this spending abets also encourages a mass psychology in favor of immediate consumption and against saving. This perspective led Deger and Smith to criticize Benoit for giving too much weight to the resource mobilization and modernization effects of defense spending, and for not giving enough emphasis to its negative effects on capital formation. On the basis of an analysis of fifty developing countries during 1965-1973, they concluded that "the negative effect of military expenditures on saving (and investment) outweighs the positive modernization and technological effect on the growth rate."[43] Smith's other studies on the developed Western economies also led him to suggest that there was roughly a one-to-one trade-off between a country's military expenditures and its total investment.[44] A recent study by Rasler and Thompson, however, shows that this trade-off tends to vary substantially for different countries and time periods.[45] A statistically significant trade-off had not existed for the United Kingdom, Japan, France, and West Germany in the post-World War II era, whereas such a trade-off was present for the United Kingdom during the period before 1945 and for the United States for periods both before and after that year. More re-

[43] Deger and Smith, "Military Expenditure and Growth in Less Developed Countries," p. 346.

[44] Smith, "Military Expenditure and Investment in OECD Countries, 1954-1973"; "Military Expenditure and Capitalism: A Reply"; and id., "Military Expenditure and Capitalism." Several other studies touching on the same general topic of the relationship between defense spending and economic investment are Pryor, *Public Expenditure in Communist and Capitalist Countries;* Steve Chan, "Defense Spending and Economic Performance: Correlates Among the OECD Countries," paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Atlanta, March 1984; and Julius E. Nyangoro, "Military Expenditure and Economic Performance in African Countries," paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Atlanta, March 1984.

[45] Rasler and Thompson, "Longitudinal Change in Defense Burdens, Capital Formation and Economic Growth."

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search is needed to investigate the reasons for these cross-national and over-time variations. We also need to learn more about the temporal lags between increased defense spending and reduced investment, and between reduced investment and economic slowdown. In explaining the discrepancies between their cross-sectional and time series analyses, Smith and Georgiou properly observed that "the effect of military expenditure on growth through investment and capital formation is likely to be a long run one and so not picked up by the short lags used in [their] time series analysis."[46]

A third perspective on the chain of causality leading from defense spending to economic stagnation is offered by the "balance of payment" model, or the export-led model of growth. It points to the negative economic effects of a chronic and serious displacement of capital and talent from the most dynamic sectors of civilian production to military production. Among the OECD countries, those most adept in taking advantage of the rapidly expanding export opportunities have had the fastest economic growth.[47] Furthermore, as capital spending for defense tends to be concentrated precisely in the more important export sectors such as machinery and transport (and, more recently, electronics), it is not surprising that it reduces the available goods for export. Slower export growth in turn causes slower economic growth, further reducing a country's trade competitiveness. It appears that even after considering the large quantities of arms exports sold by the heavy defense spenders, the overall balance of payments position of these countries (including their significant military outlays abroad) still remains quite unfavorable.[48] Rising imports and falling exports in part explain the historical weakening of the U.S. dollar and the British pound, and the phenomenon of persistently high unemployment levels in these countries even in face of relatively robust consumer demand.[49] As for the smaller developed countries, their military expenditures tend to be more import-demanding than other forms of public spending and, thus, again contribute more to their unfavorable balance of payments. However, a recent study of seventeen OECD countries has reported that these expenditures have a large positive effect on manufacturing output, although they also have a large negative effect on the investment rate.[50] Their resulting net impact on economic growth is negative (except for the Mediterranean members of the OECD).

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[46] Smith and Georgiou, "Assessing the Effect of Military Expenditure on OECD Economies," p. 13.

[47] Rothschild, "Military Expenditure, Exports and Growth."

[48] Smith, "Military Expenditure and Capitalism: A Reply"; Chester, "Military Spending and Capitalist Stability"; and Dumas, "Economic Conversion, Productive Efficiency and Social Welfare."

[49] Dumas, "Economic Conversion, Productive Efficiency and Social Welfare."

[50] Cappelen, Gleditsch, and Bjerkholt, "Military Spending and Economic Growth in the OECD Countries."

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The fourth perspective, "technological displacement," stresses the significant amounts of material and human resources consumed by the modern weapons industries for research and development. The diversion of these resources from civilian to military purposes can have a detrimental long-run effect on a country's productivity and technological position. This effect is offset somewhat when knowledge and technologies derived originally from military research are adapted for civilian uses. Although many analysts have commented on the effects of technological displacement and of technological spillover due to military spending,[51] there has been, thus far, very little systematic research on these subjects.[52] In addition to the normal challenges to causal inference, this research faces the significant problem of disaggregating gross defense budgets into outlays for specific purposes, and national accounts into output for specific industries. It is also difficult to estimate the impact of a specific new technical application in terms of its social and commercial values, and the role of military research and development in contributing to its discovery. Inevitably, research in this area will also have to come to grips with "what if" questions, such as whether the technology in question would have been obtained more cheaply and sooner through spending directly on civilian research and development than indirectly on military research and development.

The studies discussed so far have focused on how military expenditures can indirectly influence economic growth through their effects on the modernization process, the availability of investment funds, the vitality of the manufacturing and especially the export industries, and the search for technology innovations. Other studies have examined the impact of military expenditures on two additional aspects of economic performance, inflation and employment.

Some writers have argued that defense spending raises demand without increasing supply, and that it does not contribute to the current or future standard of living.[53] Moreover, because more of this spending goes to the procurement of capital goods than do other forms of government spending, it is more inflationary. It is also less resistant to price and wage increases, as military procurement contracts in the United States at least have traditionally been negotiated on a cost-plus basis. Thus,

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[51] See, for example, Dumas, "Economic Conversion, Productive Efficiency and Social Welfare"; and Murray L. Weidenbaum, *The Economics of Peacetime Defense* (New York: Praeger, 1974).

[52] One recent effort in this area is by Goran Lindgren, "Military and Civilian Research and Development," paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Atlanta, March 1984. See also his assessment of the literature, "Armaments and Economic Performance," in "Industrialized Market Economies," *Journal of Peace Research* 21 (1984), pp. 375-87.

[53] See, for example, Dumas, "Economic Conversion, Productive Efficiency and Social Welfare."

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defense spending may be disproportionately a source of cost-push inflation.[54] And, as pointed out in a recent study by the Congressional Budget Office, "if price increases are much greater in defense than in nondefense, then a given increase in real spending directed to defense would cost more in current dollars, increase the deficit more, and thus face larger offsets than the same amount of real spending directed to nondefense."[55]

Finally, because officials are usually reluctant either to raise taxes or to cut back other spending in order to finance additional defense expenditures,[56] their resort to budget deficits and public debt tends to exacerbate further inflationary pressure. The research to date, however, does not allow us to attribute inflation solely to rising defense spending. The rising costs of the government's civilian programs are also a contributing cause. In the case of the United States, the civilian expenditures have been escalating much faster than the military expenditures in the post-World War II era.[57] The one major recent contribution to the literature indicates that different inflationary processes had been operating in the advanced Western economies, and that there can be reciprocal influences between defense spending and inflation for some countries.[58] This longitudinal study found no relationship between these two variables for the United States and the United Kingdom during 1956-1979, but it did find a relationship of mutual influence for France and West Germany.

Most analysts reject the notion that defense spending offers a solution to the problem of unemployment.[59] However, the available evidence is mainly based on cross-sectional analyses and tends to be quite unstable across different samples of countries and time periods. For example, Albert Szymanski's analysis of eighteen OECD countries during 1950-1968 led him to conclude that "apparently, military spending absorbs the unemployed but somehow hinders real economic growth."[60] But he somewhat modified this generalization by noting the existence of significant exceptions (e.g., Japan had low defense spending and low unemployment), and by suggesting that defense spending need not nec-

[54] Boulding, "The War Industry."

[55] Congressional Budget Office, *Defense Spending and the Economy*, p. 45.

[56] Hamilton, "The Role of War in Modern Inflation."

[57] James L. Clayton, "The Fiscal Limits of the Warfare and Welfare State: Defense and Welfare Spending in the United States since 1900," *Western Political Quarterly* 29, September 1976, pp 364-83.

[58] Starr, Hoole, Hart, and Freeman, "The Relationship Between Defense Spending and Inflation."

[59] See, for example, Weidenbaum, *The Economics of Peacetime Defense;* Boulding, "The War Industry"; and Smith, "Military Expenditure and Capitalism."

[60] Syzmanski, "Military Spending and Economic Stagnation." See also the various reactions to this attempt by Szymanski to test Baran and Sweezy's underconsumption theory of defense spending by the advanced capitalist economies, as well as Szymanski's response, in Maurice Zeitlin, "On 'Military Spending and Economic Stagnation,' " *American Journal of Sociology* 79, May 1974; pp. 1452-56; Paul Stevenson, "A Defense of Baran and Sweezy," ibid., pp. 1456-59; Samuel R. Friedman, "An Alternative Model to Szymanski," ibid., pp. 1459-62; and Szymanski, "A Reply to Friedman, Stevenson, and Zeitlin," ibid., pp. 1462-77.

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essarily reduce unemployment. Subsequent studies have shown that the relationship between defense spending and unemployment is susceptible to variations in the country sample, which is usually quite small and characterized by outliers such as the United Kingdom and Japan.[61]

In the case of the United States, disagreement persists on whether military spending is less effective than or just as effective as civilian forms of government spending in boosting employment.[62] Nevertheless, some of the direct positive effects of defense spending on employment can be offset by its indirect negative effects. This spending can result in higher government deficits and hence higher interest rates, which in turn reduce business investment and consumer demand.

Finally, given the nature of the existing research, it is difficult to separate the temporary employment effects of defense spending from its longer-term impact on structural unemployment (such as results from deterioration in a country's trade competitiveness). On balance, the cross-sectional evidence does not support the view that this spending reduces long-term unemployment. However, needed verification will come from the more valid longitudinal evidence from time series analysis.

The preceding remarks about research to date suggest several areas for further inquiry. Regarding Benoit's suggestion that defense spending could encourage fuller utilization of the existing production facilities, it is important first to determine whether a country is actually facing constraint on the demand side or on the supply side. If there is in fact a shortage in supply and not in demand, then the supposed benefits of defense spending can instead impose additional burdens on the economy. This spending would compound the existing production bottlenecks (especially in the key engineering and capital goods areas), and would thus result in slower rather than faster economic growth. We should, therefore, include the actual rate of capacity utilization as an explicit control variable in future research.

Whether or not an economy has spare capacity that can absorb additional demand is important for determining the likely inflationary impact of defense spending. To the extent that there is substantial current or anticipated economic slack, then inflationary pressure is less likely to develop. This consideration perhaps explains in part the recent finding that there had not been a significant relationship between defense spending and inflation for the United States and the United Kingdom, whereas these variables had correlated significantly for France and the Federal

[61] Smith, "Military Expenditure and Capitalism"; and id., "Military Expenditure and Capitalism: A Reply"; and Chester, "Military Spending and Capitalist Stability."

[62] See, for example, the Center for Defense Information estimates cited by Nincic and Cusack, "The Political Economy of U.S. Military Spending," p. 111; and the projection made by the Congressional Budget Office, *Defense Spending and the Economy*, p. 43.

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Republic of Germany.[63] The authors of this study also observed that the dominant positions enjoyed by the dollar and the pound could have enabled their respective nations to alleviate somewhat their domestic inflation. They could and did actually export their domestic inflation by running large balance of payments deficits. Thus, the international status of a country's currency suggests itself as another pertinent variable in future research. Another related question concerns flight capital. To the extent that the developed Western countries, especially the United States and Switzerland, have been the recipients of foreign capital seeking shelter from political and economic instability, they are in a better position to manage their domestic inflation.

The fiscal, monetary, and tax policies of different governments are also germane. Deficit spending will obviously create more intense inflationary pressure than the alternatives of raising taxes and cutting other types of government spending on civilian programs. Therefore, the relative size of public debts and budget deficits should again be introduced as possible indicators of the future inflationary impact of defense spending. Tax policies of governments also obviously affect people's incentives to consume, save, and invest. Whether defense spending is primarily financed at the expense of consumption or investment has a major influence on both future inflation and growth rates. To the extent that the bulk of this spending comes from foregone consumption rather than foregone investment, it will be less inflationary and less detrimental to future growth.

Finally, there are reciprocal influences between economic growth and the rate of capacity utilization on the one hand, and inflation and investment on the other hand. It has already been suggested that inflation can affect capacity utilization and investment can affect growth. Recent research indicates that we should also attend to the impact of growth on the rates of inflation and investment.[64] Influence relationships between these variables tend to operate in both directions.

As for the detrimental effect of defense spending on investment, the suggestion has been made previously by others that we need to control explicitly for the availability of foreign resources. The inflow of foreign aid and investment can offset somewhat the diversion of domestic funds from investment to military expenditures. As already mentioned, the inflow of foreign capital may be important even for developed countries like the United States. However, it is by no means clear that

[63] Starr, Hoole, Hart, and Freeman, "The Relationship Between Defense Spending and Inflation."

[64] For example, Rasler and Thompson built in their analytic model the influence that economic growth has had on investment rates; see their "Longitudinal Changes in Defense Burdens, Capital Formation and Economic Growth." Other analysts have recently used the Granger method to investigate the possible reciprocal influences between defense spending and economic performance; see Starr, Hoole, Hart, and Freeman, "The Relationship Between Defense Spending and Inflation"; and Smith and Georgiou, "Assessing the Effect of Military Expenditure on OECD Economies."

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foreign aid and foreign investment are necessarily conducive to the domestic development or even growth of the Third World countries.[65]

Finally, to the extent that military spending has a negative impact on the leading and most innovative sectors of the developed countries, it is necessary to develop an explicit formulation and cross-national measure of the concept of technological rent. This concept provides the critical intervening variable linking military spending to deteriorating trade competitiveness and lagging industrial productivity, as suggested by the export-led model of growth.

The Impact of What on What

So far, the discussion has proceeded as if the meanings of the terms "defense spending" and "economic impact" were self-evident and shared by all analysts. However, considerable ambiguity and doubt pervade both the conceptualization and measurement of the dependent and the independent variables. We have seen previously that the economic impact of defense spending need not be restricted simply to the economy's growth rates, although this has been the main concern of most analysts. Inquiries focusing on other measures of economic performance — inflation, investment, unemployment, and the productivity of leading industrial sectors — are worthwhile in their own right and help to illuminate the indirect consequences of defense spending on economic growth rates. Naturally, as many *dependencia* scholars have argued, faster economic growth does not necessarily mean development. In themselves, statistics on growth rates do not tell us about possible sectoral imbalances, the marginalization of native workers and industries, increasing income disparities between the rich and the poor, and changes in the welfare status of the people (e.g., pension income, housing, education, nutrition, health care, employment). In other words, growth figures do not inform us about the distribution of the gains and the costs of defense spending within the national economic unit. Yet, these gains and costs are unlikely to be equal for all social and economic groups. Consequently, to the extent that we are interested in the economic impact of defense spending on people rather than on national economies, we need to disaggregate the dependent variable in terms of measures that are more directly relevant to the lives of particular groups of people. Recent research on the possible trade-offs

[65] A good survey of the literature on the effects of foreign aid and investment on the economic development and growth of the developing countries is provided by Volker Bornschier, Christopher Chase-Dunn, and Richard Rubinson, "Cross-National Evidence of the Effects of Foreign Investment and Aid on Economic Growth and Inequality: A Survey of Findings and a Reanalysis," *American Sociological Review* 84, November 1978; pp. 15-38. A rather comprehensive compilation of the literature on the relationship between defense spending and economic development is provided by Nicole Ball, *The Military in the Development Process* (Claremont, Calif.: Regina Books, 1981).

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between a government's military and civilian expenditures [66] has already moved in this direction.

The conceptualization and measurement of the independent variable (defense spending) is no less problematic and controversial. The common practice is to divide a country's defense budget by its GNP or GDP.[67] The resulting percentage of GNP or GDP devoted to officially acknowledged defense activities is commonly referred to as that country's defense burden. It is not difficult to imagine alternative measures such as military outlays as a percentage of a central government's total budget and the number of military personnel as a percentage of a country's total population. Understandably, these alternative measures of defense burden do not always show the same relationships with economic performance.[68] Some countries may be "people poor, money rich," whereas others may be "money poor, people rich." For the latter countries, military recruitment may actually alleviate the level of civilian unemployment. Furthermore, if a country has a conscript rather than volunteer army, the military payscale may be lower than the civilian payscale, thus bringing down the military's personnel costs. Depending on a variety of factors (the nature of foreign threat, the human, technological, and economic endowments), different countries devote varying proportions of their defense budgets to payroll, procurement, operation, maintenance, and research and development. Finally, depending on the constitutional arrangements, state and local authorities may account for a large portion of total government expenditures. These authorities, for example, have accounted for about 40 percent of all public spending in the United States in the recent past. Their role would be ignored if we focus only on the spending by the federal government.

Although a moment's reflection suggests several other problems with all the above measures of defense burden, the focus here is on defense outlays as a percentage of GNP or GDP, as this is the most commonly used measure. First of all, there is a question of cross-national comparability. Is the expenditure of 5 percent of GNP on defense the same thing for the United States, Bulgaria, and Zambia? Here I am not referring only to the well-known and important problem of currency conversion in estimating defense expenditures cross-nationally, with the assumption that the Bulgarian and Zambian economies have an efficiency rate comparable to that of the United States.[69] I am also referring to the

[66] See, for example, Eichenberg, "The Expenditure and Revenue Effects of Defense Spending in the Federal Republic of Germany."

[67] For a detailed discussion of alternative definitions of military and social expenditures by the U.S. government, see Clayton, "The Fiscal Limits of Warfare-Welfare State."

[68] Chan, "Defense Spending and Economic Performance."

[69] See Brzoska, "The Reporting of Military Expenditures"; and Nyangoro, "Military Expenditure and Economic Performance in African Countries."

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need to introduce controls for the sheer size of the economy and for the existence of slack capacity. The same figure (5 percent) would imply a much heavier defense burden for Bulgaria and Zambia than for the United States, because the economies of Bulgaria and Zambia are much smaller in absolute size and have much less surplus production capacity (especially in the capital goods industries).

Second, defense spending must be disaggregated according to different purposes. The economic impact of the military's personnel costs is similar to that of the government's civilian programs of income transfer. These costs should be separated from other types of defense spending, to see exactly how military expenditures differ from other kinds of government expenditures. Much of the theoretical literature has centered on the effects of military procurement on the economy. If this is the main concern, we should focus on military procurement rather than on gross expenditures in all defense-related activities. As the research to date has not generally tried to distinguish among types of military spending, there is the possibility of distortion in our analytic results and interpretations. In the case of the United States, total personnel costs for the Pentagon had climbed rapidly over the past decade to the point of consuming about half its budget. Some of the consequences attributed to military spending (e.g., cost-push inflation, production shortages in the capital goods industries) are accounted for by the nonpersonnel part of the defense budget and not by the entire budget.

Third, the measure of total military spending as a percentage of GNP can be misleading. For the sake of illustration, assume that a country's military spending has remained constant at $1 billion for two years, but that its GNP has grown from $20 billion to $22 billion. In this example, though the actual amount of defense spending has not changed, the defense burden would drop from 5 percent in the first year to 4.5 percent in the second. More important, the decrease in defense burden could be misinterpreted as having caused the economic growth of 10 percent, when the growth was due entirely to extraneous factors.[70]

Thus, a change in the defense burden, as conventionally measured, can result from either a change in military spending (the numerator) or a change in the GNP (the denominator). This feature in turn raises another concern. The GNP variable can appear on both sides of a regression equation. It is commonly used as the denominator for military spending on the righthand (or "cause") side of the equation. It can also be used as the denominator on the lefthand (or "effect") side of the equation

[70] Measures using population size as a control have the same liability. The value of GNP per capita or of defense spending per capita can fall more as a result of an increase in population than as a result of a decrease in GNP or defense spending.

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for measuring, say, the investment rate. In this hypothetical case, an increase in GNP will naturally result in a lower defense burden and investment rate, whereas a decrease in GNP will produce a higher defense burden and investment rate. This situation can introduce a bias in favor of a positive correlation between defense burden and investment rate. Thus, for a country with constant levels of military expenditure and investment but an expanding economy, the over-time decline in its defense burden will be positively correlated with the over-time decline in its investment rate. It is also possible inadvertently to introduce the opposite bias as when GNP itself or some variant of it (e.g., GNP per capita) is used as an independent variable to explain the level of defense burden or as a dependent variable to explain the impact of defense burden. Under such circumstances, there is the danger of a built-in negative correlation because an increase in GNP on one side of the equation will necessarily mean a decrease in defense burden on the other side of the equation.

These concerns in turn point to another problematic area in the current research. Should we focus on the levels of defense burden and economic performance, or should we focus on the changes in these phenomena? If it makes more theoretical sense to use levels, should we adopt annual levels, or should we instead resort to average or cumulative (sum total) levels over several years? On the other hand, if changes ought to be used, should we adopt the absolute amounts of change (first differences) or the rates of change (deltas)? Depending on the choice, we can obtain differing analytic results. For example, there appear to be two quite distinct data patterns characterizing the OECD countries.[71] Whereas high levels of defense spending as a percentage of GNP tend to be negatively correlated with economic growth, high rates of increase in this spending tend to be positively correlated with economic growth. These patterns feature, respectively, the stagnant economies of the larger and more established OECD members with their relatively high but steady levels of defense spending on the one hand (e.g., the United States, the United Kingdom), and the smaller and newly industrializing OECD members with their relatively low but rapidly increasing defense spending on the other hand (e.g., Greece, Turkey).

Current research has most commonly employed the annual or average levels of military spending and economic performance. This practice seems to be unsatisfactory, as the theoretical discussions usually imply a concern with the economic effects of persistently high defense expenditures. Accordingly, some weighted form of moving averages or the sum total of defense expenditures over a certain number of years are

[71] Chan, "Defense Spending and Economic Performance."

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preferable to annual or average levels. If it is the cumulative costs of military spending — in terms of structural inflation, structural unemployment, the loss of comparative trade advantages, and the accustomed dependence of defense industries on government contracts — that ultimately concern us, then we should employ measures that can capture the cumulative size of this spending and of its effects.

On the other hand, if we are interested in the volatility of defense spending and especially in the economic effects of periodic swings in this spending, then measures such as first differences and deltas should be used. From the budgetary theories of incremental adjustment, there is sound reason to focus on the relative or absolute changes in the amount of defense expenditures rather than on the levels of these expenditures.[72]

In the final analysis, the choice of alternative measures needs to be decided in the context of an analyst's theory and research question. For example, it would be more appropriate to use first differences in time series analyses of individual countries, especially if the inquiry is concerned with the impact of specific changes in defense spending on such economic variables as inflation and unemployment. Conversely, in cross-national studies comparing economic growth and balance of payments, deltas should be the proper measures for the dependent variables, whereas the moving averages or cumulative stock of defense spending are more suitable for the independent variable.

When Is This Impact Most Likely to be Felt?

One aspect of the temporal problem has been noted in connection with the need to distinguish between the short-run and the long-run effects of military spending. Several other factors or processes for which time serves as a surrogate should be mentioned.

First and perhaps most obvious, whether the increases in military expenditures are made during periods when the economy is slack or is operating near full capacity should matter for the impact of these increases. As a recent study by the U.S. Congressional Budget Office argued, inflationary pressure is less likely if the economy is sluggish, with considerable surplus capacity in the capital goods industries to accommodate additional defense orders.[73] The stimulus provided by defense

[72] See the argument in Eichenberg, "The Expenditure and Revenue Effects of Defense Spending in the Federal Republic of Germany." For two other examples of research focusing on the changes in rather than the levels of military expenditures, see Faini, Arnez, and Taylor, "Defense Spending, Economic Structure and Growth"; and Rasler and Thompson, "Longitudinal Change in Defense Burdens, Capital Formation and Economic Growth."

[73] Congressional Budget Office, *Defense Spending and the Economy*. The same argument was made by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *Challenges for U.S. National Security: Defense Spending and the Economy* (New York: Carnegie Endowment, 1981).

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spending on consumer demand and employment through its multiplier effect is apt to be more positive (at least in the short run) under these conditions than when the economy is already overheated and experiencing production bottlenecks. As mentioned above, Benoit speculated that the positive correlation between military expenditures and economic growth for the developing countries existed in part because defense spending encouraged consumer demand, moderate inflation, and, consequently, fuller utilization of spare capacity. However, some doubts have been voiced about the validity of this speculation, as the economies of the developing countries are more often constrained by supply than by demand. To date, there has been no systematic attempt to control for the degree of capacity utilization in empirical research. Future research should account for this variable explicitly and should try to determine whether its importance has changed over time. The recent phenomenon of stagflation — high inflation, high unemployment, and relatively high aggregate demand — seems to suggest that economic slack may have become less important than declining trade competitiveness (the loss of overseas markets and the displacement of domestic production by foreign imports) in determining growth, inflation, investment, and structural unemployment.

Time, or rather timing, is critical in another respect. Although the standard sources for defense spending figures have tried to be consistent in their data definition and collection, doubt persists about their sensitivity to the distinction between the commitment and disbursement of military expenditures. Actual spending is customarily spread over several years after authorization. The Congressional Budget Office reported that for the United States, "on average, $1 appropriated for defense procurement produces only about 12 cents of actual outlays in the first year. Outlays grow to 37 cents in the second year, 30 cents in the third year, and then tail off."[74] Therefore, there is a considerable lag between appropriation and disbursement.

Legislative and administration officials, obviously aware of this lag, try to make spending commitments based on their anticipation of the state of the economy in the next few years. They are also aware that at least in the case of the United States, much of the federal government's budget and of the defense budget is "uncontrollable" in the sense that these expenditures have been mandated by prior legislation.[75] Finally, they know that appropriation decisions represent official declarations of spending intentions, from which the public will derive certain economic conclusions. Consumers, investors, and producers will try to anticipate

[74] Congressional Budget Office, *Defense Spending and the Economy*, p. 36.

[75] For the United States, military outlays have represented about three-fifths of the "controllable" portion of the federal budget subject to annual change and revision in the recent past.

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the consequences of future military spending and will adjust their behavior accordingly.

This situation poses several analytic challenges. First, analysts need to focus on the controllable portion of the defense budget and, more specifically, on the annual changes in this portion, if their intent is to determine the relatively short-run consequences of boosting or cutting military expenditures. Second, analysts ought to be wary of the government officials' overreaction to the current economic situation and their inadequate adjustment to future economic changes. According to the underconsumption theory,[76] major expansions of defense programs are apt to be approved by the legislatures of the advanced capitalist countries to combat economic downswings and stagnation. Given the lag between authorization and disbursement, however, the bulk of outlays may actually occur as the economy is in the process of recovering. Thus, the additional defense spending, originally intended to offset sagging demand, may actually overstimulate the economy. The Congressional Budget Office report mentioned earlier was concerned precisely about rising U.S. military expenditures bumping into rising civilian spending in the mid-1980s. Such an occurrence would contribute to the perpetuation of boom-and-bust cycles.

Third, analysts should ideally be able to separate the impact of the announcement of defense authorization from the impact of the actual disbursement of funds. Consumers, producers, and investors will try to anticipate the future state of the economy on the basis of the government's announced spending and revenue plans, and they will alter their behavior about consumption, production, and investment according to this anticipation (of future government deficits, business orders, inflation and interest rates, and stock prices). Therefore, defense authorizations can in themselves have an impact on the economy, a relatively immediate effect quite different from the lagged effect of actual spending. This anticipation of the future impact of defense spending may become a self-fulfilling prophecy (such as when the fear of future inflation inclines people to make current purchases and borrowing, which in turn raises prices and interest rates).

Recent longitudinal research has suggested yet another problem related to time or timing by showing that the relationship between military expenditures and economic performance is hardly stable over time. For example, Nardinelli and Ackerman found substantially different coefficients for U.S. military expenditures on U.S. GNP changes during three periods (the war years were deleted from the analysis): 1905-1916 (−0.381), 1920-1939 (−0.008), and 1946-1973 (−0.082).[77] Going back

[76] See Baran and Sweezy, *Monopoly Capital.*

[77] Nardinelli and Ackerman, "Defense Expenditures and the Survival of American Capitalism," p. 15.

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further in time, Rasler and Thompson also showed that there had been substantial fluctuations in the defense-growth trade-off for the United States: 1793-1860 (−0.029), 1866-1916 (−0.400), 1919-1940 (−0.028), and 1946-1980 (−0.605).[78] This trade-off has been absent for the United Kingdom, Japan, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany since the end of World War II, but it was present for the United Kingdom before 1945 and for France and Germany before 1914.

What can account for such over-time changes? Surely, time in itself is not the answer, or at least not the full answer. Instead, time is likely to be a proxy for such other variables as an economy's capacity to absorb defense spending,[79] its government's fiscal and monetary policies, its technological and currency advantages over trade competitors, its vulnerability to foreign threats, and the effects of developments such as global wars and recessions.[80] It would especially be useful for future research to determine how a country's economic and military status in the international system might influence the relationship between its defense spending and its economic performance. Proponents of the *dependencia* and world-system perspectives argue that the economic and military top dogs derive substantial advantages from the global economic division of labor and the feudal interaction structure. Leading military powers can extract economic concessions from their allies as a price for their "protection," and can offset somewhat the economic costs of their defense spending through this as well as other means (e.g., arms trade, exporting domestic inflation). On the other hand, other analysts contend that the hegemons are more apt to make concessions in favor of a more liberal trade regime, and that their allies are more apt to be free-riders who take advantage of the hegemons' defense spending as a collective good.[81] These alternative interpretations should be evaluated empirically in future research.[82]

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[78] Rasler and Thompson, "Longitudinal Change in Defense Burdens, Capital Formation and Economic Growth," p. 18.

[79] There may very well be a threshold or scale effect of military spending on the economy. A large, expanding, and developed economy is more likely to be able to devote a high percentage of its GNP to defense or to afford big increases in military expenditures than a small, stagnant, and underdeveloped economy.

[80] Karen A. Rasler and William R. Thompson found that global wars tended to offer occasions for raising taxes and government spending (even more so for civilian programs than for military programs). See their "War Making and State Making: Governmental Expenditures, Tax Revenues, and Global Wars," *American Political Science Review* 79, June 1985, pp. 491-507.

[81] See, for example, Smith, "Military Expenditure and Capitalism"; Szymanski, "A Reply to Friedman, Stevenson, and Zeitlin"; Walter Goldstein, "The Opportunity Costs of Acting as a Super Power: U.S. Military Strategy in the 1980s," *Journal of Peace Research* 18 (1981), pp. 241-60; and Arthur A. Stein, "The Hegemon's Dilemma: Great Britain, the United States, and the International Economic Order," *International Organization* 38, Spring 1984; pp. 355-86.

[82] The studies by Rasler and Thompson on George Modelski's theory of long cycles of world leadership are particularly relevant for this investigation.

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Impact for Which Countries?

The preceding discussion highlights the need to differentiate between countries in different economic positions. The available evidence, though not entirely consistent, supports the view that a country's development level and its resource base are important intervening variables mediating the relationship between military expenditures and economic performance.[83]

According to Deger and Smith, the multiplier of defense spending on economic growth is the greatest for the high-income developing countries (−0.274), and the smallest for the middle-income developing countries (−0.108).[84] The estimate for the low-income developing countries (−0.195) is somewhere between the estimates for the other two groups. On the other hand, the results of other researchers tend to suggest that the detrimental effect of defense spending is greater for the poorest countries. For example, Brzoska and Wulf reported that except for the "OPEC countries plus Oman," all other groups of developing countries show no significant positive correlation between defense burden and economic growth and some, in fact, indicate a significant negative relationship.[85] In the same vein, Frederiksen and Looney suggested that whereas among the less financially constrained developing countries defense burden and economic growth tend to be positively correlated and hence to be consistent with Benoit's finding, these variables tend to be negatively correlated among the more financially constrained developing countries.[86] Yet another analyst, David Lim, found that the detrimental impact of military expenditures on economic growth is most significant for countries in Africa and the Western Hemisphere.[87] For these countries, the inflow of foreign capital has not been sufficient to offset the adverse effects of defense spending on investment. In contrast, the evidence on the Asian, Middle Eastern, and Southern European countries does not indicate significant substitution effects between defense spending and economic growth.

There are also substantial cross-national variations among the developed countries. Two recent studies on the OECD economies suggest

[83] The inconsistencies are due in part to the differences among the various studies in terms of temporal coverage, model specification, and criteria for creating subsets of developing countries.

[84] Deger and Smith, "Military Expenditure and Growth in Less Developed Countries," p. 351.

[85] Brzoska and Wulf, "Rejoinder to Benoit's 'Growth and Defense in Developing Countries'—Misleading Results and Questionable Methods." See also their "Military Spending in Less Developed Countries: Boost or Burden for the Economy?" University of Hamburg, mimeograph, 1978.

[86] Frederiksen and Looney, "Defense Expenditures and Economic Growth in Developing Countries." However, because of the small size of the samples (twenty-two richer developing countries and nine poorer developing countries), the results may be unstable.

[87] Lim, "Another Look At Growth and Defense in Less Developed Countries."

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that defense burden (especially measured in terms of its rate of change) tends to be positively correlated with economic growth for the Mediterranean countries (e.g., Greece, Turkey, Portugal, Spain, Italy).[88] Conversely, these variables tend to be negatively correlated for the more mature OECD economies. As already suggested, it will be desirable for future research to investigate further whether a country's exposure to and position in the international system (e.g., dependence on foreign trade, alliance status) can help to explain these data patterns.

It would also be important to take into account where different countries tend to spend their defense money. Specifically, we should determine whether this money is actually spent domestically or used to finance foreign imports. In an analysis of the smaller NATO countries, Martin Heisler found that "the proportion of money spent on defense that stays in the domestic economy varies substantially from one country to another."[89] Roughly 95 percent of the U.S. defense budget was spent domestically, whereas only 80 percent of the defense budgets of the smaller NATO countries were spent inside their countries. The obvious implication is that the same percentage increase in military expenditures is costlier for the smaller countries than for the larger countries. Given the differences between the internal and external payouts of their defense monies, Heisler estimated that in 1978, a 3 percent increase in the defense budgets of the United States, Norway, Belgium, and Denmark would have amounted to an actual increase in economic burden of 3.2 percent, 3.8 percent, 4.0 percent, and 4.4 percent respectively.[90] The smaller countries would not be able to recapture some of their defense spending through the export of arms, and would face more adverse effects in terms of foreign debt and balance of payments deficits due to their import of foreign weapons. They would also be in a less advantageous position to benefit from the multiplier effects of defense spending on consumer demand and employment, and from the spillover effects of military research and development for civilian industries.

This line of reasoning suggests some positive effects of defense spending on the economy, though they are probably more applicable to the developed countries than to the developing countries. For the latter, attempts at import substitution for sophisticated weapons would, as sug-

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[88] Cappelen, Gleditsch, and Bjerkholt, "Military Spending and Economic Growth in the OECD Countries"; and Chan, "Defense Spending and Economic Performance."

[89] Martin O. Heisler, "Domestic Defense Expenditures: Theoretical Considerations in Comparative Perspective," paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Cincinnati, March 1982.

[90] Heisler, "Domestic Defense Expenditures," p. 15.

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gested by Benoit,[91] be detrimental to their economic performance. These attempts would divert scarce material and human resources away from civilian investment and production, thereby contributing to slower economic growth. When feasible, future research should try to distinguish between internal and external defense outlays, and to determine how this difference can affect the economic performance of the developed and developing countries.

Impact At What Opportunity Costs?

Causal explanation requires us to give attention to at least four terms: "there is first of all that which intervenes, secondly that state of affairs which is interfered with by the intervention, thirdly the actual effect of the intervention and fourthly the outcome that would have prevailed but for the intervention."[92] This is sound advice for good science as well as for good policy analysis.

However, previous research on the defense-growth relationship tends to attend only to two of the four items: the "intervention" of military spending and its actual effect. The state of affairs that is interfered with and the state of affairs that would otherwise have obtained in the absence of military spending are usually not addressed. Furthermore, the assessment of the actual effect of military spending is necessarily unsatisfactory, because it lacks a baseline for comparison. In other words, if we do not have any idea about what the economy would be like without any military spending, it would be difficult to determine and measure the impact of this spending. The actual impact is the difference between the state of affairs in a hypothetical world of no military spending and the actual state of affairs with military spending.

A sensitivity to "what if" questions in turn would lead us to stress more the idea of opportunity costs. This concept is widely known, having motivated much of the literature on the trade-off relationship between defense and welfare spending. Nevertheless, there have been few experimental attempts to show how a given increase or decrease in defense spending would produce specific changes in private saving and investment, unemployment, inflation, and economic growth.[93] It is also

[91] Benoit, "Growth and Defense in Developing Countries," p. 279.

[92] Alasdair Mcintyre, "Causality and History," in Juha Manninen and Raimo Tuomela, eds., *Essays on Explanation and Understanding* (Dordrecht, Holland: Reidel, 1976), p. 148.

[93] For some examples of attempts to move in this direction, see Dumas, "Economic Conversion, Productive Efficiency and Social Welfare"; and W. Leontief and F. Durchin, *Worldwide Economic Implications of A Limitation on Military Spending* (New York: United Nations, 1980). Two other U.N. publications have examined the relationship between military expenditures and development; see *Economic and Social Consequences of Arms Race and of Military Expenditures* (New York: United Nations, 1978); and *Disarmament and Development* (New York: United Nations, 1973).

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difficult to infer from the existing cross-national studies how the money that would be saved from a cut in defense expenditures is likely to be spent, or where the money that would be necessary to finance a boost in defense expenditures is likely to come from. It appears that for the United States at least, additional defense spending is more likely to be financed at the expense of consumption than investment, and that the savings from defense spending cuts are also more likely to go to consumption than investment.[94] The investment loss entailed by increasing defense spending may be small in absolute dollar amounts but significant in terms of its multiplier effects on demand, employment, output, and additional production capacity. In cumulative terms, the opportunity costs are even greater because the lost production capacity is foregone forever. In order to show these costs and the possible benefits of defense spending, we need realistic, explicit, and dynamic simulation models for asking "what if" questions. Moreover, sound policy assessment requires us to contrast the current or recommended levels of military expenditures with the most probable (as opposed to the optimal) alternative use of these expenditures.

Conclusion

We have probably reached a point of diminishing returns in relying on aggregate cross-national studies to inform us about the economic impact of defense spending. Instead, it appears that future research will profit more from discriminating diachronic studies of individual countries. As some analysts have already noted, the search for universal patterns applicable to all places and times is likely to be disappointing. The claims to generality based on the results of such a search tend to entail substantial costs in empirical sensitivity and specificity. Moreover, the discrepancies in these results are not easily reconciled, as they are often based on different measures and samples. An alternative and perhaps more fruitful approach would be to eschew claims of generality at the present, while recognizing the complexity of the problem. This complexity suggests the need to account explicitly for factors that can mediate the influence of defense spending on economic performance, the need to trace the reciprocal over-time interactions among the pertinent variables, and the need to show the economic consequences of alternative com-

[94] Russett, *What Price Vigilance?* chapter 5. In *Public Expenditure in Communist and Capitalist Countries,* Pryor found a significant substitution effect between defense spending and private consumption for the Soviet Union. There is also evidence of a significant substitution effect between the Soviet Union's nonpersonnel military expenditures and its total investment. See Donald W. Green and Christopher J. Higgins, *SOVMOD I: A Macroeconometric Model of the Soviet Union* (New York: Academic Press, 1977).

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binations of policies to spend on defense and to offset the potentially adverse effects of this spending. Dynamic modeling — more suitable for the developed economies with available reliable data — is necessary for identifying the multiple direct and indirect causal paths, for determining the lagged influences and feedback loops, and for experimenting with "what if" questions.

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publications received

MILITARY, NATIONAL SECURITY, AND ARMS CONTROL

Strategic Stalemate: Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in American Politics. By Michael Krepon. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984. 190 pp. $25.00. In this well-researched and sometimes thoughtful study, Michael Krepon analyzes the political environment of arms control and strategic policy within the United States, and finds discord and stalemate. The domestic impasse, says Krepon, parallels the current negotiations deadlock between the superpowers. Krepon's analysis focuses on two major domestic camps, the nuclear weapon strategists and the arms control and disarmament strategists. This typology is clear, but perhaps discounts reality a bit too much. Within the opposing domestic factions, Krepon finds both ideologues and operationalists. The nuclear arms strategists believe that continued arms development, if not superiority, is essential for managing the challenge of Soviet power. Arms controllers, on the other hand, see such policies as counterproductive. So far, says Krepon, neither side has been willing to negotiate, resulting in a stalemate that has obstructed a coherent U.S. nuclear arms strategy. Krepon maintains that the factions can overcome the stalemate by joining forces and encouraging constructive debate. When the domestic camps achieve this, and the superpowers overcome their "obsession with linkage," Krepon argues that the curtain will be drawn on stalemate and the stage will be set for progress. One problem with Krepon's plan is getting the players to adhere to the script; another lies in the script itself. Nevertheless, Krepon's study provides an often insightful and informative historical analysis of the intricacies of arms negotiations, both domestic and international. At the least, the book tries to integrate analysis of abstruse doctrinal and theoretical issues of deterrence with domestic political constraints and the foibles of the human heart.

Missiles for the Nineties: ICBMs and Strategic Policy. Edited by Barry R. Schneider, Colin S. Gray, and Keith B. Payne. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984. 169 pp. $17.50. The editors of this volume have pieced together an intelligent and comprehensive study of the many issues sur-

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rounding U.S. plans for ICBM modernization. Colin Gray and Blair Stewart extoll the virtues of a diverse mix of strategic forces. Their chapter details reasons for preserving a triad of forces as well as for diversifying the capabilities of land-based ICBMs. In his own chapter, Stewart examines methods of assuring ICBM survivability by employing hard mobile launchers and deep underground basing. Superhardening of silos and its implications on U.S. deterrence policy, as well as its effect on Soviet policy, is examined thoughtfully by Barry Schneider. Keith Payne undertakes a full examination of SDI and its implications for both offensive and defensive policy. The advantages of two new U.S. ICBMs, the Peacekeeper and the Small Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (SICBM), and the components and attributes of an "ideal" ICBM force are examined by Michael Ennis. In separate chapters, Schneider and Dan Strode examine likely Soviet attitudes toward U.S. ICBM modernization. Schneider discusses Soviet uncertainties regarding U.S. strategy — uncertainties that he argues enhance deterrence. Strode examines likely Soviet strategy in response to such modernization. Taken together, these essays, all by members of the National Institute for Public Policy, provide a comprehensive and cohesive analysis of the advantages of pursuing a full-scale ICBM modernization program for security in the 1990s. For possible disadvantages, the reader must consult other works.

From H-Bomb to Star Wars: The Politics of Strategic Decision Making. By Jonathan B. Stein. Lexington: D.C. Heath and Company, 1984. 118 pp. $23.00. Arguing that politics rather than technology drives the escalation of the arms race, Jonathan Stein provides a comparative analysis of President Truman's decision to develop the H-bomb and President Reagan's decision to launch a space-based ballistic missile defense system (BMD). Stein notes that in both cases, the weapons systems were in their embryonic stages when decisions were made to aggressively pursue full-scale programs. Stein also points to parallel evolution along military, budgetary, logistical, technical, and political lines, which diverge, at least in Stein's view, in the desirability of their actual implementation. Stein opposes SDI, but he forgives Harry Truman. Stein's description of the politics of the H-bomb decision is interesting and true to his stated theme, though not particularly original. Yet, there are three serious problems with this short book. First, the section on strategic defense appears to be less an effort to analyze the interplay of politics and technology than a partisan attack on the Reagan administration's arms control and defense policies. Second, except for the novice, no one takes seriously the doctrine of technological determinism these days; the entire book is built on a straw. And third, the second part of the volume too often illustrates facile un-

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derstanding. At one point, Stein tells us that the strategic debate since 1981 has divided along ideological lines, with conservatives for space defense and liberals for MAD (p. 58). And so what do Harold Brown, Les Aspin, Alexander Haig, and Sam Nunn support, to name but a few who demonstrate the disutility of Stein's analysis? Later we are told that despite President Reagan's antipathy to MAD, "strategic emphasis is not being shifted immediately away from offensive weapons production supportive of MAD" (p. 77). Is Stein the only one who does not realize that MAD calls for countervalue targeting, and that the posture that is integral to current strategic modernization programs does not? What is one to say about a book on strategic military affairs that seems to make no distinction between strategies of deterrence through societal punishment and deterrence through military denial?

Assured Survival: Putting the Star Wars Defense in Perspective. By Ben Bova. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1984. 343 pp. $15.95. A sugar-coated, romantic advocacy of strategic defense. Bova, a former aerospace industry executive, oddly combines scientific-technical synopsis, anecdotal political gossip, and Boy-Scoutish futurology into a book that is all over the place and nowhere in particular at the same time. Bova argues that new technologies are here that allow mankind to make war "impossible," that tend to encourage "warfare suppression." He suggests that, having made war impossible, mankind can more easily evolve politically and socially into a global community. "If the trend of history continues," he assures the reader (p. 279), "as technology makes the world smaller and ties the nations of the globe together in an ever-tighter interdependency, national governments will gradually give way to multinational arrangements." Bova twice commits the sin of technological determinism, arguing that it is weapons that create or suppress the chances of war, not the human activity of politics, and that technology has foreordained political integration, not been affected by the human activity of politics.

The Evolution of Amerian Strategic Doctrine: Paul H. Nitze and the Soviet Challenge. By Steven L. Rearden. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984. 131 pp. $15.00. **Nuclear Past, Nuclear Present: Hiroshima, Nagasaki and Contemporary Strategy.** By Ian Clark. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985. 146 pp. $15.00. **A Strategy for Terminating a Nuclear War.** By Clark C. Abt. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985. 253 pp. $19.50. These three studies from Westview Press offer an array of interesting views of the evolution of contemporary U.S. nuclear strategy. Steven L. Rearden effectively uses Paul Nitze's career to examine the

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development of U.S. strategic policy prior and subsequent to NSC68. Despite major alterations in the international strategic scenario since the formulation of that influential policy paper in 1950, Nitze has held firm to its tenets. By tracing Nitze's involvement in various administrations since Truman, Rearden paints an intriguing picture of the intricacies of policy development and negotiation. Although this study, one in a series on national security issues from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, is fairly brief, it provides a comprehensive look at Nitze's values, influence, and achievements. It is about time that the career of a man whose impact on strategic doctrine has spanned four decades — and continues today — has been accorded serious study.

In *Nuclear Past, Nuclear Present,* Ian Clark also traces and evaluates the progression of U.S. nuclear strategy. His analysis begins with the 1945 decisions to drop Little Boy and Fat Man on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Arguing that the decision to *drop* the bombs was made when the U.S. decided to *build* the bombs, Clark indicts the "haphazard development" of contemporary nuclear strategy. Clark maintains that Truman's decisions to drop the two bombs were essentially made for him. He also argues that the general attitude that the A-bomb was the "winning weapon" has never diminished, even in the face of technological change and the current arms race. Clark believes that current U.S. nuclear strategy still reflects that of the Truman administration, which he feels was disastrous. To remedy this, he calls for the revamping of the "decision-making structure" and the banishment of our "mistaken impressions" of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Nuclear weapons did not achieve victory in 1945, he argues, nor can they produce it today. Clark provides an informative analysis of the decisions and circumstances surrounding Hiroshima and Nagasaki. His conclusions, however, are tenuous at best.

Clark C. Abt has developed exactly what his title suggests — a strategy for terminating nuclear war. He terms his revolutionary strategy RIACTE (Retaliatory Invasion and Cites Targeting Exclusion). To demonstrate the credibility of his idea, Abt describes the likely reactions of the superpowers to a specific crisis scenario without RIACTE. He then explains the merits of his counterforce retaliatory strategy, and concludes by describing the scenario again, but this time with world leaders enlightened by the RIACTE strategy. Of course, RIACTE saves the day. Abt provides a forum for debate and questions at the end of the book. The questions, posed by prominent colleagues, are direct and troubling; Abt struggles to find convincing answers. The central paradoxes of the nuclear age are not solved here, but are assumed away for the sake of a grand design. Nevertheless,

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even if analytically frail in places, the book is stimulating and, in many ways, refreshingly unconventional. Finally, thinking about terminating the unthinkable strikes this reviewer as a project more meritorious than either thinking about the unthinkable or not thinking at all.

Moral Principles and Nuclear Weapons. By Douglas P. Lackey. Totowa, N.J.: Rowan and Allanheld, 1984. 265 pp. $28.95. **Objections to Nuclear Defence.** Edited by Nigel Blake and Kay Pole. Boston, Mass.: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984. 187 pp. $11.95 (paper). **The Bishops and Nuclear Weapons: The Catholic Pastoral Letter on War and Peace.** By James E. Dougherty. Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1984. 255 pp. $22.50. **Just War Theory in the Nuclear Age.** Edited by John D. Jones and Marc F. Griesbach. Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1985. 214 pp. $10.75 (paper). These four discussions of morality and nuclear weapons demonstrate both the diversity of views and the diversity of logical coherence among those scholars who have recently turned their attention to these subjects. The first two volumes oscillate between the fantastically naive and the politically procrustean, each swing bringing ever greater alarm to the sober, open-minded reader. The next two, on the other hand, one of them written by one of the original scholarly analysts of arms control, have an air of erudition, balance, and maturity. Douglas Lackey cursorily examines concepts of the common good, human rights, and justice and, relating them to current nuclear weapons policy (and hand guns), concludes that nuclear deterrence is "morally irresponsible." Complete nuclear disarmament (CND) is a moral necessity. If the Russians do not agree, we should undertake "unilateral internationalization" of atomic weapons, turning over our arsenal to the United Nations. Actually, there is a lot less philosophy in this book than discussions of nuclear weapons strategy and deterrence. One gets the distinct impression that the author's views came first, the philosophy second.

Nigel Blake and Kay Pole edited the next, rather annoying, survey of British philosophers' objections to nuclear weapons. The philosophers' topics range from the inherent evil and wickedness of nuclear arms and deterrence to a plea for nuclear peace and government "by the people." Anthony Kenny, Michael Dummett and Roger Ruston assert the evils and perils of nuclear weapons and the inevitable "slaughter" they will bring about. John Krige and Kate Soper demonize the "experts" in their individual chapters — a popular pastime for leftist *philosophes* these days. Bernard Williams illustrates the consequences of a confrontation between moralists and strategists, and though reaching decidedly dovish positions

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by most measures, this essay is the least hysterical of the bunch. Deterrence protagonists are divided into crusaders and causists by Susan Khin Zaw, and Marxist theory is used by Rip Bulkeley to explain (away) deterrence. Andrew Bolsey concludes the survey by advocating "maxi-part" democracy, whatever that is.

Providing a breath of very fresh air, James Dougherty has constructed an intelligent, thoughtful, and well-researched analysis of the Catholic Pastoral Letter. He builds the framework of his study by providing a comprehensive history of Western Christian thought on war and peace and an insightful analysis of recent shifts in attitude of the American Catholic hierarchy toward U.S. policy. He then analyzes the pastoral letter itself; the result is a balanced description of the Bishops' viewpoint as well as a reasonable and sophisticated portrait of U.S. strategic requirements and policy. Dougherty makes his differences with the Bishops clear, but he respects their views and, more important, the theological tradition from which they flow. Unlike the other authors noted here, Dougherty knows that the morality of the individual and the morality of the state are not on the same plane. He also has the discipline and integrity not to allow emotions to cloud judgment of subjects, political and strategic.

Dougherty is one of the four major contributors to John D. Jones and Marc Griesbach's compilation of presentations and discussions at a just war symposium at Marquette University in 1983. Each presentation is accompanied by critical commentary and a transcript of the debate that followed the presentation. This format allows for a comprehensive survey of the current debate surrounding just war and nuclear weapons. Joseph Boyle discusses the morality of war in the context of personal morality, while Griesbach responds by arguing that the morality of war should be assessed within political, not personal, philosophy. Dougherty analyzes the history and prospects for arms control and deterrence with Kenneth Farmer offering a response. Discussing the positions of "deterrence only" and "deterrence plus," Wiliam O'Brien outlines a posture for defense and deterrence that accords with the principles of just war. Alternatives and complements to deterrence are offered by George Weigel in the concluding chapter. This collection provides a diverse yet balanced and thoughtful study of the differing argumens posed by just war debaters.

The Lackey book demonstrates that any source of sacred legitimacy may be pressed into the service of political viewpoints. The Blake and Pole volume, aside from providing a mirror of the views of the British CND movement, illustrates the return of the Oxford Syndrome of 1933. The

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Dougherty volume shows that an intelligent treatment of this important topic is still possible, albeit rare. Jones and Griesbach's compilation offers a fair examination of the wide array of arguments regarding just war theory and nuclear weapons.

The Arms Race At A Time of Decision. Edited by Joseph Rotblat and Alessandro Pascolini. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984. 291 pp. $30.00. **Armed Peace: The Search for World Security.** Edited by Josephine O'Connor Howe. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985. 191 pp. $25.00. Both books have the same publisher. Both discuss the arms race. One book wants the race to end; the other sees a need for it to continue, at least for a while. Predictably, the Rotblat and Pascolini collection of the annals of Pugwash conferences in 1983 contains numerous intelligent yet emotional pleas by concerned scientists around the world for arms reduction and resumed negotiations. Thirty-six contributors discuss space militarization, the strategic nuclear arms race, security in Europe, problems of regional security, and security-related Third World problems. Their discussions are interesting and informative, but their conclusions are stubbornly predictable. Though the scientific aspects of the book are useful, the political and strategic discussions lack balance.

Josephine O'Connor Howe's survey, edited for the British Council for Arms Control, provides a comprehensive and even analysis of the Palme Commission's conclusions in its 1982 report *Common Security.* Sir Hugh Beach presents his reaction to the commission's report on security in Europe. The report's recommendations for strategic arms control are assessed by Lawrence Freedman. Different approaches to chemical arms control are evaluated by J.P. Perry Robinson, while John Edmonds discusses proliferation and test bans. By comparing the outcomes of the Palme Commission and a similar group chaired by Willy Brandt in the 1970s, Neville Brown makes a case for yet another commission to study the ecological and environmental aspects of nuclear arms. Trade and conversion of arms for developmental purposes is analyzed by Peter Blomley. Concluding the book, Alan James evaluates different options for peace-keeping as suggested in the Palme report. For the most part, Howe has assembled a balanced and well-researched analysis of the different aspects of the Palme Commission report.

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THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

All Fall Down: America's Tragic Encounter with Iran. By Gary Sick. New York: Random House, 1985. 366 pp. $19.95. Until the publication of this book, Gary Sick was something of a footnote in U.S. diplomatic history — the man in the Carter administration who had basic responsibility for Iran at a time of great upheavel. With the publication of *All Fall Down,* Sick may have boosted his place in history a good bit. The volume combines personal experience (for which there is never an adequate substitute), erudition (Sick is a Columbia Ph.D. in political science), and realism (he was also a captain in the U.S. Navy), ultimately yielding a masterful blend of description, analysis, and broader historical commentary. The story of America's encounter with Iran sizzles with drama at every turn, and the drama is well reflected in this volume. But Sick aspired to do more, to ask whether status quo, bureaucratized governments such as that of the United States have the slightest chance to understand and deal with renegade nations in the throes of religious and revolutionary euphoria. This book has treasure for Iranian experts, for those interested generally in decision making and bureaucratic politics, for those studying the Carter administration, and for those who just enjoy a well-styled narrative.

American Hostages in Iran: The Conduct of a Crisis. Edited by Paul H. Kreisberg. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985. 443 pp. $25.00. For 444 days, fifty-two Americans were held hostage in Iran while intense negotiations for their release took place. This book tells the story of these negotiations. Told by the participants rather than by policy makers at the highest levels, it examines the crisis through the eyes of those responsible for day-to-day negotiations, analyzing developments, and preparing policy recommendations. The authors/participants attempt to draw lessons from the crisis, which they consider to be a model of crises of "the future." The book contains a wealth of heretofore unpublished material, and, together with Gary Sick's volume *All Fall Down* reviewed above, scholars now have much of the detail they need to understand the crisis. But the book also sheds light on the attitudes of those responsible for the Carter administration's maladroit handling of the affair, notably Warren Christopher and Harold Saunders. There is no contrition here, and one gets the feeling that nearly all the authors, especially Christopher, would change virtually nothing in their basic conduct if they had it to do again. These authors will draw certain lessons; others will draw different ones. Finally, it is worth noting the two commentaries by nonparticipants that

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close the volume, the most impressive of which is by the former Democratic senator and governor from Connecticut, Abraham A. Ribicoff.

Palestinian Leadership on the West Bank: The Changing Role of the Mayors Under Jordan and Israel. By Moshe Ma'oz. Totowa, N.J.: Frank Case and Company, Ltd., 1985. 217 pp. $32.50 ($15.00, paper). Clearly the most sophisticated, most useful, most scholarly, and most comprehensive treatment of the political sociology of the West Bank available in the English language. Chapter one is an overview of Palestinian nationalism concentrating on the West Bank. Chapters two and three examine the evolution of Arab municipal government under the Ottomans, the British, and especially the Jordanians. Chapters four and five discuss aspects of Israeli policy in the West Bank between June 1967 and October 1973. Chapter six charts the turbulent, fluid and oft-misunderstood relationship between the politics of the West Bank and the PLO between 1967 and 1976. Chapters seven and eight concentrate on the ascendancy of the "nationalist mayors" and their collision with Likud rule in Israel. Chapter nine details the last epoch in Israeli-Palestinian relations on the West Bank before the Israeli invasion of Lebanon — Sharon's "Iron Hand" policy. Although written by an Israeli, this volume is ideologically neutral; nowhere does wishful thinking or dissolute pessimism stain the analysis. Ma'oz has made extensive use not only of Hebrew and Arabic press materials, but also of unpublished archival sources, particularly on the period of Jordanian rule. The novice may find the detail provided here to be excessive; the scholar and policy maker should find it indispensable.

Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World. By R. Hrair Dekmejian. Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1985. 249 pp. $26.00 ($12.95, paper). This book examines the historical roots and patterns of Islamic resurgence and its manifestations in the crisis milieu of present day Arab society. Focusing on political Islam and its revolutionary implications in the Arab world, Dekmejian analyzes the catalysts, indices, and responses of Islamic fundamentalism. The central theme is that crises occurring throughout history have given shape to the ongoing dialectic between Islam and its social-economic-political environment, leading to cyclical Islamic revivals. The current resurgence is a culturally nativist response to the decline of Ottoman and Persian power in the face of European imperialism. To analyze the contemporary Islamic crisis setting, Dekmejian establishes a framework consisting of the crisis of spirit (identity and culture), the crisis of legitimacy, elite misrule, military impotence, and class conflict. The framework tries to combine Western theories of crisis with Islamists' own diagnostic tools. Next, Dekmejian

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undertakes case studies of the Islamic resurgence in the Arab world, finding variety wherever he looks. Finally, he analyzes the consequences and prospects of Islamic fundamentalism, finding the most relevant parameter of prognosis in the profound and pervasive social crisis of the Arab world. The book has a glossary, a useful bibliography, and a curious appendix that typologizes Islamic fundamentalist organizations by use of statistics, when common sense and English would have done fine. The numbers we do not need, but the extensive description of over ninety fundamentalist groups is certainly welcome.

Islam: The Religious and Political Life of a World Community. Edited by Marjorie Kelly. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984. 321 pp. $39.95 ($16.95, paper). Fourteen mostly sound essays that together form a good introduction to Islamic civilization. The editor avers that the contributors were chosen not only for their scholarship but also for their ability to write for the nonexpert, and in this, the book succeeds admirably. The diversity and dynamism of Islam are given proper due, as is the modern dilemma of coping with the challenges of secular Western civilization. Despite the introductory character of the effort, "intermediate" students of Islam, the Arab world and the Middle East may gain special insight by attending to John O. Voll's treatment of Muslim responses to colonialism, and to Ann Elizabeth Mayer's essay on Islamic law.

The Foreign Policies of Arab States. By Bahgat Korany and Ali E. Hillal Dessouki. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press; Egypt: The American University in Cairo Press, 1984. 354 pp. $35.00 ($15.95, paper). Intended to fill the void on the subject, this volume examines Arab foreign policies, focusing on the period from 1970 to 1980. Six contributors, along with two main authors, treat selected individual Arab actors including the PLO which, as a non-state actor, does not have a foreign policy in the traditional sense. There are also a few survey essays looking at the region as a whole. The authors established an analytical framework for the book that includes consideration of domestic environment, foreign-policy orientation, decision-making processes, and foreign-policy behavior. Korany and Dessouki contend that the interaction between existing systemic structures and both national capabilities and national dispositions determine a country's foreign policy and its degree of success. According to Dessouki, for example, intrasystemic pressures lessened in the 1970s as Egypt declined as the dominant power in the region, and a more multipower pattern emerged. However, pressures from the larger regional setting intensified. These supposedly included an "expansionist" Israel in the "West" and both an Islamic revolutionary government in Iran and a deterioration of intersec-

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tarian relations in the "East." Faced with these threats, Arab governments remained divided in their preoccupations, indecisive in their behavior, and dependent on one superpower or the other. To its credit, the book is structurally coherent thanks to the imposition of an analytical framework, and there is much good *descriptive* writing about the institutional setting of Arab foreign policies. But the sophistication of the analysis is uneven, the coverage of countries is spotty, and the essay on the PLO, less an analysis than an advertisement, is strewn with error. The author, Mohamed E. Selim, takes at face value a PLO propaganda claim that PLO forces in Lebanon in 1982 killed 3,500 Israeli soldiers and wounded 20,000 more (p. 207). The main authors let pass this vivid example of a preference for warm self-delusion over cool objectivity.

The Origins of the Arab-Israeli Wars. By Ritchie Ovendale. London and New York: Longman, 1984. 232 pp. $14.95 (paper). An attempt, honest but uneven, by a British academician to present the origins of the Arab-Israeli wars in 200 pages of text. The books dwells very heavily on the period between World War I and the 1948-49 war. Subsequent sections, on the Suez War of 1956, the June War of 1967, the War of Attrition, the October 1973 War, are cursory and add nothing to existing literature. The bulk of the historical section, based on secondary sources, is speckled with summary judgments about complex and contested issues, and emphasizes rather too much Zionist "intrigues" and the influence of American Zionists on U.S. policies in the Truman administration. The bulk of the analysis is fair and intelligent, however. As a supplementary text for courses on Middle East politics and history, the volume is of some use, but other texts that do not stop in 1973 do as well or better. For advanced scholars, Ovendale offers little.

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

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Charles Powers is assistant professor of sociology, Indiana University. He has published several articles on Pareto in *Sociological Theory* and *Contemporary Sociology*, among other journals.

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
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